

Confronting corruption in Paraguay's housing ministry

13 October 2021

December 2015: Soledad Núñez, head of the National Secretariat for Housing and Habitat in Paraguay (SENAVITAT, the Paraguayan housing ministry) was working in her office in the main SENAVITAT building in Asunción when her human resources director, Valeria Franco, came running in. 'He's back,' Franco told her. 'González is back; he's in my office and saying that the court has reinstated him.'¹

Núñez had been appointed minister of SENAVITAT just 15 months prior, in October 2014 (see [Exhibit 1](#) for a timeline of key events). She had entered the role eager to fight what she saw as the 'mechanism of corruption' within the institution.² According to several corruption indicators, Paraguayans viewed corruption as a persistent problem in their country's public sector (see [Exhibit 2](#)) and SENAVITAT had a reputation as one of the most corrupt ministries of all.³ In addition, SENAVITAT repeatedly failed to reach its targets. The administration had promised 29,000 homes in 2014 as part of an effort to tackle the country's large housing deficit – an estimated 1.1 million Paraguayan households lacked suitable housing.⁴ But, as of October, it appeared as though SENAVITAT would not deliver even 10% of the promised homes.⁵

González's departure had come early in Núñez's tenure. An investigation into corruption at the ministry had concluded in January 2015 that the administration director Rufino González Flores, along with two other civil servants, were involved in the disbursement of G16.75 billion (guaraní, the Paraguayan currency; approximately US\$3.9 million) for houses that were never built.⁶ Núñez dismissed González – a move that shocked many due to González's long tenure and high profile at SENAVITAT, and his connections to senior politicians in Congress.⁷

But now González had returned. Franco, whose office as HR director was near the staff entrance to the building, quickly received word that González was in the building and brandishing a court order that he claimed reinstated him.⁸ Franco told her staff not to receive the court order and ran up to Núñez's office.⁹ Meanwhile, word of González's return was spreading. As Franco hurriedly updated Núñez, another staff member came in to report that some of the SENAVITAT staff were celebrating.¹⁰ Núñez was shocked: she had worked hard to change the culture of the ministry, but González's return seemed to be threatening to undo her work already.¹¹ She needed to act quickly if she was to retain control of the situation.

SENAVITAT

SENAVITAT had been created in 2010 as the guiding institution for national housing and habitat policy in Paraguay. The ministry's mission was 'the management and implementation of the housing sector policy and its corresponding infrastructure' with the ultimate aim of providing 'universal access to decent housing through plans and programs that especially favour the low-income families ... in order to reduce the housing deficit; for the improvement of the quality of life of the inhabitants of the Republic of Paraguay'.¹² It replaced CONAVI (the National Housing Council), and absorbed CONAVI's assets, liabilities, and personnel.¹³ By 2014, the ministry had around 750 employees and a US\$120 million budget.¹⁴

Copyright © University of Oxford 2021. Dr Anna Petherick, Professor Christopher Stone and Senior Case Writer Oenone Kubie prepared this case. This case was developed as part of the Lemann Foundation Programme for the Public Sector. Special thanks to Soledad Núñez (MPP 2018), Valeria Franco, and María Paz Astigarraga (MPP 2019) for their comments and insights. Certain details of the case may have been fictionalised to serve pedagogical purposes. Cases are developed solely as the basis for class discussion and are not intended to serve as endorsements, sources of primary data, or illustrations of effective or ineffective management. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, whether by photocopying or storing in any medium by electronic means or otherwise, except as permitted by law, without permission in writing from the University of Oxford.

SENAVITAT activities included constructing new housing, improving existing housing, and improving public spaces such as parks, squares, and community buildings.¹⁵ The institution also offered loans for the construction, expansion and purchase of houses, and administered direct housing subsidies, both of which were intended to help individuals and private companies build homes with monetary support from the state.¹⁶ In addition, SENAVITAT had a mandate to analyse the existing housing situation across the 17 departments of Paraguay (see **Exhibit 3**) and establish a national plan for housing and habitat policy.

The ministry was placed under the direction and administration of a minister appointed by the president. Reporting directly to the minister were the general directors, who oversaw various departments (see **Exhibit 4** for an organisational chart). The four main departments were legal, technical, administration, and social.¹⁷ The legal department provided advice on legal matters and ensured that activities were carried out in accordance with the law.¹⁸ The technical department executed, controlled and evaluated SENAVITAT's housing and urban plans, programmes and projects.¹⁹ Responsibility for the economic, financial and administrative operations in accordance with the general budget belonged to the administration department, which was thus responsible for the management of SENAVITAT's funds.²⁰ Finally, the social department directed the activities aimed at promoting social development, including keeping an up-to-date diagnosis of the housing situation and undertaking fair and transparent selection of applicants for housing programmes.²¹

Housing in Paraguay in the early 2010s

In 2011, SENAVITAT estimated Paraguay's housing deficit at 1.1 million households, a worrying number for a country of 7 million.²² The deficit was the difference between demand and supply of housing of suitable habitability and a high housing deficit was linked to a variety of social problems, including poor public health, poor school performance, low productivity, segregation and marginalisation.²³ In Paraguay, the deficit comprised households who lacked dwellings (13%) and households who lived in housing requiring expansion or improvement (87%).²⁴ The most common reason for requiring improvement was a lack of sanitation and piped water.²⁵ While the World Health Organisation reported that Paraguay had made considerable progress in providing water and sanitation since the early 2000s, the organisation also confirmed that significant challenges remained, particularly in providing sanitation to the 20% of the population who still lacked sanitation facilities.²⁶ Furthermore, SENAVITAT estimated that, without action, the deficit would rise to more than 1.5 million households by 2020.²⁷

To meet the crisis, SENAVITAT published a National Habitat and Housing Plan (PLANHAVI) in 2012 to serve as 'a roadmap to progressively eliminate the housing deficit.'²⁸ The plan laid out an ambitious goal of building 99,300 new homes by 2020 and improving a further 145,000 homes (see **Exhibit 5**).²⁹ In 2011, 4,300 new houses had been built and in 2010, just 1,300. PLANHAVI's new target was 7,000 homes constructed in 2012, with an annual increase to reach 15,000 homes per year by 2020.³⁰ But SENAVITAT had a poor reputation for delivering on targets, reinforced by its history of low production and notorious corruption. And while PLANHAVI anticipated a budget of US\$12,000-16,000 per housing solution for 2012-2020, the budget per housing solution had previously varied widely from US\$13,000 to US\$42,000.³¹

Corruption

Since its creation in 2010, SENAVITAT had faced accusations of various forms of corruption including widespread bribery, the unlawful use of public money, and clientelism in both the distribution of housing solutions and the selection of personnel.³² Research into corruption in the country showed that the traditional political parties in Paraguay had strong clientele networks and clientelist benefits were frequently directed to the party base.³³ Political patronage also controlled public sector employment.³⁴ Once in employment, civil servants were able to divert funds and extract bribes, for example, in return for accelerating time-consuming bureaucratic procedures.³⁵ Public funds were also diverted to favoured private

companies through public procurement.³⁶ When cases of corruption were uncovered, both prosecution rates and penalties were low and corruption cases faced long judicial delays.³⁷ According to Gallup, 83% of Paraguayans in 2015 believed corruption was widespread throughout the government, compared to a global average of 67%.³⁸ (See **Exhibit 2** for more on Paraguay's standing in major corruption indicators.)

Several laws attempted to address this corruption, including Law 1626/00. This law, from 2000, mandated that public institutions select personnel through public competition.³⁹ Among other things, the law prohibited public servants from: (1) using their authority to affect the outcome of elections; (2) accepting gifts, tips, commissions, or double remuneration; (3) intervening in obtaining state concessions or privileges for their own benefit or that of a third party; and (4) obtaining direct or indirect benefits from acts undertaken as a public official.⁴⁰ Public officials could be dismissed if they committed a punishable act, but the law also allowed for an appeal before the Court of Accounts, which heard cases regarding administrative conflicts. If the dismissed public official won their appeal, the law required: (1) the immediate reinstatement of the official 'in the position he held or in another similar category'; (2) remuneration; and (3) the payment of lost wages.⁴¹ Other laws regulated procurement and transparency.

According to the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators which captured the perceptions of citizens, business leaders, and experts, the country seemed to have made some headway on tackling corruption in recent years, as well as improving regulatory quality.⁴² Yet this had not led to improved perceptions of government effectiveness (see **Exhibit 6**). Among Paraguayan citizens, corruption was still seen as a problem: almost 100% of Paraguayans reported to Transparency International that they would be willing to take anti-corruption actions and politicians frequently ran on anti-corruption platforms.⁴³

The Cartes administration

In April 2013, the National Republican Association, known as the Colorado Party, which had dominated Paraguayan politics for most of the past century, sought a return to power.⁴⁴ Horacio Cartes became the Colorado presidential candidate, but having only joined the party in 2009, he was able to position himself as a political outsider.⁴⁵ Cartes won the presidency and the Colorados also gained 14 seats in the lower house to give them a majority, and made gains in the upper house.

Once in power, the new president decided to put technocrats in charge of important ministries, despite opposition from the party establishment who preferred the usual method of installing politicians as ministers.⁴⁶ For the housing minister, Cartes selected Francisco Knapps, who had worked within SENAVITAT and its predecessor CONAVI.

