We need a transformative approach to border security

In the wake of the Assad regime’s fall in Syria, many Western governments are quick to point to the need for Syrian refugees to return to their home country. 

Syrians are among the five nationalities that made up two thirds of the arrivals of people on small boats in the UK between 2018 and 31st March 2024. Most of them are victims or witnesses of ruthless violence not only in their home country, but also along the journey to what is hoped to be a better future. 

More than 33,000 people have now crossed the English Channel this year. At least 199 migrants have now lost their lives attempting this crossing since 2018, with 2024 marking the deadliest year on record. 

These numbers represent a dual crisis: one rooted in the desperation of migrants fleeing conflict, oppression, and economic hardship. And another one driven by the proliferation of smuggling networks that exploit this desperation for profit. 

These criminal organisations have become more professionalised, and the scale of their operations is mind blowing: according to estimates, smuggling networks can earn more than a million US dollars a month. 

The UK’s new Border Security Command must tackle smuggling networks

The establishment of the Border Security Command in July 2024 represents a significant shift in UK strategy. With a focus on dismantling smuggling networks responsible for illegal Channel crossings, it aims to deliver stronger border security. It emphasises intelligence-sharing, enforcement, and coordination across agencies like MI5, the Border Force, the National Crime Agency, and European law enforcement partners. 

While this initiative holds promise, it also poses risks if not carefully executed. Focusing on smuggling gangs presents an opportunity to disrupt illegal activities—but only if our efforts extend beyond surface-level interventions.

Targeting smugglers without addressing the broader network won’t work. For one, smuggling groups are easily replaced by others. Currently, gangs organised by Iraqi Kurds, Iranian Kurds and Albanians offer their services to those who want to cross. They operate separately but also cooperate if it brings profit. As long as demand stays high, they can easily identify new business partners if one of them is dismantled.

Smugglers themselves are often not the most powerful players in these networks. The true power lies with brokers who operate far from the front lines. These individuals frequently reside in origin countries like Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, or Albania, or in Western European nations such as the UK or Germany. Intelligence-sharing, as envisioned by the Border Security Command, must focus on these actors, as dismantling their operations can have a ripple effect across the entire network. 

Take, for instance, Iraqi Kurdish groups, involved in smuggling. Many of their leaders are based in Europe but maintain strong ties to Iraqi Kurdistan, where some profits from smuggling are reinvested in real estate or other ventures.

Targeting shared routes for people, weapon and drug smuggling 

The routes, that is, the infrastructure and the expertise used for one form of smuggling often support multiple illicit activities. This pattern is not unique to the UK. My research shows that, in Colombia, for example, the same routes facilitate the smuggling of gasoline, people, and cocaine. In Libya, contraband, weapons, people, and cigarettes are trafficked along overlapping paths. Likewise, during my fieldwork in northern Iraq, I consistently encountered discussions of how people smuggling intersects with human trafficking, oil smuggling and weapons trafficking, demonstrating how the know-how developed in one illicit supply chain can easily be applied to another.

People smuggling into the UK often intersects with other forms of organised crime, including human trafficking, and modern slavery. For instance, Albanian groups have been known to coerce smuggled individuals into working on illegal cannabis farms. Similarly, there are reportedly cases of boats mixing human cargo with drugs. Some smugglers are believed to reinvest their profits into other illicit economies, such as drug and arms trafficking. 

By curbing one transnational threat, people smuggling, we might easily catalyse another one. Smugglers might engage in the trafficking of drugs such as cocaine, heroin, or synthetic drugs like Captagon, which is increasingly flooding European markets. 

My work with the Minerva Global Security Programme that I direct at Oxford University's Blavatnik School of Government highlights these connections. Through mapping illicit flows, we see how human trafficking routes intersect with drug trafficking routes, such as along the Myanmar-China border. We currently expand this analysis to regions like the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, and eventually the UK. Understanding these flows as interconnected networks is crucial. By identifying key, high-traffic border zones where multiple illegal networks intersect, we hope to support a data-driven, long-term approach to protect people. 

Where one route closes, another, more dangerous one might open 

Relying solely on enforcement measures to prevent irregular migration could exacerbate the dangers faced by migrants. Stricter border controls often create unintended consequences, driving desperate individuals to take even more deadly journeys. These measures can also increase the profitability of smuggling, incentivising criminal networks to develop new methods to circumvent restrictions. 

During my fieldwork along the Colombia-Venezuela border, I observed a striking example of this dynamic. The closure of official border crossings forced migrants to use informal, dangerous pathways controlled by criminal groups. These routes placed already vulnerable individuals at even greater risk of exploitation and violence. A similar pattern is evident in the English Channel. Borders are inherently porous, and when one route is closed, another emerges, often at a higher cost to those attempting the journey. 

The humanitarian implications of this approach cannot be overstated. Stricter enforcement risks producing a "balloon effect," where migration pressures shift to other regions or countries ill-equipped to handle them. This not only transfers the problem but also raises serious ethical concerns. People will continue to flee, regardless of the barriers, because the alternative is often far worse. 

Safe and legal pathways undercut smuggling networks 

Raising barriers to legal migration exacerbates the problem. By closing off safe and legitimate pathways for economic migrants and asylum seekers, governments fuel the smuggling industry. Smugglers exploit the demand, further endangering lives and driving up their profits. 

The solution lies in creating safe and legal migration pathways for economic migrants and legitimate asylum seekers. These avenues not only provide a humane response to the crisis but also undercut the smuggling networks by reducing their client base. In doing so, we shift the focus from punitive enforcement to a strategy that prioritizes both security and humanity. 

Addressing the root causes is essential 

It is essential to adopt a long-term, transformative approach to irregular migration that tackles the root causes driving people to flee their homes. Criminals, while a critical part of the problem, are not the root cause. As long as demand persists, new criminal networks will emerge to exploit it. 

While it might appear that addressing these root causes falls outside the purview of the Border Security Command, this assumption misses the bigger picture. A holistic approach to border security requires us to understand why people leave their home countries and why they cannot return. This understanding must inform policies that extend beyond enforcement and include development and peacebuilding in source countries. 

In the case of Syria, there is now a window of opportunity to make positive change happen. Syria’s future is far from certain. The Assad regime may be gone but for Syrians abroad to be able to return home safely, a long-term commitment to promote development, peace, and stability in the region is required. Of course, such a commitment needs to be rooted locally, but it should also receive support internationally. 

Investing in regions such as Syria is not merely a humanitarian imperative; it is a strategic necessity. It reduces the need for people to seek refuge elsewhere. It is a preventative measure that benefits both the migrants and the receiving countries by addressing the crisis at its source rather than managing its symptoms. 

By combining intelligence with compassion, enforcement with prevention, and national policies with international cooperation, we can build a border security framework that is both effective and humane.