

## Civil Service reform in Ghana

16 June 2022

Accra, 2014: Nana Agyekum-Dwamena scribbled on his stack of sticky notes – he always carried it around to write down new ideas – as he left a meeting with several World Bank officials. Just a few weeks prior, he had been appointed as Ghana's Head of Civil Service, taking the helm of the organisation where he had worked for more than two decades helping to implement various reform initiatives. Now in 2014 he was responsible for developing a strategy to drive performance across the entire institution. But the Civil Service he inherited was widely perceived as ineffective – plagued by laziness, low motivation, and corruption. 'I want to change the way this place works,' Agyekum-Dwamena said on taking the job.<sup>1</sup>

And now he had a potential opportunity to do just that: World Bank officials had come for an exploratory meeting to discuss funding reform. They were open to supporting a multi-year reform project designed by Agyekum-Dwamena and his team to improve the fundamental structures and processes of the Civil Service. This had been a common approach in Ghana: since the 1980s, the Civil Service had implemented over half a dozen major performance-oriented reform programmes, most of which had been funded by donors. These past reform projects had achieved some successes, but typically fell well short of expectations. New rules and processes were often established on paper but not implemented in practice, and they did not have a tangible impact on day-to-day work. Moreover, few initiatives were sustained over time, often ending when the funding ran out or a new administration came to power.

This ebb and flow of reform had made it difficult for the Civil Service to improve performance. The massive institution, with 25 ministries, 26 departments, and 14,200 employees, remained a slow-moving bureaucracy. Rigid rules and an embedded hierarchy limited opportunities for innovation. High performers felt stuck in their roles and unrecognised, while poor performers faced few consequences. Citizens, in turn, had to endure long and complicated processes – or else sometimes paid extra fees to evade official paths altogether.<sup>2</sup> Enhancing Civil Service performance was vital to the country's development, particularly since Ghana's economic position was deteriorating with a significant fiscal deficit in 2014, driven, in part, by a large public-sector wage bill.

Agyekum-Dwamena considered the prospect of implementing another major reform programme. He felt that the targets, timelines, and conditions of these donor-funded projects were not always helpful, and often came with a heavy administrative cost. Moreover, they had not yet proven able to embed a culture of performance improvement. But he recognised that access to this additional funding might be necessary to address service-wide issues; past reform programmes had cost millions of dollars in consultant fees, personnel allowances, and direct reform costs. Refusing a multimillion-dollar opportunity from a development partner might be a risky move, especially given the government's difficult financial constraints and pressures to improve the Civil Service, from both the president and the public alike.

Agyekum-Dwamena was deeply committed to improving civil-service performance, but the question was how to bring about lasting change. He wondered if he and his team should design a reform programme to pitch to the World Bank, or try something different altogether. Before he next met with the World Bank officials, he needed to decide just what exactly he wanted to change to improve performance, and what levers were available for doing so.

---

Copyright © University of Oxford 2022. Associate Professor Martin J Williams and Senior Case Writer Sarah McAra prepared this case, which draws substantially on material from Williams's book, *Implementing Civil Service Reform in Africa*. Special thanks to Nana Agyekum-Dwamena for his insights and comments. Certain details of the case may have been fictionalised to serve pedagogical purposes. Cases are developed solely as the basis for class discussion and are not intended to serve as endorsements, sources of primary data, or illustrations of effective or ineffective management. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, whether by photocopying or storing in any medium by electronic means or otherwise, except as permitted by law, without permission in writing from the University of Oxford.

## Overview of the Civil Service

The history of Ghana's Civil Service originated in the British colonial bureaucracy of the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. The British Colonial Service focused on advancing imperial policy; it was oriented towards maintaining order and social control, collecting tax revenue, and exploiting natural resources, not towards delivering developmental policies and services.<sup>3</sup> During this time, the British held the more senior roles and relegated Ghanaians to lower ranks. Bringing more Ghanaians into the Civil Service, known as Africanisation, became an increasingly significant political goal in the 1950s as Ghana gained independence.<sup>4</sup>

The late-1950s to the mid-1970s was considered 'the good days of the civil service,' according to political scientist Joseph Ayee.<sup>5</sup> Not only were civil servants 'well-trained, and adequately remunerated and resourced', Ayee wrote, but the 'size of the service was "manageable" and security of tenure as well as the anonymity and neutrality of civil servants were guaranteed.'<sup>6</sup> The Civil Service was widely commended for its high productivity during this time.<sup>7</sup>

Then in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Ghana fell into a period of economic crisis and political turmoil. The Civil Service struggled to implement development policies and to manage public resources. It had become overstaffed at junior levels but understaffed at senior levels, and wages declined.<sup>8</sup> Cumbersome bureaucracy, poor resource allocation, and limited political direction constrained the service,<sup>9</sup> which, at the time, was described as a 'moribund, paper-pushing institution'.<sup>10</sup> Overall, morale, performance, and productivity were low.<sup>11</sup> By the mid-1980s, structural adjustment had prompted some restructuring and cost-saving measures. These reforms also started to target improved performance and service delivery, sparking a series of performance-oriented reform initiatives that would continue for the next 30 years.

## The modern Civil Service

In 1992, following a period of military rule, Ghana returned to democracy with multiparty elections and a new constitution. The constitution established the Civil Service as a part of the wider Public Service, which included frontline services such as policing and teaching under separate administrative hierarchies. The Civil Service was responsible for core policymaking and oversight functions, while others such as the Education Service actually delivered public services. The 1993 Civil Service Act further defined the structure and responsibilities of the service, with each of the dozens of ministries led by a Minister and a Chief Director. (See **Exhibit 1** for the structure.) Chief Directors (equivalent to permanent secretaries in Westminster-style systems) were appointed by the president and served as the administrative heads of ministries.<sup>12</sup> The 1993 Act also strengthened the Office of the Head of Civil Service (OHCS), which provided central management and human resources (HR) policies for the whole Civil Service.<sup>13</sup> The OHCS was led by the Head of Civil Service, who was appointed by the president.