SENAVITAT under Knapps

Knapps entered office in August 2013. He inherited an institution that was failing to provide housing solutions. Despite the ambitions of PLANHAVI, SENAVITAT had produced just 1,300 housing units in 2012, far below the target of 7,000, and those houses that had been built faced reports of poor quality.⁴⁷

As a first step towards reforming the institution, Knapps led a process of auditing and detecting irregularities in SENAVITAT programmes.⁴⁸ The process uncovered several malpractices, notably 'ghost houses', where SENAVITAT had paid private companies advances of up to 85% of the total contract for homes that were never completed.⁴⁹ In one case, SENAVITAT had paid a company G1,437 million (approximately US\$340,000) in 2011-12 for materials for 149 homes that were never started, or of which only the foundations were built.⁵⁰ In total, the institution counted 10,525 unfinished homes.⁵¹ In some cases there were no insurance policies, or those that had been signed had expired or had been made with third-party 'briefcase companies' that existed only on paper.⁵²

Knapps struggled to get SENAVITAT back on track. By the end of 2013, SENAVITAT had completed just 2,400 homes.⁵³ In December, Knapps appealed to the Ministry of Finance for funds to help complete the construction of 8,500 unfinished homes the following year.⁵⁴ The Ministry of Finance authorised a further US\$19 million for SENAVITAT to use to complete the housing units.⁵⁵ With this financing secured and the unfinished homes identified, the government promised 29,000 completed homes by the end of 2014.⁵⁶ By the summer of 2014, however, it had become apparent that SENAVITAT would be unlikely to reach a tenth of the 29,000 target.⁵⁷ For one thing, the problem of ghost houses had continued under Knapps.⁵⁸ In December 2013, SENAVITAT had paid more than G2 billion (US\$460,000) in advances for one project; eight months later the works appeared abandoned with only four foundations built.⁵⁹ Where houses had been completed, the ministry was criticised for allocating new houses only to members of the Colorado Party or to those who already had housing.⁶⁰

Throughout August and September 2014, the problems at SENAVITAT were frequently in the headlines. The press condemned the lack of delivery and called SENAVITAT a 'ship without a rudder'.⁶¹ Within the institution, Knapps had long faced opposition from the SENAVITAT Workers' Union, in part due to his attempts to professionalise the workforce and terminate many temporary contracts. An email chain leaked to the press revealed union leaders telling Knapps to address the poor management of the agency or they would ask for his resignation.⁶² Although Knapps conceded that there were managerial issues in SENAVITAT, he also blamed the lack of results on external factors such as delays caused by construction companies.⁶³

Pressure on Cartes to replace Knapps grew, especially following a report by Knapps to the population and housing commission of the Chamber of Deputies (the lower house of Paraguay's legislature). Members of the commission were unconvinced by Knapps' assurance that 45% of the stopped works inherited from previous administrations were being reactivated. Instead, the president of the commission commented that 'the report does not agree with reality ... they have money, there is no argument to justify inaction.'⁶⁴ He continued that SENAVITAT had a 'serious management and leadership problem' and concluded that 'the entire structure of SENAVITAT needs to be changed.'⁶⁵

As names of candidates to replace Knapps began to circulate, the press quoted one Colorado Party senator saying that 'the men selected by the president do not have the management capacity or the work capacity that is needed for these positions.'⁶⁶ The Colorado Party establishment pushed Cartes to choose a politician to fill the role. However, Cartes was considering a young non-governmental organisation (NGO) director unaffiliated with any political party – Soledad Núñez.

Soledad Núñez

Núñez was a 31-year-old civil engineer. After graduating from the National University of Asunción in 2007, Núñez had joined TECHO Paraguay, a new Paraguayan branch of the youth-led NGO which provided emergency housing across Latin America, and was soon invited to serve as the National Director in Paraguay.⁶⁷ Over the next three years, the team mobilised 15,000 young people and built over 4,000 emergency homes under Núñez's direction.⁶⁸

But Núñez realised that she wanted to do more. 'I was leading this NGO, trying to influence public policies, but I had no contact with political parties,' she reflected.⁶⁹ Gradually, Núñez became involved in civil society partnerships with the government, such as the National Strategy Team, a group of civil society leaders brought together by the government to create a long-term vision for Paraguay and a strategy for combating poverty.⁷⁰ As a result of her work with the government, Núñez was invited by the planning minister to join his team to lead the National Poverty Eradication Plan and the Paraguayan Open Government Plan.⁷¹ This was her first experience working in a public institution, but her time in the planning ministry was to be short-lived. Just six months later, in late August 2014, the planning minister told Núñez that she was being considered to lead SENAVITAT.⁷²

In September 2014, Núñez received a phone call from the Minister of the Cabinet Office, who explained that the president wanted her to take over SENAVIDAT. It was not an easy decision for Núñez. Almost every person that Núñez asked for advice told her not to accept. 'Politicians will use you'; 'It's not easy to tackle corruption'; and 'You're not going to be able to make change', several friends told her.⁷³ Núñez knew there would be risks; if she stood against corruption, she would make enemies.⁷⁴ Furthermore, Núñez knew that her appointment would be opposed by the party establishment, particularly as she was so young, a woman, and not affiliated with any political party.⁷⁵ A lot of people would expect, or even want, her to fail.

Yet Núñez kept coming back to the idea of saying yes. 'We have to have the courage to take challenges to improve our country,' she remembered. 'I don't like to say we can't change this country.... I knew that change can only happen if we, the youth, get involved, even if we have to take risks.'⁷⁶ And Núñez believed it would be hypocritical of her, as a social activist who had worked for years to provide housing to people in need, to now say no when she had the chance to lead the national government effort on housing.⁷⁷ Núñez agreed to take on the job, but she had a condition: Núñez insisted that she needed the support of the Executive to make the best decisions for the country without any interference from the political sphere. If anyone asked her to do something she felt was corrupt, Núñez told the president and his chief of staff that she intended to quit.⁷⁸

SENAVITAT under Núñez

Núñez was appointed minister for housing on 1 October 2014. A faction of the Colorado Party protested her appointment, accused Cartes of abandoning the grassroots of the party, and threatened to withdraw support.⁷⁹ However, Cartes stood firm behind his choice of candidate and Núñez got to work at the ministry. Her first step was to diagnose SENAVIDAT's strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats.

Diagnosis

Núñez knew that SENAVIDAT had access to resources, but that budget execution had been low for years.⁸⁰ In 2014, the budget was G552 billion (US\$123 million), but the budget executed was likely to be just half that number.⁸¹ When questioned by Congress, Knapp had suggested that the low execution was due to the 'complexity and diversity of issues to be addressed.'⁸² The 2015 Budget promised SENAVIDAT G985 billion (US\$189 million) for the coming year; the difficulty would lie in translating those resources into housing solutions.⁸³

To Núñez, SENAVIDAT seemed a 'tremendously weakened institution in every way.'⁸⁴ 'The disorder was impressive,' she remarked.⁸⁵ On arrival, she received no report summarising the ministry's ongoing projects and she struggled to find out more about them.⁸⁶ She went to each of the departments and asked, 'How many houses are we building?', but each director gave her a different figure.⁸⁷ There was also a lack of transparency in the institution. Núñez found that decisions over where the programmes were going to take place, who contracts would go to, and who would receive housing were all kept privately within the institution.⁸⁸ The selection process for construction projects, for example, was carried out behind closed doors.⁸⁹

In addition, Núñez soon realised that SENAVIDAT lacked technical capacity. At the time of her arrival, SENAVIDAT had only two engineers and 33 architects on the permanent staff.⁹⁰ And with only five technicians in charge of verification of 4,680 homes around the country, oversight of housing projects was difficult.⁹¹ Employees throughout the institution were largely selected through patronage rather than merit.⁹² Typical for the public sector, previous administrations had appointed political supporters to SENAVIDAT jobs: about one-third were members of the Colorado Party; one-third members of the opposition Liberal Party, and one-third members of the country's left-wing parties.⁹³ Knapp had tried to streamline, primarily by terminating those on temporary contracts, and had succeeded in increasing the proportion of professionals.⁹⁴

However, by the time Núñez arrived, the institution still employed so many people that individuals had to work in corridors and without desks.⁹⁵

Núñez identified further weaknesses in the structure of the ministry. SENAVITAT had a very rigid vertical hierarchy, which was standard in public sector institutions in Paraguay. Núñez's main points of contact within the ministry were the General Directors (see [Exhibit 4](#)). Civil servants working within the departments had very limited contact with the minister; it could take months working up the chain of command for them to schedule appointments to see the minister.⁹⁶ Moreover, interdepartmental relationships appeared to Núñez to be largely antagonistic and communication ineffective; rather than picking up the phone and talking, the different departments seemed to prefer writing memos to each other, spelling out problems with projects rather than working together to create a solution.⁹⁷

Núñez also believed that there was an embedded culture of corruption. According to Núñez, the social programmes were beset with clientelism and used as a way to maintain networks of political and electoral power.⁹⁸ And when Núñez signed the payslips of SENAVITAT employees, she saw that many of the civil servants had substantial amount of debt which they were paying off directly from their salaries. Núñez discovered that the resulting low take-home pay after debt repayments was frequently subsidised through taking bribes and claiming expenses for travel.⁹⁹ Through talks with SENAVITAT staff at all levels about the culture in the institution, Núñez came to believe that there were perhaps 10% of the SENAVITAT employees who were deeply corrupt and another 10% who were committed to the institution's honesty and integrity.¹⁰⁰ The remaining 80% she saw as simply going along with the current climate within the ministry.¹⁰¹ According to Núñez, these employees may have joined SENAVITAT wanting to help alleviate housing problems within the country, but they had seen others take bribes and improve their quality of life and so they had adopted some of the malpractices themselves.¹⁰²

Even if they wanted more integrity in the institution, many of the people Núñez spoke to had been in the housing ministry for decades; they had seen administrations come and go, and were sceptical about the new administration's commitment to, and ability to, change the culture. It did not help that Núñez and many of her team were young women; Franco, whom Núñez brought into SENAVITAT with her, remembered employees saying to her 'you are like babies in diapers trying to govern this institution.'¹⁰³ For her part, Núñez reflected: 'I got two types of comments from people that first year: one was that I might leave tomorrow and the other was that everybody comes at the beginning with a nice speech about making changes and they all become corrupt in the end.'¹⁰⁴ Many of the employees seemed to just want to keep their heads down.¹⁰⁵ If Núñez somehow lasted and managed to make some changes, the employees also knew that her term at SENAVITAT would soon be over and a new minister would come in with their own plans for the ministry.

