Tom Simpson

Tom Simpson

Associate Professor of Philosophy and Public Policy

Tom Simpson is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Public Policy at the Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford, and a Senior Research Fellow at Wadham College. He is an AHRC/BBC Radio 3 New Generation Thinker for 2017. 

He works particularly on trust, and issues at the intersection of technology and security. His research was recently profiled by the ABC. During this academic year, he is convening a series of events on Aspects of Conservatism.

He joined the School from Cambridge, where he was a Research Fellow at Sidney Sussex College, and was also educated (BA, MPhil, PhD).

Between degrees he was an officer with the Royal Marines Commandos for 5 years. He served in Northern Ireland; Baghdad, Iraq; and Helmand Province, Afghanistan. The academic life is undoubtedly a privilege, but he remains conflicted about its sedentary nature.

Recent publications

Forthcoming. Trust, Belief and the Second PersonalAustralasian Journal of Philosophy
2017. The Impossibility of Republican FreedomPhilosophy and Public Affairs 45(1): 27-53
2017. Trust and Evidence. In The Philosophy of Trust, ed. P. Faulkner and T. Simpson,
pp. 177-94. Oxford University Press
2016. Just War and Robots' Killings (with V. Müller) Philosophical Quarterly 66(263): 302-22


+44 (0)1865 614 346


I work on trust, both its theory and practical applications. I also work on questions thrown up by information and computing technologies; on the ethics of war; and especially about the intersection of these. 


Trust raises important theoretical questions. These include: What is trust? When is trust justified? Under what conditions do we know by trusting others? How should trust be restored when broken? The central thought I am pursuing is that moral commitment is one of the central bases for rational trust. Shared moral norms really are glue that holds society together. 
In more detail, I have views on the answers to at least the first two of these questions. It seems to me that the term ‘trust’ permissibly refers to a variety of importantly differently attitudes, and indeed sometimes to actions, but which nonetheless have shared features. A consequence is that the prospects of success for a reductive analysis of trust are slim. It is an interesting question whether there is an explanation for the plurality of forms of trust, and what it is they have (roughly) in common. I give a genealogical explanation and argue the above claims in my (2012a). Further, there is a kind of trust—which I call ‘cognitive trust’—which is justified only if there is evidence for trustworthiness. This opposes the claim that trust is essentially or characteristically a matter of going beyond the evidence (Forthcoming). Reasons for rational trust may derive from a person’s moral character (see 2013). 
I am working towards an answer to the third question: if a hearer's rational trust of a speaker suffices for knowledge of her sincerity, this may be a basis for knowledge of her epistemic authority. These jointly suffice for knowledge of what the speaker testifies to. (Early thoughts on the interrelation of practical and epistemic reasons regarding sincerity are in 2012c; also ms. under review).

Trust applied

Trust is vital in many areas of life. So a theoretical treatment is preparatory to practical reflection. So far I have applied this work on trust in most detail to the Internet. In my doctoral research I asked whether it is rational to place trust online, and how can the Internet be built to facilitate rational trust and encourage trustworthiness. I concluded that the search for trust online was urgent and important. I examined ways in which rational trust can be achieved, both technological and social. Telepresence and reputation systems are examples of the former. Institutions and regulatory intervention are examples of the latter. See (2011b, 2012b, 2014b, Forthcoming) for some of the so-far published results. 
I have worked on parallel questions regarding another vital and contemporary area of life, viz. banking. How can banks and the finance sector be designed, regulated and influenced in such a way as to ensure trustworthiness, and to facilitate rational trust? This work started under a €1m, 5 year project entitled Trusting Banks, funded by the NWO (Dutch Research Council), supporting collaboration between Groningen and Cambridge and led by Prof Boudewijn de Bruin and Prof Alex Oliver. Specifically, I am interested in issues around payment structures and the effects on individual bankers’ motivation.
Trust also has application to the philosophy of religion. Trust seems to be characteristic of the life of faith. Further, I see no in principle reason why testimony may not make religious knowledge available. I have initial work developing these claims (2015). 


My first-hand experience of war has led to an interest in military ethics. So far my published work has addressed ethical questions around the military use of modern technologies – robots as well as non-autonomous platforms operated at a distance (see 2011a, Forthcoming), and cyber-attacks (2014a). See also the Impact tab for accompanying work. I have a larger project developing some non-standard views about the moral value of the warrior ideal, which has implications for the relations between the military, the state and civil society. 


Edited volume

2017The Philosophy of Trust, ed. P. Faulkner and T. Simpson. Oxford: Oxford University Press


Articles & book chapters

Forthcoming. Trust, Belief and the Second Personal. Australasian Journal of Philosophy

2017. The Impossibility of Republican Freedom. Philosophy and Public Affairs 45(1): 27-53

2017. Trust and Evidence. In The Philosophy of Trust, ed. P. Faulkner and T. Simpson, pp. 177-94. Oxford: Oxford University Press

2017. Telepresence and Trust: A Speech-Act Theory of Mediated Communication. Philosophy and Technology 30(4): 443-459

French translation forthcoming in La confiance à l'ère numérique, ed. J. Domenicucci and M. Douehi, Editions Berger-Levrault and Editions Rue d'Ulm (2017)

2016. _____ and Vincent C. Müller. Just War and Robots' Killings. Philosophical Quarterly 66(263): 302-22

2016. The Morality of Unconventional Force. In Ethics and the Future of Spying: Technology, National Security and Intelligence Collection, ed. J. Galliott and W. Reed, pp. 132-42. London: Routledge 

2015. Testimony in John's Gospel: The Puzzle of 5:31 and 8:14. Tyndale Bulletin 65(1): 101-18

2014. Computing and the Search for Trust. In Dialogues: Trust, Computing and Society, ed. R. Harper, pp. 95-119. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

2014. The Wrong in Cyberattacks. In Ethics of Information Warfare, ed. L. Floridi and M. Taddeo, pp. 141-154. London: Springer

2013. Trustworthiness and Moral Character. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16(3): 543-57

2012. What is Trust? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93(4): 550-69

2012. Evaluating Google as an Epistemic Tool. Metaphilosophy 43(4): 426-45. 

Reprinted in Philosophical Engineering: Toward a Philosophy of the Web, ed. A. Monin and H. Halpin, 97-115. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell (2014)

2012. Testimony and Sincerity. Ratio 25(1): 79-92

2011. Robots, Trust and War. Philosophy and Technology 24(3): 325-37

2011. e-Trust and Reputation. Ethics and Information Technology 13(1): 29-38


Book reviews & symposia

2015. Cécile Fabre and Seth Lazar (eds), The Morality of Defensive WarPhilosophical Quarterly 65(260): 590-93

2015. Did Marine A do wrong? On Biggar's Lethal Intentions. Studies in Christian Ethics 28(3): 287-91

2013b. Critical Notice of Benjamin McMyler, Testimony, Trust, & Authority and Paul Faulkner, Knowledge on TrustMind 122(485): 305-11



Please email me for the published version if required.