Civil servants were the professional officers who developed and oversaw policy from ministerial headquarters, usually based in the capital, Accra. (See **Exhibit 2** for staff numbers.) Most were career civil servants, selected through a centralised process through the OHCS. They remained in place even as political administrations changed. Turnover after elections was typically limited to some Chief Directors, Directors (heads of units), and political appointees and special advisors in ministers' offices. Civil servants had various motivations for joining the public sector, including a sense of civic duty: a survey found that 83% joined 'to serve my community or my country.'<sup>14</sup> Job security also appealed.<sup>15</sup> Legislation and unionisation gave strong tenure protections, and it was difficult to be fired, except in cases of extreme misconduct. As a former tax commissioner put it, 'you don't lose your job, it is taken as a permanent for life.'<sup>16</sup>

## Nana Agyekum-Dwamena

Agyekum-Dwamena had developed extensive reform experience during his long career in the Civil Service. He joined in 1988 and was placed at the Management Services Department

(MSD) in the OHCS. In this first role, he interviewed officers from around the Civil Service to inform retrenchment decisions as part of a major reform wave. 'Really the key thing was that it made me appreciate the breadth and scope of the Civil Service,' he reflected.<sup>17</sup> He also saw how differently offices approached the exercise. 'There were some people who had already prepared data to show us while others had nothing to show,' he recalled. 'So from day one, I got to know that there were different routes to which organisations would respond to issues from the centre [the OHCS].'<sup>18</sup>

In 1995, he was named head of the Reform Coordinating Unit at the OHCS, responsible for institutionalising reform initiatives such as organisational performance improvement and a new individual appraisal system.<sup>19</sup> He particularly admired his boss at the time, Head of Civil Service Robert Doodoo. He described him as a 'maverick leader', with a strong vision for the nation and deep commitment to reform. Doodoo had high expectations for his team, Agyekum-Dwamena recalled, but in return for hard work, he gave them independence to try new ideas.<sup>20</sup>

In 2005, Agyekum-Dwamena continued to rise the ranks when he was appointed director of the Performance Management Division where he was tasked with implementing performance improvement initiatives. Then from 2011 to 2013, he returned to the MSD as the Executive Secretary where he led a team helping organisations deliver on their service-delivery goals. For instance, they supported the passport agency in establishing two service streams at their office, with one window for regular processes and another for expedited and specialist processes. While it was considered an effective improvement, implementation took much longer than anticipated. Nonetheless, Agyekum-Dwamena was inspired by these promising signs. 'If we lead organisations properly and get them involved, they can achieve a lot of things,' he said.<sup>21</sup> He also focused on improving performance in his own department. 'I learned that leadership is one of the key things, and that depends on getting people involved, building their capacity, creating an atmosphere of sharing.'<sup>22</sup> For instance, he implemented a system of continuous improvement for his team, where once a month individuals could give a lecture to their peers about something they had been studying. 'If you think carefully, you can find ways to improve an organisation without huge resources.'<sup>23</sup>

Then in January 2014, Agyekum-Dwamena was asked to serve as the Acting Head of Civil Service and was officially appointed to the role later that year. This position was the culmination of his Civil Service experience. 'I was thrown into the furnace of reforms from the very beginning of my time with the Civil Service,' he reflected. 'Since then, I've realised that we cannot continue with business as usual.'<sup>24</sup> Reform was a deeply personal mission to him: he wanted to create an institution where his children would be proud to work, as well as contribute to the country's progress. 'I am committed to helping make Ghana a nation that is great and strong,' he said.<sup>25</sup> However, his time in the role was uncertain: he had five years until the standard retirement age, but also knew he could be dismissed by the president at any time, especially if a new administration came into office in the 2016 elections.

## Ghana in 2014: demanding better services

Agyekum-Dwamena was appointed to lead the Civil Service by President John Dramani Mahama of the National Democratic Congress (NDC). Mahama had been the vice president in 2012 when the president at the time, John Atta Mills, died suddenly. Mahama subsequently won presidential elections later that year with an agenda that included growing the economy and improving government accountability.<sup>26</sup> The next presidential election was set for 2016. Since the 1992 elections, power had alternated between the two main parties, the NDC and the New Patriotic Party (NPP). Increasingly thin margins separated them at the polls; Mahama had won the 2012 election by just 3% of the vote.<sup>27</sup>

Agyekum-Dwamena came to the helm of the Civil Service at a challenging time for Ghana. The country had long been seen as a regional leader for tackling several development goals, particularly poverty: from 2006 to 2013 its poverty rate fell from 31% to 24%.<sup>28</sup> However, rising

inflation, a declining currency, and a large deficit were threatening to stall progress. Underlying the deficit was a massive wage bill that resulted from a major public-sector salary restructuring in the late 2000s and early 2010s. While the new salary structure had been seen as a boon for staff retention and welfare, it had come at a huge cost.<sup>29</sup> Public-sector wages as a share of GDP had doubled since 2000, reaching 10% of GDP in 2013.<sup>30</sup> And the wage bill peaked at more than 60% of tax revenue in 2013, above the 28% average in sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>31</sup> In 2014, the government announced plans to cut the wage bill to 35% of tax revenue in three years.<sup>32</sup>

An effective Civil Service was vital for achieving Ghana's development goals, and Ghanaians had developed a growing expectation of better public services, particularly after the salary restructuring. As President Mahama noted in his 2013 state of the nation address, 'It is said "to whom much is given, much is expected". The people of Ghana demand better service from our public sector employees commensurate to the investment made in their remuneration.'<sup>33</sup>

### The state of the Civil Service in 2014

Politicians and the public alike wanted to see a more effective Civil Service. As former President Jerry John Rawlings (NDC) explained, the Civil Service had a reputation as a 'large bureaucracy that epitomises bad customer service, deliberate delay tactics and inefficiency'.<sup>34</sup> Indeed, the Civil Service faced a number of barriers to performance.