Núñez remembered thinking, 'I need to be creative and think about how I can design some control over what is happening.'¹⁰⁶ A typical move for a new minister in the Paraguayan public sector was to build a parallel structure filled with new people that would respond to the minister's culture and directions.¹⁰⁷ Núñez had brought in a small team of people from outside the ministry whom she trusted and could use.¹⁰⁸ But Núñez worried about inefficiency: 'you would have an old structure which is not actually working or just doing small jobs and then you would have a small group of very efficient people dealing with the great projects of the ministry.'¹⁰⁹ Alternatively, Núñez considered that she could simply replace all of the directors with her own people. But, if she did so, Núñez feared that the learning curve would be hard and extremely costly.¹¹⁰ Furthermore, some of the people Núñez had brought with her were young activists from the NGO sector; putting them in senior positions might provoke negative reactions from civil servants who had worked their way up SENAVITAT's hierarchy.

Above all, Núñez could not afford any failures. Núñez might have wished to fight corruption and transform SENAVITAT into an institution with integrity, but her support from the president was contingent on producing housing solutions.¹¹¹ She believed that the president would not

blame her for a lack of delivery in the remaining three months of 2014, but come the new year, SENAVITAT would need to be in a position to hit the ground running.¹¹²

Early steps

Núñez needed to turn SENAVITAT into a ministry that could deliver housing solutions efficiently in the year ahead. She had identified what she considered the major problem areas, and now she set about to address them.

- **Audit of projects and loans:** To ascertain the exact numbers and status of all SENAVITAT's ongoing projects, Núñez sent teams of auditors to each construction project.¹¹³ Some of the staff were incredulous about the plan's feasibility, but Núñez thought, 'we have the resources, we have the vehicles, we can ask local municipalities to help us.'¹¹⁴ Over a three-week tour, the teams travelled the country and discovered projects that no department had reported.¹¹⁵ Many projects, particularly those in remote rural and indigenous communities, were progressing poorly. The audit showed that a third of homes in current SENAVITAT projects were stalled or 'paralysed' (see **Exhibit 7**). A further 1,250 were deemed unsalvageable and SENAVITAT initiated the lengthy legal process of 'rescinding' the contracts.¹¹⁶ Núñez realised that often '50% of the advances of the contractual amounts had been disbursed. Many of these companies were "briefcase companies": when we wanted to make complaints and demands, they didn't even exist.'¹¹⁷ They also did an audit of the loan portfolio, identified irregularities, and began to terminate contracts and foreclose on loans where no repayments were made.¹¹⁸
- **Structure:** Instead of either creating a parallel structure or replacing the department directors, Núñez created a new role – the 'coordinators'. When Núñez had arrived at the institution, she had brought with her a small team to whom she initially gave responsibility for specific tasks that spanned the whole institution and would require working across departments – e.g., finding and collating all of the paralysed housing projects into one spreadsheet.¹¹⁹ Núñez wanted to build upon this burgeoning interdepartmental network and created the role of coordinators for her trusted team.¹²⁰ The coordinators would be placed in each department, just below the level of general directors. They would have three objectives: (1) monitor and report back to Núñez if there was a risk of corruption and, more broadly, on departmental strengths and weaknesses; (2) facilitate coordination and communication among the departments; and (3) ensure that departmental decision making was in line with new procedures on transparency.¹²¹ As the coordinators reported to both Núñez and the general directors, they represented a first step in changing the institution's vertical structure. Núñez also tried to make herself more accessible to everyone in the institution by circulating her phone number and email address to all SENAVITAT employees, thus giving them a direct means to communicate with her.
- **Capacity and personnel:** Núñez placed Franco in charge of the HR department and tried to implement more meritocratic hiring procedures, following normative processes established by the Ministry for the Civil Service.¹²² Now, hiring would all be conducted by a designated selection committee, including representatives from the union, that would work in conjunction with line managers on job specifications and essential criteria for candidates.¹²³ To staff the technical department, a priority for Núñez, more architects and engineers were hired whose job it would be to identify quick wins and to monitor the progress of every project.¹²⁴ For existing SENAVITAT employees, staff training plans were developed to provide on-the-job training aligned with institutional strategy.¹²⁵ Núñez's team also discovered that employees were not in departments where their skills would be most useful and began moving them; for example, they transferred architects and engineers to the technical department and sociologists to the social department.¹²⁶ Finally, SENAVITAT initiated a performance evaluation for all staff members and sought to remove a small number of poorly performing employees.¹²⁷

- **Transparency:** To promote a culture of transparency in the institution, Núñez first decided that everything she signed would be made public.¹²⁸ Next, she formed a Transparency Unit in the ministry to which citizens could complain, for example about irregularities in the selection of beneficiaries.¹²⁹ The institution also began work on 'The Housing Map', an open data platform through which the public could access information about every contract administered, each project in progress, and all resources spent.¹³⁰ Finally, Núñez began to create a social media presence to post about the work SENAVITAT was undertaking.¹³¹
- **Regulations and processes:** Núñez also tried to put in place new regulations and processes, as well as implement existing regulations. This involved: a new social housing targeting index to reduce politicization of the selection of communities receiving interventions; systematising the application system for beneficiaries; and clamping down on uses of institution resources such as vehicles for non-SENAVITAT business.¹³² In addition, Núñez began on-site ministerial visits to projects.¹³³ The institutional mission, vision, and values were also reviewed and simplified.¹³⁴ The agency held over 100 induction and awareness workshops for staff to discuss the new code of ethics and good governance, at the end of which the civil servants signed a declaration of commitment to the code.¹³⁵
- **Tackling corruption:** In addition to the other changes within the institution, Núñez decided to investigate high-profile instances of corruption under previous administrations. Núñez ordered the investigation into alleged offenses related to disbursement of G16.75 billion (US\$3.9 million) for the construction of 321 social housing solutions between January and August 2013, none of which were completed.¹³⁶ After noticing discrepancies in claims for fuel expenses, Núñez also ordered an investigation into the fuel quota system and SENAVITAT installed GPS trackers to monitor the distances vehicles travelled.¹³⁷

As Núñez implemented the changes, she encountered resistance. In particular, she faced push-back on the new coordinators. Núñez remembered that, 'There was a lot of conflict at the beginning because the government has a really rigid hierarchical structure, so the directors didn't want to have someone below them who could report directly to the minister – they felt it took away some of their power.'¹³⁸ She continued, 'In every meeting, the directors made comments like, "you don't trust us, why do we have this coordinator below us?"'¹³⁹ At the same time, some anonymous posts appeared on Twitter claiming that Núñez was making nepotistic appointments. Franco remembered one post, for example, that claimed Franco had only been appointed because she was a cousin of the president's chief of staff; in fact, they were unrelated.¹⁴⁰ To reduce any controversy surrounding the coordinators' appointments to what was a fairly senior role, Núñez promised that her team would leave with her when her administration finished. In addition, Núñez kept the salaries of the coordinators lower than might be expected for such a high-up position in the institution hierarchy, although this decision caused tension within the team, as some felt they were working very hard for low salaries.¹⁴¹

As the year came to an end, Núñez took stock of the situation at SENAVITAT. In 2014, the ministry had built just 1,650 new homes.¹⁴² In addition, SENAVITAT had received a rating of 1.96/5, or 'Inadequate', from a Paraguayan government programme that evaluated the rules, principles, actions and process of public entities for transparency and efficiency, known as the Standard Model of Internal Control for Public Entities (MECIP).¹⁴³ In the new year, the budget was set to increase from G552 billion (US\$123 million) to G985 billion (US\$189 million) and Núñez had announced a goal of 12,000 houses – a more than sevenfold increase on 2014, but still lower than the president wanted.¹⁴⁴ Núñez knew she would have to deliver.

