Kurdistan’s strength is Iraq’s opportunity: lessons for national reform after the 2025 elections

Iraq’s 2025 parliamentary elections marked a shift in public expectations.

 Turnout rose to almost 56%, up from 43% in 2021, signalling that that voters expect more and creating an opening for political actors to commit to a more accountable governance agenda. The three leading blocs were the Reconstruction and Development Coalition (RDC), the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and the Sunni-led Taqaddum alliance. Notably, the KDP secured the highest number of votes and seats in Nineveh – a predominantly Sunni province – showing that Kurdish political leadership resonates beyond the Kurdistan Region.

Yet the headline results reveal a more complex picture. Despite around 1.8 million ballots cast in Kurdish-majority areas, the Kurdistan Region’s representation in Baghdad may not reflect this strength. Because seats are allocated by governorate, the KDP is likely to secure around 29-30 seats, while Kurdish parties collectively may reach 63-64. Meanwhile, the RDC – with only around 200,000 more votes than the KDP – is projected to secure roughly 46 seats due to their more evenly distributed support.

This has prompted criticism that the system disadvantages Kurdish representation despite higher turnout. The issue is not procedural alone: it exposes structural weaknesses in Iraq’s electoral design, which rewards larger provinces and penalises concentrated regional constituencies – limiting the influence of constitutionally recognised autonomous entities such as the Kurdistan Region.

Federal strain and regional resilience: the Baghdad–Erbil disputes

Since 2003, relations between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Region have been shaped by recurring disputes over oil management, revenue-sharing and constitutional powers. Although the 2005 Constitution grants the Kurdistan Region clear federal powers, Baghdad has repeatedly contested these – most notably over budget transfers and oil management.

The consequences have been felt acutely by public servants. The Kurdistan Region has faced chronic budget uncertainty, with federal payments repeatedly delayed, withheld or tied to shifting political conditions. These tensions have left tens of thousands of public servants in the Kurdistan Region facing salary arrears or irregular payments, despite their legal entitlement under Iraq’s fiscal framework. The situation has created economic strain for households and weakened public trust, while limiting the Region’s capacity to plan long-term.

And yet, despite these institutional constraints, the Kurdistan Regional Government has continued to push forward with governance reforms and service improvements, demonstrating a commitment to long-term stability even under significant fiscal constraints.

The strength of the Kurdistan Region is an asset to Iraq

The Kurdistan Region has long been one of Iraq’s strongest diplomatic assets in a turbulent neighbourhood. From hosting hundreds of thousands of refugees and IDPs during the ISIS conflict to maintaining stable relations with key regional powers – Turkey, Iran, the GCC and the United States – Erbil has acted as a stabilising partner when Iraq needed one most.

The Region’s political moderation, openness and international networks continue to enhance Iraq’s external credibility. In this sense, the strength of the Kurdistan Region is not a regional luxury: it is an asset for Iraq’s national agenda.

Public service modernisation in the Kurdistan Region

A core pillar of the Kurdistan Regional Government’s reform agenda has been improving the services people rely on every day. Through a comprehensive Digital Transformation Strategy, the government is modernising administrative systems and expanding access to essential services. Under the Ninth Cabinet, more than 24 major digital initiatives have been launched – including the “My Account” programme, which delivers salaries securely through bank cards and ATMs. By linking e-government tools with a stronger banking sector, these reforms reduce bureaucracy and improve financial transparency.

Electricity access has also transformed. Through the Runaki programme, nearly 4.5 million residents now enjoy reliable, 24-hour power – replacing costly generators and sharply reducing household bills. Despite having a far larger budget, the federal government has yet to deliver uninterrupted electricity nationwide, prompting Baghdad’s Ministry of Electricity to consider the Runaki model.

These shifts in digital governance and energy provision are being matched by investment in the infrastructure that connects communities. New and upgraded roads are enabling smoother travel between cities and rural areas, supporting trade, tourism and easier access to essential services. Even under fiscal pressure, these developments signal a long-term commitment to improving living standards, building a more connected economy, and preparing the Kurdistan Region for future economic growth.

A model with lessons beyond Iraq

The Kurdistan Region’s ability to sustain reform under persistent constraints offers lessons far beyond Iraq. In many fragile states, subnational governments face a paradox: they are closest to citizens’ needs yet operate with limited fiscal certainty and institutional protection. Kurdistan shows that autonomy can deliver stability when paired with a clear, forward-looking reform agenda. Its experience highlights how decentralised decision-making supports resilience, economic continuity and better public services.

Comparative cases – from Catalonia to Puntland – show that subnational governance can either fuel fragmentation or drive national development. Kurdistan demonstrates the latter: self-governing regions can strengthen a fragile federal system when empowered and supported fairly by the federal government.

The path forward

For Iraq to realise the potential of its federal system, the Kurdistan Region must be treated as a partner in national reform rather than a recurring point of dispute.

Baghdad and Erbil need a predictable, depoliticised fiscal framework that guarantees regular revenue-sharing and shields public servants from political shocks. Stable finances would enable both governments to invest confidently in services and long-term development.

Iraq should establish joint federal–regional platforms to coordinate reforms in areas where interests align – from digital governance and electricity to trade, border management and private-sector growth. Many of the Kurdistan Region government’s recent advances could serve as models for national scale-up if supported rather than compartmentalised.

Finally, Iraq can strengthen its foreign policy by drawing on the Kurdistan Region’s diplomatic networks and pragmatic engagement with global and regional actors. A more coordinated diplomatic posture would enhance stability and allow Iraq to play a more constructive regional role.

The Kurdistan Region government represents the Middle East’s only enduring model of constitutionally recognised regional self-government – balancing local legitimacy with federal integration in a part of the world where centralisation has historically been the norm. A Kurdistan Region that is stable, empowered and engaged ultimately strengthens Iraq. Supporting its reform trajectory is not a regional favour – it is a national investment.