#### Human resources management

Recruiting the right people for the right jobs was an important factor in the overall performance of the Civil Service. As set out in the 1993 Civil Service Act, HR practices were managed centrally by the OHCS, including recruitment, training, transfers, promotions, and termination. Ministries and departments could make certain personnel requests, but HR practices were generally managed uniformly across the Civil Service – albeit with significant inconsistency and imperfect enforcement. All personnel decisions had to receive final approval from the OHCS.<sup>35</sup>

Civil servants reported that education and experience had been the most important factors in their recruitment.<sup>36</sup> Most were interviewed before they were hired, and some had to sit exams, though about 10% said they had no assessments.<sup>37</sup> Personal and political connections could also factor into recruitment decisions. In a report prepared for the Public Services Commission, which supervised the public services, researchers estimated that around a quarter of civil servants used personal or political links to help secure their jobs.<sup>38</sup> The Africa Integrity Indicators (All), a project on governance in Africa, argued that while the majority of Ghana's government institutions advertised vacant positions, it was often just a formality. In the All's opinion, 'Most of those appointed to the civil service are not necessarily the best qualified applicants but [are appointed] because they are related to the appointing authority either by political affiliation, family connection or ethnicity in what has become known in Ghana as "Who you know syndrome"'.<sup>39</sup>

Once in the Civil Service, there were clear routes for career progression. Each job class had a Scheme of Service that outlined responsibilities, training requirements, and levels of advancement. Officers became eligible to interview for promotion after a certain number of years – typically three to five, depending on the role. Promotions had traditionally been based on length of service, essentially resulting in an 'age-graded' workforce.<sup>40</sup> While in theory it was possible for an officer to not be promoted due to poor performance or an unsatisfactory interview, this rarely occurred. The *de facto* assumption was that officers would be promoted based on seniority. At the same time, there was little opportunity for high performers to be promoted ahead of schedule; while not against any policy, it did not happen in practice.

Officers had to attend certain trainings every three years to be eligible for promotion, and other professional development programmes were available such as general management and professional ethics.<sup>41</sup> Managers were meant to identify employees' training needs through

performance reviews. However, a 2013 survey of civil servants found that 83% believed training needs were *not* identified through performance reviews, and 91% thought that training nominations were *not* driven by performance appraisals.<sup>42</sup> Instead, decisions around who attended trainings, especially those involving per diems or study at foreign institutions, were seen to be based on office politics or personal connections.<sup>43</sup> Funding shortfalls also limited opportunities. Former Head of Civil Service Woeli Kemevor explained that inadequate and irregular funding stalled training, leaving a number of top managers 'seriously challenged in terms of skills and knowledge to perform well because they did not undergo relevant Scheme of Service training'.<sup>44</sup> In 2013, just 980 civil servants (7% of all staff) attended a training course.<sup>45</sup>

## Bureaucracy and hierarchy

The Civil Service was marked by a strict hierarchy which extended from the colonial bureaucratic model. Political scientist Ayee explained that the model 'discouraged individual initiative and supported a culture of unreflective defence of the status quo.'<sup>46</sup> A World Bank survey in 2000 found that there were 1.59 subordinates per manager (from assistant director to director), meaning there were nearly as many managers as there were professional staff.<sup>47</sup> Navigating the bureaucracy and frequently requiring sign-off from superiors caused delays. An Assistant Director explained that if his Chief Director was travelling, he could not progress his work until his boss returned and approved his projects.<sup>48</sup>

Within this structure, low- and middle-level officers felt that they lacked discretion in their work and were deterred from innovating. A junior officer noted that civil servants were expected to 'think within "the box"'.<sup>49</sup> Some reported that their supervisors explicitly told them not to speak up, while others said the notion was embedded in the culture. An officer explained that '[t]here are factors within our system which make me feel that I do not want to be deviant for trying to change things. People continue doing things and it stays the same.'<sup>50</sup> Junior officers noted that their superiors did not like to be questioned. One commented, 'When the big man speaks, the juniors should not speak...This depresses you as you wonder what is [the point of] your presence? Is it just to occupy space and time?... You keep the idea to yourself and then you go along singing the same tune and at the end of the month take your salary.'<sup>51</sup>

Junior officers observed that senior leaders were much more open to ideas suggested from their peers or superiors, while ideas from junior officers were more likely to be dismissed. Even supervisors themselves sometimes acknowledged this phenomenon. 'It is sad that this goes on, we need to treat and train juniors to be directors...,' said one supervisor. 'In my experience, innovative ideas have been few as people are afraid or shy to share ideas'.<sup>52</sup>

Highly educated employees often grew frustrated when they could not apply the skills they had learnt in their degrees or help to change the system. A recent graduate described her experience trying to bring new ideas: 'it's like boxing the system, like boxing with your boss. ... The hierarchy that we run is from the head to the toe.'<sup>53</sup> She ultimately left the job for a PhD programme.

## Inefficiencies

Outdated or inconsistently applied processes often hindered efficiency at the Civil Service. For instance, communication between ministries and with citizens was largely done in hard copy since the internet was often too weak or unstable to send emails, and better connectivity was too expensive.<sup>54</sup> Administrative assistants had to hand deliver correspondence to other offices, sometimes travelling far distances. Furthermore, according to a special assistant at the Ministry of Health, they 'find it hard to figure out where letters are brought from and who needs to act and follow up – making it difficult for the ministry to meet schedules and deadlines.'<sup>55</sup>

Even when inefficiencies were known, it was challenging to address them. In a training exercise where lower- and middle-level civil servants were asked to identify potential work process

innovations, most suggested implementing practices that already existed on paper, or making relatively small and simple process changes. One officer noted that it was difficult to access documents using their ministry's record-keeping system, and proposed scanning important files to have them on hand when needed.<sup>56</sup> Another noted that delays commonly occurred when collecting data from other divisions and proposed sending a schedule of deadlines for data requests once a year, rather than obtaining the Chief Director's signature on a letter for each reporting deadline. However, officers explained that there were barriers to implementing such ideas, noting that a lack of cooperation from other divisions or their own organisation – particularly from superiors – was more of an obstacle than resources.<sup>57</sup>

Inefficient processes contributed to delays in services. In some instances, as the special assistant at the Ministry of Health explained, 'many customer service agents take undue advantage of delays to charge citizens exorbitant prices to process their documents faster and in time.'<sup>58</sup> Bridget Katsriku, chair of the Public Services Commission, acknowledged this issue in a speech to Chief Directors in 2014, stating that '[t]aking bribes before providing services for which we are being paid is now the norm in many of our institutions'.<sup>59</sup> Some Ghanaians opted to hire intermediaries known as 'Goro boys' to manage, or even evade, long processes for them. The Registrar General's Department, which registered businesses, commonly faced this issue. As a business leader said, 'If the rules of engagement at the Registrar-General's Department were efficient and service delivery up to speed, the "Goro boys" would not be operating and making money from the public.'<sup>60</sup>