A new year

In January 2015, the anti-corruption investigation within the ministry into the 2013 disbursements came to an end. The investigation concluded that the head of the administration department, González, had paid advances of up to 85% of the total value of the unfinished contracts.¹⁴⁵ The news media reported that the contracted firm had neither the technical nor the financial

capacity to complete the homes, and that the insurance policies could not be executed because they were in the name of third parties.¹⁴⁶ The Judge of Administrative Inquiry issued a resolution on the case. The resolution found that the conduct of González (and two other directors on secondment with SENAVITAT) constituted serious offences and imposed on them the penalty of dismissal and disqualification from holding public office for a period of five years.¹⁴⁷ On 8 January 2015, Núñez dismissed the three officials.¹⁴⁸ Meanwhile, a criminal case began.¹⁴⁹

González had been at the ministry for decades and Núñez could see that he was a well-liked person. 'Everybody loved him,' she remembered.¹⁵⁰ Not only was González charismatic, Núñez heard reports that he would also give out small sums of money to the other civil servants at his discretion.¹⁵¹ She also heard rumours claiming that González had used ministry funds to build a chapel and, at his own house, a football pitch, where he invited SENAVITAT civil servants to play every Friday.¹⁵² Although the ministers changed frequently, González had remained in control of the ministry's finances since SENAVITAT began. As Núñez put it, 'It didn't matter which political party was ruling the country, the corruption mechanism was in place.'¹⁵³ For Núñez, firing González was more important than simply removing one corrupt figure; 'it was a strong sign for the whole structure,' she commented.¹⁵⁴ The dismissal was reported widely in the press; according to Franco, 'it was a really big deal; we made a big deal of it.'¹⁵⁵

González appealed the decision at the Court of Accounts, which heard cases concerning disputes in the public administration, including labour disputes.¹⁵⁶ Franco remembered that Núñez's team expected González to win his appeal: 'We knew that in some instances, those in the judiciary have a price,' she said. 'If González paid that price, they would make a resolution to have him return. We knew that was going to happen and we were waiting for it.'¹⁵⁷

In general, Núñez received less pushback about the coordinators as the year went on. According to Núñez, the directors 'started to notice that they were achieving goals, they were more efficient.'¹⁵⁸ Instead of complaining of the excessive scrutiny, Núñez now had directors saying to her, 'I think we need more people like my coordinator because he moves fast, he solves problems.'¹⁵⁹ But elsewhere Núñez began to recognise that her coordinators structure was not working as well as intended. In some departments, the coordinators were having to work very hard to push against the directors to ensure any productivity.¹⁶⁰

Meanwhile, the new processes, regulations and hiring practices were having an effect. In the first half of 2015, SENAVITAT advertised 50 positions and received approximately 1,200 applications.¹⁶¹ The ministry focused on hiring professionals and, by the end of the year, the number of professionals almost equalled the number of non-professionals employed.¹⁶² In addition, the institution had improved its MECIP score from 1.96/5 to 4.39/5.¹⁶³

Alongside these institutional changes, SENAVITAT restarted work on projects which had been stalled for years.¹⁶⁴ Although SENAVITAT failed to reach the target of 12,000 homes, construction and delivery of homes increased sixfold, from just over 1,650 in 2014 to more than 10,000 homes by the end of 2015.¹⁶⁵ SENAVITAT recorded its highest-ever budget execution that year, almost G500 billion (US\$96 million).¹⁶⁶

These successes translated into support from sections of the public. As Franco put it, Núñez 'was creating a lot of results and a lot of people in the country were looking and saying "okay, we trust this girl; she is really doing things and not only for people of one party, but for everyone."' ¹⁶⁷ Additionally, Núñez felt that her social media presence had helped boost her popularity with the public, making her accessible when they had complaints or requests.¹⁶⁸ Her reputation as one of the most efficient ministers in the government grew, solidifying her support from the president and his office. In a way, Franco reflected, Núñez became the 'face' of efficient and reformed public institutions.¹⁶⁹

Internally, investigations into corruption revealed new malpractices that occurred in the institution. In August, investigations confirmed that the logistics director had signed off on inflated data regarding distances travelled and fuel consumption used to produce fuel quotas. The inquiry showed fuel quota fraud worth almost G600 million (US\$140,000) between April and December 2013.¹⁷⁰ Núñez dismissed the director.¹⁷¹ Then, in the autumn, Núñez was approached by the director of a private company that had placed a bid for an important contract SENAVITAT was currently tendering worth G6 billion (US\$1.2 million).¹⁷² The company director had received a phone call from an undisclosed party at SENAVITAT asking for a bribe in return for success in the tender.¹⁷³ Núñez attempted to persuade him to help unveil the guilty party, but to no avail. 'I trust you,' the director told her, 'but you're not going to be here forever and my family lives from what I make being part of these bidding processes.'¹⁷⁴ Núñez believed the official did not actually have the power to affect the results of the tender, but according to Núñez, that did not matter to those companies approached for bribes: they believed the civil servants would outlast Núñez's administration and felt that they 'needed to be aligned with the system for the future.'¹⁷⁵

SENAVITAT also had to work with other ministries and municipal governments as well as private companies. In some cases, these collaborations were straightforward, for example Núñez found working with the social development ministry fairly easy. Núñez felt the minister was similar to her as he was not a politician and he was not seeking to use his role to bolster a political position.¹⁷⁶ At the other end of the spectrum were some municipalities. While Núñez believed that she might eventually be able to stop bribery and corruption within SENAVITAT itself, 'what happened next, that was another matter.'¹⁷⁷ For example, Núñez remembered one construction company ringing to tell her that the mayor of the town where SENAVITAT was working was insisting that the builders buy materials from a company with which the mayor had an association and that they employ people whom the mayor hand selected.¹⁷⁸

As the year wore on, the stress of the job began to take a toll on Núñez's health. Every day Núñez worked well into the night, sleeping for a few hours here and there. Twice in 2015 she ended up in hospital, needing treatment for stress.¹⁷⁹ Not only was she responsible for SENAVITAT, but she also felt the pressure of being seen as the representative young person and woman in government. 'I told myself a couple of times,' Núñez remembered, 'if you fail, society is going to say that young women cannot be in positions of power.'¹⁸⁰ And as the year ended, for the first time, Núñez found she was afraid. When she got home at night, she would check the doors were locked behind her.¹⁸¹

December 2015

As the year ended, Núñez was looking to the future. She needed to build upon the successes of the previous year. However, water levels had been rising around Asunción, bringing flooding and damage to thousands of citizens' homes.¹⁸² The Paraguay River flooded yearly, yet this winter's floods seemed likely to be particularly devastating. It looked as though SENAVITAT would have a lot of work to do over the next twelve months. Núñez planned to start building 20,000 homes in 2016 with a budget of G802 billion (US\$154 million).¹⁸³

However, Núñez's preparations for the coming year were interrupted. As she was working in her office, her HR director, Franco, came running in and hurriedly informed her that González had just arrived at the ministry. He had walked in the staff entrance, right by the HR office, brandishing a court order. The Court of Accounts had ordered the reinstatement of the former administration director.¹⁸⁴ As Núñez listened to Franco's hurried report, another member of the team came bursting in. 'Minister,' they said, 'word is spreading that González is coming back. People are celebrating: they're saying the good times have returned.'¹⁸⁵

Núñez turned to Franco and told her, 'Don't take the paper from him. We need to think what we are going to do now.'¹⁸⁶

Exhibit 1: Timeline of key events

2010	SENAVITAT is created to be the guiding institution for national housing and habitat policy in Paraguay.
2012	SENAVITAT publishes the National Habitat and Housing Plan (PLANHAVI).
January-August 2013	SENAVITAT disburses approximately G16.75 billion (US\$3.9 million) for the construction of 321 housing solutions that are never built.
April 2013	Horacio Cartes is elected President; he selects Francisco Knapps to lead SENAVITAT.
August 2013	The new administration begins; Knapps takes over SENAVITAT.
August-September 2014	Problems at SENAVITAT are frequently in the headlines; the press condemns the lack of delivery and poor management.
September 2014	Knapps resigns and Cartes selects Soledad Núñez to take over as minister of SENAVITAT.
October 2014	Núñez enters office and begins her diagnosis of SENAVITAT and starts her initial reforms. Núñez orders an investigation into the 2013 disbursements.
January 2015	Núñez dismisses Rufino González Flores and two other officials after the internal investigation into the 2013 disbursements is concluded.
December 2015	Núñez receives word that González has returned to SENAVITAT.

Source: Case writers.

Exhibit 2: Corruption indicators, 2015

Indicator	About the indicator	Relevant measures	Paraguay (2015)
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) – Transparency International	- A composite index based on a combination of surveys and assessments of corruption collected by a variety of institutions. - The most widely used indicator of corruption.	- Score: Each country received a score out of 100 where 0 means the country was perceived as highly corrupt and 100 meant the country was perceived as very clean. - Rank: The countries' corruption perception scores were ranked relative to other countries' scores in the index. The country ranked 1/168 was perceived as the least corrupt.	- Score: 27/100. - Rank: 130/168.
Gallup World Poll	A survey of approximately 1,000 individuals in each of 150 countries using a standard set of core questions.	Corruption in government: % of people surveyed who said corruption is widespread throughout the government of their country. The global average in 2015 was 67%.	Corruption in government: 83%.
Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) – Transparency International	- A survey of approximately 1,000 people in each of 107 countries for their views on corruption and their direct experiences with bribery. - The most recent edition of the barometer in 2015 was the 8th edition published in 2013.	% of people who have paid a bribe. The global average in 2015 was 27%. - Perception of corruption among public officials and civil servants: 1 corresponds to not corrupt at all and 5 to extremely corrupt. The global average in 2015 was 3.6. % of people who would be willing to do one of five actions against corruption: actions included reporting corruption, signing a petition and protesting. The global average in 2015 was 87%.	% of people who have paid a bribe: 25%. - Perception of corruption among public officials and civil servants: 3.8. % of people who would be willing to act against corruption: 99%.
World Governance Indicators (WGI) – The World Bank	A measure of six broad dimensions of governance drawn from a large number of different data sources including surveys of households and firms, NGOs, commercial business information providers, and public sector organizations.	- Control of corruption governance score: perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for public gain measured on a scale from -2.5 to 2.5. Higher values correspond to better governance. - Control of corruption percentile rank: 0 corresponds to the lowest rank (i.e., the least control of corruption) and 100 to the highest rank.	- Control of corruption governance score: -0.95. - Control of corruption percentile rank: 15.87.


