A window into Syria’s caretaker government

After the fall of the Assad regime, a caretaker government was hastily formed to fill the power gap.

It promised a more permanent “interim” cabinet but it has struggled with several challenges, from legitimacy to governance capacity, economic stability to geopolitical positioning.  

A government’s capacity to tackle such challenges hinges on its members. We analysed the backgrounds of 21 caretaker government ministers and 154 senior appointees, using data collected between 8 December 2024 and 20 February 2025, drawing on materials such as official statements and investigative reports. Our analysis of the composition of the caretaker government and its senior appointments shows several notable patterns.  

Qualification and education levels could mean technocratic limitation  

First, most caretaker government ministers hold undergraduate qualifications from Syrian institutions, while six pursued postgraduate studies (four from abroad). However, none appear to have attended top-tier universities—according to global rankings—and the educational backgrounds of three ministers remain unknown. Such limited insight into their academic backgrounds might raise questions about the practical competencies they bring, particularly to technical roles such as health, energy, and economics, which demand specialised knowledge and technical proficiency.  

Advanced credentials alone don’t guarantee effective governance if ministers lack broader institutional experience. Notably, none of the ministers have served in established government bodies or formal political institutions outside the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG), a de facto state which controlled much of northwest Syria, often regarded as an administrative extension of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Islamist militant group whose advance on Aleppo precipitated the fall of the Assad regime.  

Political affiliations  

One barometer of the caretaker government’s independence from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham is the extent of its leaders’ affiliations with the Syrian Salvation Government, a de facto state which controlled much of northwest Syria. Another barometer is independence from other opposition military factions. 

According to our data, 12 ministers have been affiliated with the Syrian Salvation Government. By contrast, the current leadership seems more open to sharing power at lower levels with individuals unaffiliated with the SSG, with 138 senior appointees meeting that criteria. Although a varied base can broaden the government’s perspective and enhance its legitimacy, the strong Hayat Tahrir al-Sham  presence among ministers raises questions about the caretaker government’s autonomy and policy latitude.  

When it comes to military affiliation, the figures reveal a considerable “unknown” category, especially among senior appointees. Although a substantial portion of appointees have unknown military backgrounds, the confirmed military affiliations among some ministers nevertheless highlight the continued influence of armed groups within Syria’s political landscape. While a military background need not preclude effective governance, it points to the enduring role of armed actors in Syria’s policy and political realms. Taken together, these affiliations shape the internal dynamics of the caretaker government and external perceptions of legitimacy, particularly as it attempts to chart a transitional path in a deeply fragmented society.    

The gap on gender representation  

One clear measure of inclusivity is the degree to which women occupy leadership positions. In the caretaker government, the numbers are stark: 100% of ministers are male. Among senior appointees, women account for only around 8%.      

This gender gap raises concerns over the breadth of perspectives guiding Syria’s transitional governance. When women are absent or underrepresented at the highest levels, policy discussions risk overlooking issues that often affect half the population, which can impede the caretaker government’s ability to respond effectively to the country's complex social and economic challenges and weaken its support among women.  

Religion, age and geographic disparities  

Regarding religious inclusivity, the caretaker government reveals limited variety: all 21 ministers are Muslim—primarily Sunni, with five of unknown sects. Senior appointments are similarly homogeneous, with only three Christians and one Druze among 154 officials.       

Such a narrow representation of Syria’s heterogeneous society, raises questions about the caretaker government’s ability to represent all groups in governing the country. If such disparities persist, they may trigger unrest as minorities feel excluded from decision-making.  

The caretaker government leadership is noticeably young, indicating a generational shift in how governance is approached in new Syria. The 14 ministers with known birth dates have an average age of 45.4 years, compared to 56.3 years in Assad’s last cabinet. The decade-plus difference might be viewed as both a risk and an opportunity. While age can reflect experience, younger generations may bring a fresh perspective. However, it remains to be seen how effectively this translates into policy formation and governance.

Finally, in terms of geographic representation, areas historically controlled by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham are over-represented in the cabinet at the expense of other governorates—especially Latakia, Tartous, As-Suwayda, and Damascus, which were under the regime’s control before its fall. The underrepresentation extends beyond formerly regime-held areas to include areas in Raqqa and parts of Deir Ezzor which are currently controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a Kurdish-led coalition of U.S.-backed left-wing ethnic militias and rebel groups which recently formed a deal with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham to form a government.    

A transparent government?  

Transparency is a cornerstone of effective governance, yet our findings reveal notable gaps in information about new government officials. We classified the information relating to an official as “inaccessible” whenever the key details of the date of birth, education, geographical origin, and religion or sect were all missing. According to our data, three ministers and nearly half of senior appointees lack this essential information, underscoring the limited societal notability of these individuals and raising questions about transparency and the criteria for their appointment.   

What comes next?  

The significant gaps in representation identified in this article can, in part, be excused due to the extraordinary circumstances under which the appointments were made, attempting to fill a power vacuum created following Assad’s downfall.   

But as Syria approaches the transition to a new interim government, which has been in the making for weeks now, Syrians and the international community may not look at the new appointments leniently if critical representation gaps persist.   

Will loyalty eclipse competence, or will we see a stronger focus on experience and technocratic capacity? Will there be improvements in transparency and a better balance in representation, be it geographically, religiously, or in terms of gender? Will traditional power structures persist, with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and its old guards continuing to dominate, or will a more inclusive, more technocratic government emerge?