### Working hours

Absenteeism was a widespread issue, and civil servants had a reputation for abandoning their posts during work hours.<sup>61</sup> Sociologist Erin Metz McDonnell described a typical day at the ministry offices in Accra: 'Civil servants trickle into offices between 9 and 11 am. Around noon, most exit the ministry buildings for lunch.... Some sleep at desks through the heat of early afternoon, overshadowed by piles of disorganized paperwork. Before formal closing time, officials begin heading home, or to a second job supplementing their income.'<sup>62</sup> Such observations were common. One civil servant commented that '[on] Friday, people come to work [at] like 10am and close at 2pm,' adding that 'there are too many people doing nothing'.<sup>63</sup> A former deputy minister had a similar assessment, noting that civil servants 'come to work late and leave so early and Friday is virtually a holiday.'<sup>64</sup> When at the office, some civil servants conducted personal affairs, leaving others to cover their work.<sup>65</sup> A lack of punctuality was also a common issue. In a survey of Directors and Chief Directors, 82% believed that management personnel in their organisations did not report for duty punctually.<sup>66</sup>

At the same time, some civil servants worked long hours with unpaid overtime in order to keep things running, and officers who were at work often had unproductive down time because of management and communication failures. In one survey, over 80% of officers reported having at least one idle hour per workday on average due to a lack of work to do.<sup>67</sup>

### Resource constraints

Civil servants often cited resource constraints as a barrier to their work.<sup>68</sup> Office infrastructure was deficient, computers and other equipment were lacking, and electricity outages were frequent.<sup>69</sup> An employee at the OHCS added that even when resources were available, they were distributed unevenly, meaning one department might get new equipment while another was left with outdated machines. The officer noted that 'no one pays attention or coordinates' how these resources were shared.<sup>70</sup> Additionally, government funding via the Ministry of Finance was often delayed, posing a challenge for Chief Directors who were expected to meet time-bound targets.<sup>71</sup> In many cases, these shortfalls and delays meant that officers had to spend their own money to keep their offices running and to deliver programmes. A survey found that 38% of civil servants had made out-of-pocket expenses on programmes and projects, and 70% of these payments were never reimbursed.<sup>72</sup>

## Performance management

Prior reform efforts had had limited success in improving individual-level performance management processes such as the annual staff appraisal system. According to a 2013 survey of civil servants, 71% of respondents believed that the existing performance appraisal system did not help improve their productivity and performance.<sup>73</sup> A common concern was that appraisals were not objective and instead reflected interpersonal issues with managers. Some civil servants believed that performance evaluations gave supervisors a tool to exert their power over officers, rather than improve performance; as one civil servant said, 'If someone wants to get you out of the system, PA [performance appraisal] is an effective tool to do so'.<sup>74</sup> An officer at the OHCS explained that the current approach to performance evaluations did not appeal to all civil servants since it was 'based on a very subjective review by someone who might, you know, hold a grudge against them'.<sup>75</sup>

At the same time, some managers reported that they received little training on how to assess their officers, and no clear guidelines on scoring candidates.<sup>76</sup> Several managers explained that a 'lack of resources, poor communication, inadequate education and ineffective supervision' were major challenges to implementing performance management effectively.<sup>77</sup>

Efforts to link performance to rewards and sanctions had also proven to be a challenge over time. A 2013 survey found that only 11% of civil servants felt that employees were always rewarded for good performance.<sup>78</sup> Given the financial constraints and rigid pay scales of the public sector, large monetary incentives were not possible. However, some organisations had found other ways to recognise high achievers. For instance, some hosted 'best worker' awards, either recognising one overall high performer or developing awards for different categories, such as 'most hardworking' or 'most punctual'. Other ministries relied on 'informal promotions' rather than accelerating someone on the promotion track: an employee might receive additional responsibilities such as committee membership, which came with small allowances that served as financial perks.<sup>79</sup> Some departments even found that simple letters of congratulation from senior leaders helped officers feel recognised for their achievements.<sup>80</sup>

Meanwhile, weak performance often went unaddressed. Managers only dismissed poor performers after several years of missed targets.<sup>81</sup> Political scientist Rachel Sigman reported that '[s]everal prominent reform proponents in Ghana lamented the difficulty of sanctioning under-performing public servants. When such events transpire it is not uncommon for family members, chiefs, or other associates of the individual to publicly appeal for the employee's reinstatement'.<sup>82</sup> Additionally, public-sector unions made it difficult to fire officers. The unions were strong and influential; during past efforts to reform pay, they had threatened nationwide strikes.<sup>83</sup> To the unions, the use of rewards and sanctions through performance evaluations risked formalising avenues for favouritism or punishment.

Furthermore, sanctions were not implemented uniformly. For instance, the Civil Service introduced a 'Code of Conduct' in the 1990s that outlined the values and work ethic expected of civil servants, as well as the sanctions for failing to adhere to them.<sup>84</sup> But interviews at a finance department illustrated how breaches of the code were unevenly punished. As one officer commented, 'the code of conduct affects only the lower and middle-level staff, the top-level officials appear to go unpunished when they violate the rules and regulation'.<sup>85</sup> Another added that 'management sometimes hinders the process by tempering justice with mercy. Instead of giving the appropriate sanctions, they base the sanction on personal relationship'.<sup>86</sup> The department created disciplinary committees and attendance records to enforce compliance, but there was no monitoring to assess if the tools were effective.<sup>87</sup>

## Variation across organisations

While many challenges permeated the entire Civil Service, there was great variation in performance across its component parts. Public administration scholar Francis Owusu used an

expert perception survey in 2006 to identify 13 high-performing and 13 low-performing public organisations in Ghana. He argued that '[b]y failing to recognize that not all public organizations perform poorly, we ignore any potential lessons that could have been learnt from the experiences of organizations that have managed to perform effectively under the same social, political, economic and institutional environment.'<sup>88</sup>

These 'pockets of effectiveness' could exist even within organisations. During her research in 2008, for instance, sociologist Metz McDonnell identified the Policy Analysis and Research Division (PARD), within the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, as one of the most effective organisations within the Civil Service.<sup>89</sup> While it operated within the same constraints as the other divisions, PARD was able to demand high levels of professionalism from its officers (such as timeliness and productivity); ensured there was always someone available to do every task, even if officers were absent; and fostered a deep sense of pride in the division's work. So while other civil servants left work before closing time, PARD officers put in long hours to ensure they met important deadlines.<sup>90</sup>