Source: Compiled by case writers from Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index (2015), <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2015/index/nzl>, accessed August 2021; Transparency International, Global Corruption Barometer (2013), <https://www.transparency.org/en/publications/global-corruption-barometer-2013>, accessed August 2021; The World Bank, 'Worldwide Governance Indicators', <https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Reports>, accessed May 2021; Gallup, Gallup World Poll, 2015 accessed through Gallup Analytics, August 2021.

Exhibit 3: Political map of Paraguay



Source: 'Paraguay (Political) 1998', Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, University of Texas Libraries, <http://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/paraguay.html>, accessed May 2021.

Exhibit 4: Simplified SENAVITAT organisational chart, September 2014



Source: Compiled by case writers from 'Organigrama Estructural SENAVITAT', Ministerio de Urbanismo, Vivienda y Hábitat website, <https://www.muvh.gov.py/sitio/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Organigrama-SENAVITAT-Res.-3030-Dic.-2015-Enero2016.jpg>, accessed May 2021.

Exhibit 5: Resources and projects outlined in the PLANHAVI, 2012

Resources assigned and projects executed by CONAVI/SENAVITAT, 2008-2011:


Years	Budget (US\$ millions)	New homes	Expanded and improved homes	Total housing solutions	Budget/housing solution (US\$ thousands)
2008	27	600	50	650	42
2009	31	2100	250	2350	13
2010	34	1300	1100	2400	29
2011	84	4300	1400	5700	15

Projection of resources assigned and projects to be executed by SENAVITAT in the PLANHAVI, 2012-2020:

Years	Budget (US\$ millions)	New homes	Expanded and improved homes	Total housing solutions	Budget/housing solution (US\$ thousands)
2012	150	7,000	3,000	10,000	15
2013	180	7,770	3,800	11,500	16
2014	219	8,500	6,100	14,600	15
2015	259	9,300	9,000	18,300	12
2016	311	10,200	12,800	23,000	14
2017	373	11,300	17,100	28,400	13
2018	448	12,400	22,900	35,300	13
2019	537	13,600	30,100	43,700	12
2020	645	15,000	38,800	53,800	12

Source: Compiled by case writers from SENAVITAT, 'PLANHAVI: Plan Nacional de Hábitat y Vivienda del Paraguay' (2012), <https://www.muvh.gov.py/?publicaciones=plan-nacional-de-habitat-y-vivienda-planhavi>, accessed May 2021.

Exhibit 6: Worldwide Governance Indicators in Paraguay 2000-2010





Source: The World Bank, 'Worldwide Governance Indicators', <https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Reports>, accessed May 2021.



Exhibit 7: Status of SENAVITAT housing projects, end of 2014

At the end of 2014, SENAVITAT current housing projects fell into one of four categories:

1. Unstarted, which included housing projects that were in the planning stage, that were out for tender, where the contract had been awarded, or where advances had been paid but no work yet begun.
2. Underway, which included new projects where construction had begun as well as previously stalled projects that had been restarted.
3. Paralysed, which referred to projects where work had begun but had been abandoned.
4. Rescinded, which referred to paralysed projects that SENAVITAT had decided to begin the legal process of rescinding the contracts.

The following graphs show housing in each of these five categories by department.





Source: Compiled by case writers from SENAVITAT, 'Balance Annual De Gestión Pública: Año 2014', <https://www.muvh.gov.py/recursos/bg2014.pdf>, accessed May 2021.

Notes

- ¹ Soledad Núñez, Interview with case writers, 7 May 2021; Valeria Franco, Interview with case writers, 9 June 2021.
- ² Soledad Núñez, Interview with case writers, 16 Mar 2021.
- ³ Transparency International, 'Evaluación del Sistema Nacional de Integridad: Paraguay 2011/12 [Evaluation of the National System of Integrity: Paraguay 2011/12 (Google Translate, 2021)]' (2012), <https://www.transparency.org/en/publications/evaluacion-del-sistema-nacional-de-integridad-paraguay-2011-12>, accessed May 2021; Leonardo Alfonzo and José Molinas Vega (eds.), 'Cambio organizacional en el sector público paraguayo: Manual de Buenas Prácticas basado en el Caso SENAVITAT [Organizational change in the Paraguayan public sector: Good Practices Manual based on the SENAVITAT Case (Google Translate, 2021)]', https://www.conacyt.gov.py/sites/default/files/upload_editores/u454/Cambio%20Organizacional%20en%20el%20Sector%20P%C3%ABlico%20Paraguay%20%281%29.pdf, accessed May 2021.
- ⁴ 'Cambian a Knapps de las Senavitat luego de duras críticas a su gestión [They change Knapps from Senavitat after harsh criticism of his management (Google Translate, 2021)]', ABC, 1 Oct 2014, <https://www.abc.com.py/edicion-impresa/economia/cambian-a-knapps-de-la-senavitat-luego-de-duras-criticas-a-su-gestion-1291624.html>, accessed May 2021.
- ⁵ 'Cambian a Knapps de las Senavitat luego de duras críticas a su gestión [They change Knapps from Senavitat after harsh criticism of his management (Google Translate, 2021)]'.
- ⁶ 'Destituyen a tres exdirectores de Senavitat [Three former directors of Senavitat are dismissed (Google Translate, 2021)]', *Diario HOY* (9 Jan 2015), <https://www.hoy.com.py/nacionales/destituyen-a-tres-exdirectores-de-senavitat>, accessed May 2021.
- ⁷ Valeria Franco, Interview with case writers, 9 June 2021.
- ⁸ 'SENAVITAT apeló decisión de reponer a ex funcionarios acusados [SENAVITAT appealed the decision to reinstate accused former officials (Google Translate, 2021)]', *La Nación*, 16 Dec 2015, <https://www.lanacion.com.py/2015/12/16/senavitat-apelo-decision-de-reponer-a-ex-funcionarios-acusados/>, accessed May 2021.
- ⁹ Valeria Franco, Interview with case writers, 9 June 2021.
- ¹⁰ Ibid.
- ¹¹ Soledad Núñez, Interview with case writers, 16 Mar 2021; Soledad Núñez, Interview with case writers, 7 May 2021.
- ¹² 'Ley N° 3909 / Crea La Secretaría Nacional De La Vivienda Y El Hábitat "SENAVITAT" [Law No. 3909 / Creates the National Secretariat of Housing and Habitat "SENAVITAT" (Google Translate, 2021)]' (2010), Biblioteca y Archivo Central del Congreso de la Nación website, <https://www.bacn.gov.py/leyes-paraguayas/1538/ley-n-3909-crea-la-secretaria-nacional-de-la-vivienda-y-el-habitat-senavitat>, accessed May 2021.
- ¹³ 'Ley N° 3909 [Law No. 3909 (Google Translate, 2021)]'.
- ¹⁴ Soledad Núñez, 'Institutional Brief: National Secretariat for Housing and Habitat', Presentation at the Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, September 2016, <https://www.ichs.harvard.edu/blog/developing-a-new-urban-agenda-in-paraguay>, accessed May 2021; 'Ley N° 5.142 Que Aprueba El Presupuesto General De La Nación Para El Ejercicio Fiscal 2014', available at <http://biblioteca.mds.gov.py:8080/bitstream/handle/123456789/148/C1.12.%202014%20Ley%205142%20Que%20aprueba%20el%20PGN%202014.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>, accessed August 2021.
- ¹⁵ 'Misión', SENAVITAT website [archived], available at <https://web.archive.org/web/20130403013953/http://www.senavitat.gov.py/index.php>, accessed May 2021.
- ¹⁶ Leonardo Alfonzo, et al., 'Governance-Oriented Leadership in Public Agencies: The Case of SENAVITAT', Working Paper, Instituto Desarrollo Universidad de Buenos Aires, 26 June 2018, <https://desarrollo.edu.py/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/governance-oriented-leadership-articulo-a-ser-publicado.pdf>, accessed May 2021; 'Créditos Hipotecarios', SENAVITAT website [archived], available at <https://web.archive.org/web/20130304143023/http://www.senavitat.gov.py/credithipotecario.php>, accessed May 2021.
- ¹⁷ 'Organigrama Estructural SENAVITAT', Ministerio de Urbanismo, Vivienda y Hábitat website, <https://www.muvh.gov.py/sitio/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Organigrama-SENAVITAT-Res.-3030-Dic.-2015-Enero2016.jpg>, accessed May 2021.
- ¹⁸ 'Dirección General de Asesoría Jurídica y Notarial', Ministerio de Urbanismo, Vivienda y Hábitat website, <https://www.muvh.gov.py/direccion/direccion-general-de-asesoria-juridica-y-notarial/>, accessed May 2021.
- ¹⁹ 'Dirección General Técnica', Ministerio de Urbanismo, Vivienda y Hábitat website, <https://www.muvh.gov.py/direccion/direccion-general-tecnica/>, accessed May 2021.
- ²⁰ 'Dirección General de Administración y Finanzas', Ministerio de Urbanismo, Vivienda y Hábitat website, <https://www.muvh.gov.py/direccion/direccion-general-de-administracion-y-finanzas/>, accessed May 2021.
- ²¹ 'Dirección General Social', Ministerio de Urbanismo, Vivienda y Hábitat website, <https://www.muvh.gov.py/direccion/direccion-general-social/>, accessed May 2021.
- ²² SENAVITAT, 'PLANHAVI: Plan Nacional de Hábitat y Vivienda del Paraguay' (2012), <https://www.muvh.gov.py/?publicaciones=plan-nacional-de-habitat-y-vivienda-planhavi>, accessed May 2021.
- ²³ Ibid.
- ²⁴ Ibid.
- ²⁵ Ibid.
- ²⁶ 'Paraguay', UN-Water Global Analysis and Assessment of Sanitation and Drinking Water, https://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/glaas/2014/paraguay-14-mar-16.pdf?ua=1#:~:text=Paraguay%20has%20made%20considerable%20progress,to%20meet%20its%20MDG%20targets.

