Case Centre resources

This case study focuses on the phenomenon of pens’ blackout in Brazil where efforts to reduce corruption and increase the authority of control bodies have caused civil servants to avoid taking decisions for fear of being penalised. The case can be used to teach concepts such as how laws and control institutions can backfire by deterring honest civil servants; the role of legal uncertainty and audit; the relationship between executive and control authorities; and how to protect and promote discretion and innovation in the public service.

In June 2022, four Senators, two Republican and two Democrat, gathered in the basement of the US Senate to negotiate the details of what they hoped would become the US’s first national gun safety legislation in decades. Such bipartisan negotiations had long seemed impossible. Debates of gun-related legislation had historically been dominated by the influential National Rifle Association (NRA), which vehemently defended the right to bear arms through a large grassroots base and direct pressure on politicians. Gun safety advocates, on the other hand, had failed to convince politicians to support their mission, struggling to amass enough funding and grassroots support to influence political campaigns – even when the majority of Americans supported stricter gun laws. But gradually over the 2010s, a few large gun-safety activist groups emerged and pursued new strategies, and by the 2020s, they were seeing some political victories at the local and state level.

This had given hope to Democrat Senator Chris Murphy who had supported gun safety since 2012. But now his colleague, Republican Senator John Cornyn, threatened to walk away from the negotiations over the inclusion of ‘red flag laws’, a tool to remove guns from individuals deemed to be at extreme risk to themselves or others. The provision was championed by gun safety groups and derided by the NRA. Murphy did not want to lose this potential moment for change, and he had to figure out if he could hold the coalition together.

In November 2012, in the aftermath of the Egyptian revolution, opposition leader Mohamed ElBaradei faced a pivotal decision on his role in supporting the new democratically elected President Mohamed Morsi, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. Though ElBaradei and other liberal and secular figures had previously supported the Brotherhood during the revolution, they were wary of the Brotherhood’s Islamist agenda. Their primary concern was the makeup of the constituent assembly responsible for drafting Egypt's new constitution, which they believed failed to represent Egypt’s diversity. Many liberal figures were threatening to boycott the assembly in protest. 

With the assembly on the brink of collapse, Morsi sought dialogue with ElBaradei and other opposition figures to reach a consensus on the constitution draft. However, ElBaradei doubted the sincerity of Morsi’s intention to form a more representative assembly. Accepting Morsi's olive branch would symbolically legitimize his government and conservative agenda, while refusing could delay constitution drafting, leaving Morsi with unchecked powers and the country vulnerable to a military takeover. As fault lines deepened between Islamists and secularists, ElBaradei grappled with the decision to accept the invitation.