Beyond standouts such as PARD, minor differences across all units led to a wide spectrum of performance. Some variation stemmed from how organisations implemented written policies and built a culture around performance-related norms, as illustrated by approaches to the annual performance reviews. (See **Exhibit 3.**) While performance management policies were highly centralised, organisations used them in different ways. In an economic-sector ministry, for instance, officers completed appraisal forms each year, but only as a formality; they were not held accountable for their annual targets. At a social-sector ministry, officers' appraisals were completed every few years, only when an employee was up for promotion. Yet others went beyond the annual requirement. At an infrastructure ministry, performance reviews were done every year with in-depth discussions between supervisors and officers, who continued to check in on their targets in mid-year reviews and discussed performance at weekly divisional reviews.<sup>91</sup> A 2012 study found that the civil servants who were evaluated more frequently had higher levels of both work motivation and satisfaction.<sup>92</sup>

## Morale

Overall, civil servants had low job satisfaction. A 2013 survey found that 73% of civil servant respondents were not satisfied with their jobs (and 96% were not satisfied with their pay).<sup>93</sup> Job satisfaction tended to rise with tenure, meaning more senior employees were more content.<sup>94</sup> Those with more education (except those with doctorates) tended to be less satisfied with their work.<sup>95</sup> Some employees, especially the young and highly educated, reported feeling 'stuck' in their positions and often looked for better opportunities outside of government.<sup>96</sup> Indeed, many officers left the Civil Service not just for higher pay, but because they felt stifled.<sup>97</sup>

Additionally, after decades of halting reform efforts, civil servants were experiencing reform fatigue. Experts familiar with Ghana's reform programmes suggested that there was 'a certain level of apathy and resistance to change amongst public institutions and workers, [and] poor understanding of the benefits of reforms'.<sup>98</sup> When it came to the implementation of performance management, by some accounts it was only the OHCS and those involved with executing the programme who seemed invested in its success.<sup>99</sup>

## Improving performance: lessons from past reform efforts<sup>100</sup>

The Civil Service had struggled for years to improve performance and jettison its negative reputation, despite undergoing several major reform programmes. Agyekum-Dwamena, whose career spanned these reform efforts, considered past experiences as he deliberated on his own strategy in 2014. (See **Exhibit 4** for a summary of past initiatives.)

## CSRP (1987-1993): a top-down approach

Ghana's first major reform effort was the Civil Service Reform Programme (CSRP) launched in 1987. It was a five-year programme funded and designed mainly by the World Bank and the UK's Overseas Development Administration.<sup>101</sup> External consultants played a central role in its development and implementation, with little input from Ghanaian civil servants.<sup>102</sup> Part of a wider structural adjustment programme which aimed to reduce the size of the public sector and cut fiscal deficits, the CSRP featured staff retrenchment, job re-evaluations, organisational restructuring, and pay-scale reform.

Beyond its fiscal motives, CSRP attempted to modernise performance management.<sup>103</sup> The existing 'confidential reporting' system lacked transparency, and ratings had little association with performance; as then-President Rawlings lamented, 'almost everybody, that is, the hard-working and the lazy, get a good confidential report'.<sup>104</sup> In 1992, the confidential reporting system was replaced with the Performance Evaluation System (PES), where supervisors set performance targets with each supervisee at the start of the year, then assessed individual performance against the targets at the end of the year using a standard template. Coupled with staff reductions, the PES was meant to provide an objective basis for increasing pay for the remaining – and hopefully better-performing – civil servants. Organisations were instructed to set aside 10% of their personnel budgets for merit-linked cash awards.<sup>105</sup>

Agyekum-Dwamena reflected on the PES: 'That was a major challenge because there was a cultural shift in people sitting down to talk to their director. People wanted the old one, for them it was better.'<sup>106</sup> Some civil servants found that the PES brought transparency, mutuality, and a better understanding of their roles, and many started having routine conversations with their supervisors about their responsibilities and performance for the first time.<sup>107</sup> However, civil servants later reported that, even after several years, the system had not been effectively institutionalised and appraisals had not been linked to pay.<sup>108</sup>

CSRP came to an end when its funding expired in 1993. It had had some successes, but little impact on staff performance. Its main outcome was reducing the workforce by 30%.<sup>109</sup> A World Bank review later concluded that CSRP had suffered from a 'lack of ownership and commitment' by government actors and had not been crafted to suit the Ghanaian context.<sup>110</sup> Agyekum-Dwamena added that it had also been hindered by its heavy reliance on external consultants. 'I did not get the impression that we were doing this because it was good for the Civil Service,' he said. 'We were doing this so we can report to the donors.'<sup>111</sup> He also felt that there had been no cohesive strategy. 'Things were taken as if they were separate activities,' he reflected. 'The linkages were not properly established. So we will do job inspections just to reduce staff numbers. We will do staff appraisals as a separate thing. But it was not seen as a complete set of activities that is aimed at improving Civil Service performance.'<sup>112</sup>

## CSPIP (1994-2001): a homegrown reform

The next major reform effort came in 1994 with the Civil Service Performance Improvement Programme (CSPIP). Whereas CSRP had been designed by external consultants, CSPIP was a homegrown initiative developed by a team of civil servants and led by Head of Civil Service Robert Dadoo.<sup>113</sup> It was intended to 'correct [CSRP's] shortfalls' with a focus on bottom-up performance improvement.<sup>114</sup> CSPIP was pitched to and funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) with £5 million for a five-year programme.<sup>115</sup>

CSPIP established an elaborate system of organisational reviews that aimed to build an institutional commitment to performance improvement.<sup>116</sup> Each organisation had to form an internal capacity development team, survey their beneficiaries and stakeholders, conduct an organisational self-appraisal, and develop a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP).<sup>117</sup> CSPIP was lauded for this high level of stakeholder engagement, which was rare at the time,

especially 'for a civil-service organisation cocooned in its own ways thinking,' Agyekum-Dwamena recalled.<sup>118</sup> But the participatory approach had been time consuming and delayed implementation of actual reform. Three years into the five-year programme, just 29 of the 182 organisations had developed PIPs and only 20 had started to implement them.<sup>119</sup>