[&text=Progress%20Since%202007%2C%20Paraguay%20has,in%20urban%20and%20rural%20areas](#), accessed October 2021.

²⁷ SENAVITAT, 'PLANHAVI'.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Vega and Meza, 'Factores para la implementación exitosa del cambio organizacional [Factors for successful implementation of organizational change (Google Translate, 2021)]'.

³² Leonardo Alfonzo and José Molinas Vega (eds.), 'Cambio organizacional en el sector público paraguayo: Manual de Buenas Prácticas basado en el Caso SENAVITAT [Organizational change in the Paraguayan public sector: Good Practices Manual based on the SENAVITAT Case (Google Translate, 2021)]', https://www.conacyt.gov.py/sites/default/files/upload_editores/u454/Cambio%20Organizacional%20en%20el%20Sector%20P%C3%ABlico%20Paraguayo%20%281%29.pdf, accessed May 2021.

³³ Leonardo Alfonzo, et al., 'Governance-Oriented Leadership in Public Agencies: The Case of SENAVITAT', Working Paper, Instituto Desarrollo Universidad de Buenos Aires, 26 June 2018, <https://desarrollo.edu.py/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/governance-oriented-leadership-articulo-a-ser-publicado.pdf>, accessed May 2021.

³⁴ Transparency International, 'Evaluación del Sistema Nacional de Integridad [Evaluation of the National System of Integrity (Google Translate, 2021)]'.

³⁵ 'Paraguay Corruption Report', Gan Integrity Risk & Compliance Portal (Sep 2020), <https://www.ganintegrity.com/portal/country-profiles/paraguay/>, accessed October 2021.

³⁶ Ibid.; Emmanuelle Auriol, Stéphane Straub and Thomas Flochel, 'Public Procurement and Rent-Seeking: The Case of Paraguay', *World Development*, vol. 77 (Jan 2016), pp. 395-407.

³⁷ Transparency International, 'Evaluación del Sistema Nacional de Integridad [Evaluation of the National System of Integrity (Google Translate, 2021)]'.

³⁸ Gallup, Gallup World Poll, 2015 accessed through Gallup Analytics, August 2021.

³⁹ 'Ley N° 1626/De La Función Pública,' (28 December 2000), available at <https://www.bacn.gov.py/leyes-paraguayas/1711/ley-n-1626-de-la-funcion-publica>, accessed August 2021.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² The World Bank, 'Worldwide Governance Indicators', <https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wqi/Home/Reports>, accessed May 2021.

⁴³ Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index (2015), <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2015/index/nzl>, accessed August 2021; Transparency International, Global Corruption Barometer (2013), <https://www.transparency.org/en/publications/global-corruption-barometer-2013>, accessed August 2021.

⁴⁴ Gilbert James Butland, 'Paraguay', *Encyclopedia Britannica*, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Paraguay>, accessed May 2021.

⁴⁵ Jeff Wallenfeldt, 'Horacio Cartes', *Encyclopedia Britannica*, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Horacio-Cartes>, accessed May 2021.

⁴⁶ Soledad Núñez, Interview with case writers, 7 May 2021.

⁴⁷ Soledad Núñez, 'Institutional Brief: National Secretariat for Housing and Habitat'; Luis Echagüe, 'Nativos denuncian la mala calidad de casas de Senavitat [Natives denounce the poor quality of Senavitat's houses (Google Translate, 2021)]', *Ultima Hora* (11 Mar 2012), <https://www.ultimahora.com/nativos-denuncian-la-mala-calidad-casas-senavitat-n510318.html>, accessed May 2021.

⁴⁸ Leonardo Alfonzo and Alejandro M Estévez, 'Transformación de la Política Habitacional en Paraguay: Dinámica del límite entre lo público y privado [Transformation of Housing Policy in Paraguay: Dynamics of the boundary between public and private (Google Translate, 2021)]', in Leonardo Alfonzo and José Molinas Vega (eds.), 'Cambio organizacional en el sector público paraguayo: Manual de Buenas Prácticas basado en el Caso SENAVITAT [Organizational change in the Paraguayan public sector: Good Practices Manual based on the SENAVITAT Case (Google Translate, 2021)]', https://www.conacyt.gov.py/sites/default/files/upload_editores/u454/Cambio%20Organizacional%20en%20el%20Sector%20P%C3%ABlico%20Paraguayo%20%281%29.pdf, accessed May 2021.

⁴⁹ Rossana Escobar, 'Senavitat pagó G. 1.437 millones por 149 viviendas fantasmas en Mbuyapey [Senavitat paid G. 1,437 million for 149 ghost houses in Mbuyapey (Google Translate, 2021)]', *Ultima Hora* (28 Jul 2014), <https://www.ultimahora.com/senavitat-pago-g-1437-millones-149-viviendas-fantasmas-mbuyapey-n815769.html>, accessed May 2021.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ 'Senavitat necesita G. 350 mil millones para concluir 10.000 viviendas paradas [Senavitat needs G. 350 billion to complete 10,000 idle homes (Google Translate, 2021)]', *Ultima Hora* (23 Jul 2014), <https://www.ultimahora.com/senavitat-necesita-g-350-mil-millones-concluir-10000-viviendas-paradas-n814326.html>, accessed May 2021.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Soledad Núñez, 'Institutional Brief: National Secretariat for Housing and Habitat'.

⁵⁴ 'Paró construcción de 8.500 viviendas [Construction of 8,500 homes stopped (Google Translate, 2021)]', ABC (12 Dec 2013), <https://www.abc.com.py/nacionales/paro-construccion-de-8500-viviendas-645502.html>, accessed May 2021.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