The OHCS set up a Performance Improvement Fund (PIF) to which organisations could apply for small grants to help deliver on their PIPs. According to Agyekum-Dwamena, the PIF was able to fund relatively basic, tangible assets. For instance, a sanitation organisation needed large rubbish bins for its communities, and the Passport Office needed an electricity generator to ensure reliable services.<sup>120</sup> However, service-wide issues beyond the remit of the OHCS hindered progress. For instance, the Ministry of Finance did not integrate funding for PIPs into the main budget, so the end of the donor funding would mean the end of the PIPs. Agyekum-Dwamena explained, 'Making the budget process performance driven, the availability of funds, some public sector rules and regulations – these were system-wide bottlenecks.'<sup>121</sup>

To improve service delivery and client orientation, CSPIP also required organisations to develop Service Charters, which detailed services, timelines, application steps, and costs for services, as well as Client Service Units, one-stop offices for clients to access services and information. Most organisations developed the charters and client units, and while they continued to exist to some extent after CSPIP ended, they generally lost their institutional commitment.<sup>122</sup>

Another component of CSPIP targeted senior-leader performance with the introduction of a Performance Agreement System (PAS) for Chief Directors. Previously, those at the director level and above did not have their performance assessed. The new PAS entailed setting detailed targets for each Chief Director at the start of the year which corresponded with their organisation's workplan. They were then evaluated against these targets at the end of the year, with performance linked to rewards and sanctions. After a pilot, the PAS was formally conducted in the last two years of CSPIP. The results were meant to be published in 2001, but a new administration came to office and decided against it. The PAS ultimately faded away.<sup>123</sup>

CSPIP lost momentum in 2001 when the DFID grant ended, a new NPP administration came to office, and Dodoo subsequently left his post.<sup>124</sup> While CSPIP's impact fell short of original goals, experts believed it was more successful than CSR. The organisational reviews and PIPs helped create meaningful conversations around performance – for the first time in some organisations. PIPs also brought forward numerous small reform ideas which helped to improve performance at specific organisations, though some reforms did not materialise until several years later.<sup>125</sup>

However, rank-and-file officers reported seeing little impact in their day-to-day work.<sup>126</sup> And a decade later, an academic study argued that CSPIP's performance management system had 'not led to any significant improvement in attitudinal change, accountability, managerial freedom, organizational capacity, organizational efficiency, or service delivery'.<sup>127</sup> Another assessment concluded that CSPIP had 'too many reform activities going on concurrently, with inadequate sequencing that seemed to have over-burdened the same people and did not exploit the synergies of the various reform dimensions.'<sup>128</sup>

### The MPSR era (2005-08): raising reform's political profile

A new NPP administration was elected in 2001 and returned attention to reform in 2003 by establishing a Public Sector Reform Secretariat under the Office of the Senior Minister, with a team of consultants commissioned to review past reforms. Then in 2005, the administration established the Ministry of Public Sector Reform (MPSR) under the Office of the President. A high-profile minister was placed at its helm, and it was staffed by a mix of civil servants and consultants.<sup>129</sup> The MPSR developed a five-year reform agenda, which included the Single Spine Pay Policy (SSPP), a major effort to harmonise and increase pay scales across the public sector and to link pay to performance.<sup>130</sup> The initiative brought performance management

back to the fore, and in 2007, a new staff appraisal process was developed for public-service officials based on the PES model of the 1990s.<sup>131</sup> The MPSR also reintroduced CSPIP's programme of Client Service Units and Service Charters. During this period, a range of donors funded the different components of reform.

The heavy reliance on external consultants during this reform era created some friction. Civil servants felt that the consultants excluded them from meaningful decision-making and did not employ their first-hand knowledge of the institution. There was also some resentment of the consultants' high salaries – several multiples of the civil servants' – and the short-term basis of their work. The consultants, in turn, criticised the competence of public officials, referring to them as mere 'paper pushers'.<sup>132</sup> They faced challenges in collecting relevant information from civil servants and meeting their fast-paced deadlines.<sup>133</sup>

In 2008, the NDC won the presidency, and the new administration downgraded the MPSR from a ministry to a secretariat. Performance management policies lost steam, as did the Service Charters and Client Service Units, which were seen to be 'owned' by the MPSR.<sup>134</sup> However, the salary restructuring continued, and implementation began in January 2010. Salaries were harmonised and generally increased, but it came at a much higher cost than anticipated.<sup>135</sup> The linking of performance to pay did not occur for a variety of reasons, including reform fatigue after the years-long regrading process and the growing cost of the higher pay levels.

## The next step for reform

Now in 2014, it was Agyekum-Dwamena's turn to decide what was next for Ghana's Civil Service reform agenda. Past reform projects had generated some positive policies for performance, yet they were not implemented consistently nor always used effectively. Agyekum-Dwamena had grown tired of seeing reform programmes end when their funding ran out and felt that previous efforts had not sparked the continuous performance improvement he thought was necessary to transform the Civil Service.

He now had to decide if he and his team wanted to work with the World Bank to undertake new reforms. The initial meeting had been provisional: the World Bank was interested in funding a reform programme, but exactly what it would look like would have to be negotiated. Resources could potentially be used to fund a variety of activities, such as designing and implementing a reform programme (e.g., for workshop consultations, allowances for officers taking on extra duties); covering the direct costs of reform (e.g., to purchase equipment); providing incentives for employees; or other related costs that could be justified to the World Bank. But Agyekum-Dwamena knew from experience that donor funding came with certain constraints. When potentially millions of dollars were on offer, development partners typically expected to see comprehensive, multi-year projects with clear objectives and measurable targets. Such large projects were costly; they tended to be difficult to design and report on, and they were often administratively burdensome.

Agyekum-Dwamena considered if this approach to reform would help him achieve his goals. Before he came to the exact finances of reform, he had to consider several questions. What practical changes were most important to achieve? What type of changes were realistic within the constraints of the current structures? How should he approach working with others within the OHCS and the broader Civil Service to design and implement reforms? What lessons should be learned from the Civil Service's past reform efforts? And ultimately, how should he respond to the World Bank's offer of support?


**Exhibit 1a** Basic structure of the Civil Service



**Source:** 'A presentation on the civil service', Office of the Head of Civil Service, 29 October 2018, p. 4, <https://ohcs.gov.gh/sites/default/files/INDUCTION%202018%20-%20THE%20GHANA%20CIVIL%20SERVICE.pdf>, accessed November 2021.

**Note:** The Civil Service Council, as established by the Civil Service Act, deliberated and advised on policy related to the management of the Civil Service. The Head of Civil Service was part of the council.

**Exhibit 1b** Sample ministry structure




**Source:** 'A presentation on the civil service', Office of the Head of Civil Service, 29 October 2018, p. 19, <https://ohcs.gov.gh/sites/default/files/INDUCTION%202018%20-%20THE%20GHANA%20CIVIL%20SERVICE.pdf>, accessed November 2021.

**Exhibit 2a** Number of Civil Service staff by ministry and department, 2013

Ministry		Staff	Department		Staff
1	Communications	66	1	Attorney General	191
2	Chieftaincy & Traditional Affairs	44	2	Births and Deaths Registry	288
3	Defence	59	3	Bureau of Ghana Languages	33
4	Education	142	4	Chieftaincy	632
5	Employment & Labour Relations	84	5	Children	69
6	Energy	125	6	Community Development	52
7	Enviro, Science, Tech & Innovation	63	7	Controller & Acct Gen Dept.	3,702
8	Finance	573	8	Cooperatives	324
9	Fisheries & Aquaculture Dev.	21	9	Factories Inspectorate	69
10	Food & Agriculture	935	10	Feeder Roads	87
11	Foreign Affairs	567	11	Geological Survey Dept.	270
12	Gender, Children & Social Prot.	68	12	Housing Loan Scheme	9
13	Health	202	13	Information Service Dept.	1,183
14	Information & Media Relations	65	14	Labour Department	311
15	Interior	68	15	Mgmt Services Dept.	49
16	Justice	244	16	Office of the Copyright Admin.	33
17	Lands & Natural Resources	100	17	Parks & Gardens	206
18	Local Gov't & Rural Development	154	18	Pub Records & Archives Admin.	157
19	Office of Gov't Machinery	1,007	19	Public Works Dept.	128
20	Roads & Highways	101	20	Registrar-Generals Dept.	226
21	Tourism, Culture & Creative Arts	66	21	Rent Control	111
22	Trade and Industry	272	22	Rural Housing	17
23	Transport	87	23	Social Welfare	515
24	Water, Works & Housing	124	24	Town & Country Planning	52
25	Youth and Sports	59	25	Urban Roads	89
	<b>Total</b>	<b>5,296</b>	26	Women	64
			<b>Total</b>		<b>8,867</b>

**Source:** Compiled from '2013 Annual Performance Report of the Civil Service', Ghana Civil Service, 2013, pp. 241-2, available at <https://vdocuments.mx/2013-annual-performance-report.html>, accessed February 2022.


**Note:** The Office of the Head of Civil Service was one of four extra-ministerial organisations within the Office of Government Machinery.

**Exhibit 2b** Number of Civil Service staff by age, 2013

**Source:** '2013 Annual Performance Report of the Civil Service', Ghana Civil Service, 2013, p. 222, available at <https://vdocuments.mx/2013-annual-performance-report.html>, accessed February 2022.

**Exhibit 3** Performance management implementation by Civil Service organisations, 2013

Benchmarking criteria		
<b>Score 1</b>	<b>Score 3</b>	<b>Score 5</b>
People are rewarded in the same way irrespective of their performance. Promotions are solely based on tenure.	There is an evaluation system which in principle awards good performance (financially or non-financially), but awards are not based on clear criteria/ processes. Performance can sometimes influence career progression.	There is an evaluation system which rewards individuals (financially or non-financially) based on performance. Rewards are given as a consequence of well-defined and monitored individual achievements. Performance is a key criterion for promotion decisions.



**Source:** Martin J Williams, 'From Institutions to Organizations: Management and Informality in Ghana's Public Bureaucracies', working paper, 9 September 2015, p. 19, [https://martiniwilliamsdotcom.files.wordpress.com/2015/09/martinwilliams\\_frominstitutionstoorganizations\\_150915.pdf](https://martiniwilliamsdotcom.files.wordpress.com/2015/09/martinwilliams_frominstitutionstoorganizations_150915.pdf) accessed March 2022.

**Note:** Forty Civil Service organisations were examined to determine whether individual performance was assessed transparently and rewarded proportionately and ranked on a scale from 1-5 (see benchmarking criteria).

**Exhibit 4** Overview of major Civil Service reform programmes, 1987-2012

	<b>Civil Service Reform Programme (CSRP)</b>	<b>Civil Service Performance Improvement Programme (CSPIP)</b>	<b>Public Sector Reform Agenda (PSRA) &amp; Single Spine Pay Policy (SSPP)</b>
	1987-93	1994-2000	2006-2011
<b>Individual performance mgmt</b>			
Leadership perf agreements		√	
Staff appraisals & perf mgmt	√		√
<b>Organisational mgmt</b>			
Org reviews / performance mgmt		√	
Performance improvement funds		√	
<b>Service delivery-focused</b>			
Client-focused reforms		√	√
Sector-driven reforms			
<b>Salaries and structures</b>			
Staff redundancies	√		
Pay regrading / reform	√		√