- ⁵⁶ 'Cambian a Knapps de las Senavitat luego de duras críticas a su gestión [They change Knapps from Senavitat after harsh criticism of his management (Google Translate, 2021)]', ABC, 1 Oct 2014, <https://www.abc.com.py/edicion-impresa/economia/cambian-a-knapps-de-la-senavitat-luego-de-duras-criticas-a-su-gestion-1291624.html>, accessed May 2021.
- ⁵⁷ Ibid.
- ⁵⁸ 'La Fiscalía impute al ex presidente de Senavitat por lesión de confianza [The Prosecutor's Office charged the former president of Senavitat with a breach of trust (Google Translate, 2021)]', *Ultima Hora* (12 Aug 2014), <https://www.ultimahora.com/la-fiscalia-imputo-al-ex-presidente-senavitat-lesion-confianza-n820000.html>, accessed May 2021.
- ⁵⁹ 'Senavitat: Aparacen más pagos de anticipos que dejan casas fantasmas [Senavitat: More advance payments appear leaving ghost houses (Google Translate, 2021)]', *Ultima Hora* (11 Aug 2014), <https://www.ultimahora.com/senavitat-aparecen-mas-pagos-anticipos-que-dejan-casas-fantasmas-n819654.html>, accessed May 2021.
- ⁶⁰ Elías Cabral, 'Denuncian politización en concesiones de Senavitat en Curuguaty [They denounce politicization in Senavitat concessions in Curuguaty (Google Translate, 2021)]', *Ultima Hora* (10 Apr 2014), <https://www.ultimahora.com/denuncian-politizacion-concesiones-senavitat-curuguaty-n785147.html>, accessed May 2021; 'Senavitat vuelve a adjudicar proyectos a intermediarias de obras inconclusas [Senavitat once again awards projects to intermediaries for unfinished works (Google Translate, 2021)]', *Ultima Hora* (4 Sep 2014), <https://www.ultimahora.com/senavitat-vuelve-adjudicar-proyectos-intermediarios-obras-inconclusas-n826558.html>, accessed May 2021.
- ⁶¹ 'Barco sin timón: El internismo se apodera de la Senavitat [Ship without a rudder: Internism takes over the Senavitat (Google Translate, 2021)]', *Ultima Hora* (23 Aug 2014), <https://www.ultimahora.com/barco-timon-el-internismo-se-apodera-la-senavitat-n822975.html>, accessed May 2021.
- ⁶² Ibid.
- ⁶³ 'Senavitat sigue con entrega de subsidios habitacionales [Senavitat continues with the delivery of housing subsidies (Google Translate, 2021)]', *Ultima Hora* (8 Aug 2014), <https://www.ultimahora.com/senavitat-sigue-entrega-subsidios-habitacionales-n818905.html>, accessed August 2021.
- ⁶⁴ 'Informe de Senavitat no convence a diputados y dudan que se logre meta [Senavitat report does not convince deputies and they doubt that goal will be achieved (Google Translate, 2021)]', *Ultima Hora* (8 Sep 2014), <https://www.ultimahora.com/informe-senavitat-no-convence-diputados-y-dudan-que-se-logre-meta-n827654.html>, accessed May 2021.
- ⁶⁵ Ibid.
- ⁶⁶ 'Seccionalero habla de retirar apoyo a Cartes [Sectionalist talks about withdrawing support for Cartes (Google Translate, 2021)]', ABC (4 Oct 2014), <https://www.abc.com.py/edicion-impresa/politica/seccionalero-habla-de-retirar-apoyo-a-cartes-1292774.html>, accessed May 2021; 'Colorados disidentes cuestionan designación de nueva ministra [Dissident Colorados question appointment of new minister (Google Translate, 2021)]', *Ultima Hora* (3 Oct 2021), <https://www.ultimahora.com/colorados-disidentes-cuestionan-designacion-nueva-ministra-n835147.html>, accessed May 2021.
- ⁶⁷ Soledad Núñez: "La pobreza es una situación que cobra vidas todos los días" [Soledad Núñez: "Poverty is a situation that takes lives every day" (Google Translate, 2021)]', TECHO website (21 Feb 2014), <https://www.techo.org/informate/soledad-nunez-y-la-situacion-de-pobreza/>, accessed May 2021.
- ⁶⁸ 'María Soledad Nunez Mendez, a former minister seeks professional development', Blavatnik School of Government website (Feb 2019), <https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/study/mpp/student-experiences/maria-soledad-nunez-mendez-former-minister-seeks-professional-development>, accessed May 2021.
- ⁶⁹ Soledad Núñez, Interview with case writers, 5 Mar 2021.
- ⁷⁰ 'María Soledad Núñez Mendez', World Economic Forum website, <https://www.weforum.org/people/maria-soledad-nunez-mendez>, accessed May 2021; 'Equipo Nacional Estrategia País (ENEP)', AICESIS website, <http://www.aicesis.org/database/organization/151/characteristics/>, accessed May 2021.
- ⁷¹ Soledad Núñez, comments given to case writers, 6 Oct 2021.
- ⁷² Soledad Núñez, Interview with case writers, 5 Mar 2021.
- ⁷³ Ibid.
- ⁷⁴ Ibid.
- ⁷⁵ Ibid.
- ⁷⁶ Ibid.
- ⁷⁷ Ibid.
- ⁷⁸ Soledad Núñez, Interview with case writers, 16 Mar 2021; Tamara Celano, 'Soledad Núñez', *Ultima Hora* (5 Apr 2015), <https://www.ultimahora.com/soledad-nunez-n885376.html>, accessed October 2021.
- ⁷⁹ 'Seccionalero habla de retirar apoyo a Cartes [Sectionalists talk about withdrawing support for Cartes (Google Translate, 2021)]' ABC (4 October 2014), <https://www.abc.com.py/edicion-impresa/politica/seccionalero-habla-de-retirar-apoyo-a-cartes-1292774.html>, accessed August 2021.
- ⁸⁰ 'Senavitat culpa a ley por la baja ejecución [Senavitat blames law for low execution (Google Translate, 2021)]', *Ultima Hora* (13 June 2012), <https://www.ultimahora.com/senavitat-culpa-ley-la-baja-ejecucion-n536252.html>, accessed August 2021; 'A un año de gestión, Senavitat ahora apura las licitaciones para viviendas [After a year of management, Senavitat now rushes the bids for housing (Google Translate, 2021)]', *Ultima Hora* (17 August 2014), <https://www.ultimahora.com/a-un-ano-gestion-senavitat-ahora-apura-las-licitaciones-viviendas-n821286.html>, accessed August 2021.
- ⁸¹ 'Ley N° 5.142 Que Aprueba El Presupuesto General De La Nación Para El Ejercicio Fiscal 2014', available at <http://biblioteca.mds.gov.py:8080/bitstream/handle/123456789/148/C1.12.%202014%20Ley%205142%20Que%20apru>

- [eba%20el%20PGN%202014.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y](#), accessed August 2021; SENAVITAT, 'Rendición de Cuentas: Gobierno Horacio Cartes, 2013-2018 [Accountability period: Government Horacio Cartes, 2013-2018 (Google Translate, 2021)]', (May 2018) <https://www.muvh.gov.py/sitio/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Informe-de-Gesti%C3%B3n-SENAVITAT-Borrador-Actualizado-a-Mayo-2018.pdf>, accessed May 2021.
- ⁸² 'A un año de gestión [After a year of management (Google Translate, 2021)]'.
- ⁸³ 'Ley N° 5.386 Que Aprueba El Presupuesto General De La Nación Para El Ejercicio Fiscal 2015', available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/PDFs/mesicic5_pry_ley_PGN_5386.pdf, accessed August 2021.
- ⁸⁴ Rebeca González Garcete, 'La Senavitat, lista para despegar [Senavitat, ready to take off (Google Translate, 2021)]', *Mandua* (Aug 2018), <https://www.mandua.com.py/la-senavitat-lista-para-despegar-n403>, accessed May 2021.
- ⁸⁵ Ibid.
- ⁸⁶ Soledad Núñez, Interview with case writers, 7 May 2021.
- ⁸⁷ Ibid.
- ⁸⁸ Soledad Núñez, Interview with case writers, 5 Mar 2021.
- ⁸⁹ Vega and Meza, 'Factores para la implementación exitosa del cambio organizacional [Factors for successful implementation of organizational change (Google Translate, 2021)]'.
- ⁹⁰ González Garcete, 'La Senavitat, lista para despegar [Senavitat, ready to take off (Google Translate, 2021)]'.
- ⁹¹ 'Senavitat dice que tiene solo cinco técnicos para fiscalizar 4.680 obras [Senavitat says it has only five technicians to supervise 4,680 works (Google Translate, 2021)]', *Ultima Hora* (5 Sep 2014), <https://www.ultimahora.com/senavitat-dice-que-tiene-solo-cinco-tecnicos-fiscalizar-4680-obras-n826949.html>, accessed May 2021; 'Solo 10% del staff de Senavitat son técnicos [Only 10% of Senavitat staff are technicians (Google Translate, 2021)]', *Ultima Hora* (11 Oct 2014), <https://www.ultimahora.com/solo-10-del-staff-senavitat-son-tecnicos-n837505.html>, accessed May 2021.
- ⁹² Alfonzo and Estévez, 'Tranformación de la Política Habitacional en Paraguay [Tranformation of Housing Policy in Paraguay (Google Translate, 2021)]'.
- ⁹³ Soledad Núñez, Interview with case writers, 7 May 2021.
- ⁹⁴ SENAVITAT, 'Rendición de Cuentas: Gobierno Horacio Cartes, 2013-2018 [Accountability period: Government Horacio Cartes, 2013-2018 (Google Translate, 2021)]'.
- ⁹⁵ Soledad Núñez, Interview with case writers, 7 May 2021.
- ⁹⁶ Soledad Núñez, Interview with case writers, 5 Mar 2021.
- ⁹⁷ Ibid.
- ⁹⁸ Soledad Núñez, 'What should public leaders do to build institutions with integrity?: The Case of Paraguay', draft discussion paper for the building integrity programme, Blavatnik School of Government, unpublished.
- ⁹⁹ Soledad Núñez, Interview with case writers, 16 Mar 2021.
- ¹⁰⁰ Soledad Núñez, Interview with case writers, 5 Mar 2021.
- ¹⁰¹ Ibid.
- ¹⁰² Ibid.
- ¹⁰³ Valeria Franco, Interview with case writers, 9 June 2021.
- ¹⁰⁴ Soledad Núñez, Interview with case writers, 7 May 2021.
- ¹⁰⁵ Ibid.
- ¹⁰⁶ Soledad Núñez, Interview with case writers, 5 Mar 2021.
- ¹⁰⁷ Ibid.
- ¹⁰⁸ Ibid.
- ¹⁰⁹ Ibid.
- ¹¹⁰ Ibid.
- ¹¹¹ Alfonzo, et al., 'Governance-Oriented Leadership in Public Agencies'.
- ¹¹² Soledad Núñez, Interview with case writers, 16 Mar 2021.
- ¹¹³ Soledad Núñez, Interview with case writers, 7 May 2021.
- ¹¹⁴ Ibid.
- ¹¹⁵ Ibid.
- ¹¹⁶ 'Un tercio de las viviendas de Senavitat, paralizadas [A third of SENAVITAT's homes, paralyzed (Google Translate, 2021)]', *ABC* (4 Dec 2014), <https://www.abc.com.py/edicion-impresa/economia/un-tercio-de-las-viviendas-de-senavitat-paralizadas-1312883.html>, accessed May 2021.
- ¹¹⁷ González Garcete, 'La Senavitat, lista para despegar [Senavitat, ready to take off (Google Translate, 2021)]'.
- ¹¹⁸ Ibid.
- ¹¹⁹ Valeria Franco, Interview with case writers, 9 June 2021.
- ¹²⁰ Ibid.
- ¹²¹ Soledad Núñez, Interview with case writers, 5 Mar 2021.
- ¹²² Vega and Meza, 'Factores para la implementación exitosa del cambio organizacional [Factors for successful implementation of organizational change (Google Translate, 2021)]'.
- ¹²³ Ibid.
- ¹²⁴ Soledad Núñez, 'What should public leaders do to build institutions with integrity?'.
¹²⁵ Vega and Meza, 'Factores para la implementación exitosa del cambio organizacional [Factors for successful implementation of organizational change (Google Translate, 2021)]'.
- ¹²⁶ Soledad Núñez, Interview with case writers, 7 May 2021.
- ¹²⁷ Ibid.
- ¹²⁸ Soledad Núñez, Interview with case writers, 5 Mar 2021.
- ¹²⁹ Soledad Núñez, 'What should public leaders do to build institutions with integrity?'.

- ¹³⁰ Ibid.; 'Mapa de viviendas online [Online housing map (Google Translate, 2021)]', ABC (16 Dec 2014), <https://www.abc.com.py/nacionales/mapa-de-viviendas-online-1316851.html>, accessed May 2021.
- ¹³¹ Soledad Núñez, Interview with case writers, 7 May 2021.
- ¹³² Soledad Núñez, 'What should public leaders do to build institutions with integrity?'; Silvana Bogarín Toledo, 'Núñez: "Queremos intervenciones integrales" [Núñez: "We want comprehensive interventions" (Google Translate, 2021)]', ABC (8 May 2016), <https://www.abc.com.py/edicion-impresa/suplementos/empresas-y-negocios/nunez-queremos-intervenciones-integrales-1478044.html>, accessed May 2021.
- ¹³³ Soledad Núñez, 'What should public leaders do to build institutions with integrity?'.
¹³⁴ Ibid.; Alfonzo and Vega (eds.), 'Cambio organizacional en el sector público paraguayo [Organizational change in the Paraguayan public sector:(Google Translate, 2021)]'.
¹³⁵ Ibid.
- ¹³⁶ 'Destituyen a tres exdirectores de Senavitat [Three former directors of Senavitat are dismissed (Google Translate, 2021)]'.
- ¹³⁷ 'Inventaban datos de móviles oficiales [They invented official mobile data (Google Translate, 2021)]', ABC (31 Aug 2015), <https://www.abc.com.py/edicion-impresa/politica/inventaban-datos-de-moviles-oficiales-1403352.html>, accessed May 2021.
- ¹³⁸ Soledad Núñez, Interview with case writers, 5 Mar 2021.
- ¹³⁹ Ibid.
- ¹⁴⁰ Valeria Franco, Interview with case writers, 9 June 2021.
- ¹⁴¹ Ibid.
- ¹⁴² Silvana Bogarín Toledo, 'Núñez: "Queremos intervenciones integrales" [Núñez: "We want comprehensive interventions" (Google Translate, 2021)]', ABC (8 May 2016), <https://www.abc.com.py/edicion-impresa/suplementos/empresas-y-negocios/nunez-queremos-intervenciones-integrales-1478044.html>, accessed May 2021.
- ¹⁴³ SENAVITAT, 'Rendición de Cuentas: Gobierno Horacio Cartes, 2013-2018 [Accountability period: Government Horacio Cartes, 2013-2018 (Google Translate, 2021)]'.
- ¹⁴⁴ 'Jefe de Estado exige a titular de Senavitat apurar y aumentar las viviendas sociales [Head of State demands that the head of Senavitat speed up and increase social housing (Google Translate, 2021)]', ABC (19 Mar 2015), <https://www.abc.com.py/edicion-impresa/politica/jefe-de-estado-exige-a-titular-de-senavitat-apurar-y-aumentar-las-viviendas-sociales-1348002.html>, accessed May 2021; 'Ley Nº 5.142 Que Aprueba El Presupuesto General De La Nación Para El Ejercicio Fiscal 2014', available at <http://biblioteca.mds.gov.py:8080/bitstream/handle/123456789/148/C1.12.%202014%20Ley%205142%20Que%20aprueba%20el%20PGN%202014.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>, accessed August 2021; 'Ley Nº 5.386 Que Aprueba El Presupuesto General De La Nación Para El Ejercicio Fiscal 2015', available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/PDFs/mesicic5_pry_ley_PGN_5386.pdf, accessed August 2021.
- ¹⁴⁵ 'Titular de la Senavitat destituye a 3 funcionarios [Senavitat head dismisses 3 officials (Google Translate, 2021)]', Última Hora (9 Jan 2015), <https://www.ultimahora.com/titular-la-senavitat-destituye-3-funcionarios-n862633.html>, accessed May 2021; 'Destituyen a tres exdirectores de Senavitat [Three former directors of Senavitat are dismissed (Google Translate, 2021)]'.
- ¹⁴⁶ 'Destituidos de Senavitat por corrupción seguirán fuera de la institución [Dismissed from Senavitat for corruption will remain outside the institution (Google Translate, 2021)], ABC (21 Dec 2015), <https://www.abc.com.py/edicion-impresa/economia/destituidos-de-senavitat-por-corrupcion-seguiran-fuera-de-la-institucion-1438080.html>, accessed May 2021; 'SENAVITAT apeló decision de reponer a ex funcionarios acusados [SENAVITAT appealed the decision to reinstate accused former officials (Google Translate, 2021)], La Nación (16 Dec 2015), <https://www.lanacion.com.py/2015/12/16/senavitat-apelo-decision-de-reponer-a-ex-funcionarios-acusados/>, accessed May 2021.
- ¹⁴⁷ 'Senavitat destituye a exdirectores por presuntas irregularidades [Senavitat dismisses former directors for alleged irregularities (Google Translate, 2021)]', ABC (9 Jan 2015), <https://www.abc.com.py/nacionales/senavitat-destituye-a-exdirectores-por-presuntas-irregularidades-1325132.html>, accessed May 2021.
- ¹⁴⁸ Ibid.; 'Destituyen a directores por millonaria "tragada" [Directors dismissed for millions "swallowed" (Google Translate, 2021)]', ABC (9 Jan 2015), <https://www.abc.com.py/edicion-impresa/economia/destituyen-a-directores-por-millonaria-tragada-1325259.html>, accessed May 2021.
- ¹⁴⁹ Soledad Núñez, Interview with case writers, 16 Mar 2021.
- ¹⁵⁰ Ibid.
- ¹⁵¹ Ibid.
- ¹⁵² Ibid.
- ¹⁵³ Ibid.
- ¹⁵⁴ Ibid.
- ¹⁵⁵ Valeria Franco, Interview with case writers, 9 June 2021.
- ¹⁵⁶ 'Senavitat apeló decision de reponer a ex funcionarios acusados [Senavitat appealed the decision to reinstate accused former officials (Google Translate, 2021)]'.
- ¹⁵⁷ Valeria Franco, Interview with case writers, 9 June 2021.
- ¹⁵⁸ Soledad Núñez, Interview with case writers, 5 Mar 2021.
- ¹⁵⁹ Ibid.
- ¹⁶⁰ Soledad Núñez, Interview with case writers, 7 May 2021.
- ¹⁶¹ SENAVITAT, 'Rendición de Cuentas: Gobierno Horacio Cartes, 2013-2018 [Accountability period: Government Horacio Cartes, 2013-2018 (Google Translate, 2021)]'.

¹⁶² SENAVIDAT, 'Rendición de Cuentas: Gobierno Horacio Cartes, 2013-2018 [Accountability period: Government Horacio Cartes, 2013-2018 (Google Translate, 2021)]'.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Silvana Bogarín Toledo, 'Núñez: "Queremos intervenciones integrales" [Núñez: "We want comprehensive interventions" (Google Translate, 2021)]'.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Valeria Franco, Interview with case writers, 9 June 2021.

¹⁶⁸ Soledad Núñez, Interview with case writers, 16 Mar 2021.

¹⁶⁹ Soledad Núñez, Interview with case writers, 7 May 2021.

¹⁷⁰ Valeria Franco, Interview with case writers, 9 June 2021.

¹⁷¹ 'Inventaban datos de móviles oficiales [They invented official mobile data (Google Translate, 2021)]'; 'Senavitat: investigan más desvíos de combustible [Senavitat: investigating more fuel diversions (Google Translate, 2021)]', ABC (23 Aug 2015), <https://www.abc.com.py/nacionales/senavitat-desvio-de-combustibles-puede-ser-aun-mayor-1400984.html>, accessed May 2021.

¹⁷² 'Inventaban datos de móviles oficiales [They invented official mobile data (Google Translate, 2021)]'.

¹⁷³ Soledad Núñez, Interview with case writers, 16 Mar 2021; 'Arresto en el caso Senavitat [Arrest in the Senavitat case (Google Translate, 2021)]', ABC (20 Apr 2016), <https://www.abc.com.py/edicion-impresa/judiciales-y-policiales/arresto-en-el-caso-senavitat-1472641.html>, accessed May 2021.

¹⁷⁴ Soledad Núñez, Interview with case writers, 16 Mar 2021.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Soledad Núñez, Interview with case writers, 7 May 2021.

¹⁷⁸ Soledad Núñez, Interview with case writers, 16 Mar 2021.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.; Soledad Núñez, Interview with case writers, 7 May 2021.

¹⁸⁰ Soledad Núñez, Interview with case writers, 7 May 2021.

¹⁸¹ Soledad Núñez, Interview with case writers, 5 Mar 2021.

¹⁸² Soledad Núñez, Interview with case writers, 7 May 2021.

¹⁸³ 'Paraguay – 1000s Affected by Rising River Levels in Asunción', *Floodlist News* (11 Dec 2015)

<http://floodlist.com/america/paraguay-1000s-affected-rising-river-levels-in-asuncion>, accessed May 2021.

¹⁸⁴ 'Ley Nº 5554 / Que Aprueba El Presupuesto General De La Nación Para El Ejercicio Fiscal 2016', available on Ministry of Finance website, <https://www.hacienda.gov.py/web-hacienda/archivo.php?a=7e7e8187928b918c904c8d848b4f4d4e534c8982963d8d848b4f4d4e534b8d81837e01d&x=acac04b&y=e4e4083>, accessed October 2021; Silvana Bogarín Toledo, 'Núñez: "Queremos intervenciones integrales"

[Núñez: "We want comprehensive interventions" (Google Translate, 2021)]'.

¹⁸⁵ Soledad Núñez, Interview with case writers, 7 May 2021.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.