**Source:** Martin J Williams, synthesis based on document review and interviews.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Nana Agyekum Dwamena quoted in Martin J Williams, *Implementing Civil Service Reform in Africa* (unpublished manuscript).
- <sup>2</sup> 'Ghana Public Sector Reform for Results Project: Combined Project Information Documents / Integrated Safeguards Datasheet (PID/ISDS),' The World Bank, 14 August 2018, p. 8, <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/pt/201091534269283682/pdf/Project-Information-Documents-Integrated-Safeguards-Data-Sheet-Ghana-Public-Sector-Reform-for-Results-Project-P164665.pdf>, accessed March 2022.
- <sup>3</sup> 'History', The Office of Head of Civil Service, n.d., <http://www.ohcs.gov.gh/history> and Joseph RA Ayee, 'Six Decades of the Public Sector in Ghana: Issues and Prospects', Institute for Democratic Governance, 17 January 2018, available at <https://ideg.org/media-centre/archives-2/catalog/technical-publications/six-decades-of-the-public-sector-in-ghana-issues-and-prospects/>, accessed May 2021.
- <sup>4</sup> Joseph R A Ayee, 'Six Decades of the Public Sector in Ghana: Issues and Prospects', Institute for Democratic Governance, 17 January 2018, p. 2, available at <https://ideg.org/media-centre/archives-2/catalog/technical-publications/six-decades-of-the-public-sector-in-ghana-issues-and-prospects/>, accessed May 2021.
- <sup>5</sup> Joseph R A Ayee, 'Civil Service Reform in Ghana: A Case Study of Contemporary Reform Problems in Africa,' *African Journal of Political Science / Revue Africaine De Science Politique*, 2001, vol. 6, no. 1, p. 2.
- <sup>6</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>7</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>8</sup> Peter Fuseini Haruna, 'Reflective Public Administration Reform: Building Relationships, Bridging Gaps in Ghana,' *African Studies Review*, 2001, vol. 44, no. 1, pp. 40 & 44.
- <sup>9</sup> Frank Kwaku Ohemeng and Felix K Anebo, 'The Politics of Administrative Reforms in Ghana: Perspectives from Path Dependency and Punctuated Equilibrium Theories,' *International Journal of Public Administration*, 2012, vol. 35, no. 3, p. 168, DOI: [10.1080/01900692.2011.635470](https://doi.org/10.1080/01900692.2011.635470).
- <sup>10</sup> J Nti, 'Civil Service in Ghana: Its Appraisal and Prospects, 1978, in 'Innovations and Best Practices in Public Sector Reforms: The Case of Civil Service in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa', Economic Commission for Africa, December 2010, p. 50, <https://uclgafrica-alga.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Innovation-and-best-practices-in-Public-Sector-Reform.pdf>, accessed August 2021.
- <sup>11</sup> Ayee, 'Civil Service Reform in Ghana,' p. 3.
- <sup>12</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>13</sup> '2013 Annual Performance Report of the Civil Service', Ghana Civil Service, 2013, available at <https://vdocuments.mx/2013-annual-performance-report.html>, accessed February 2022.
- <sup>14</sup> Rachel Sigman, *Which Jobs for Which Boys? Party Financing, Patronage and State Capacity in African Democracies*, Doctoral Dissertation, Maxwell School Syracuse University, 2015, p. 147, <https://surface.syr.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1325&context=etd>, accessed November 2021.
- <sup>15</sup> Ibid, p. 146.
- <sup>16</sup> David Adom interview by David Hausman, Innovations for Successful Societies, Bobst Center for Peace and Justice Princeton University, 27 January 2010, [https://successfulesocieties.princeton.edu/sites/successfulesocieties/files/interviews/transcripts/3537/david\\_adom.pdf](https://successfulesocieties.princeton.edu/sites/successfulesocieties/files/interviews/transcripts/3537/david_adom.pdf), accessed January 2022.
- <sup>17</sup> Nana Agyekum Dwamena, interview with Martin J Williams, 18 December 2018.
- <sup>18</sup> Nana Agyekum Dwamena, interview with Martin J Williams, 18 December 2018.
- <sup>19</sup> Nana Agyekum Dwamena, interview with case writers, 20 August 2021.
- <sup>20</sup> Nana Agyekum Dwamena, interview with case writers, 8 October 2021.
- <sup>21</sup> Nana Agyekum Dwamena, interview with case writers, 28 September 2021.
- <sup>22</sup> Nana Agyekum Dwamena, interview with case writers, 28 September 2021.
- <sup>23</sup> Nana Agyekum Dwamena, interview with case writers, 28 September 2021.
- <sup>24</sup> Nana Agyekum Dwamena, interview with case writers, 8 October 2021.
- <sup>25</sup> Nana Agyekum Dwamena, interview with case writers, 8 October 2021.
- <sup>26</sup> '2012 Manifesto: Advancing the Better Ghana Agenda,' National Democratic Congress, 2012, <https://www.codeoghana.org/assets/downloadables/NDC-2012-Manifesto.pdf>, accessed December 2021.
- <sup>27</sup> Daniel Appiah and Abdul-Gafaru Abdulai, 'Competitive clientelism and the politics of core public sector reform in Ghana,' *Effective States and Inclusive Development*, Working Paper No. 82, March 2017, p. 9, [https://www.effective-states.org/wp-content/uploads/working\\_papers/final-pdfs/esid\\_wp\\_82\\_appiah\\_abdulai.pdf](https://www.effective-states.org/wp-content/uploads/working_papers/final-pdfs/esid_wp_82_appiah_abdulai.pdf), accessed August 2021, and 'Ghana election: John Mahama declared winner,' *BBC News*, 10 December 2012, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20661599>, accessed June 2022.
- <sup>28</sup> Felix Oppong, Dilek Aykut, and Gregory Smith, 'Ghana Economic Update', The World Bank, October 2014, p. 2, <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/20801>, accessed December 2021.
- <sup>29</sup> 'The 2014 Budget State and Economic Policy,' Ministry of Finance, 19 November 2013, p. 5, <http://ir.parliament.gh/bitstream/handle/123456789/380/BUDGET%20STATEMENT%202014.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>, accessed December 2021.
- <sup>30</sup> Ibid, p. 44, and International Monetary Fund African Department, 'Ghana: Request for a Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility,' International Monetary Fund, 21 April 2015, p. 5, available at <https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/002/2015/103/article-A001-en.xml?rskey=V8juGh&result=16>, accessed March 2022.
- <sup>31</sup> 'Fiscal Consolidation to Accelerate Growth and Support Inclusive Development: Ghana Public Expenditure Review,' The World Bank, 8 May 2017, p. 85, <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/972961498157963462/pdf/Ghana-PER-FINAL-June-19-2017.pdf>, accessed March 2022.

- <sup>32</sup> Kwasi Kpodo, 'UPDATE 1-Ghana seeks to public sector wage bill over three years -govt minister,' *Reuters*, 17 June 2014, <https://www.reuters.com/article/ghana-economy-idUSL5N0OX5S720140617>, accessed December 2021.
- <sup>33</sup> John Dramani Mahama, State of the Nation address, 21 February 2013, available at <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/John-Dramani-Mahama-s-State-of-the-Nation-address-265576#>, accessed December 2021 and 'Ghana: Request for a Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility,' International Monetary Fund, 21 April 2015, p. 16, available at <https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/002/2015/103/article-A001-en.xml?rskey=V8juGh&result=16>, accessed March 2022.
- <sup>34</sup> Jerry John Rawlings quoted in 'Rawlings calls for an independent and professional Civil Service,' 12 January 2011, <https://www.myjoyonline.com/rawlings-calls-for-an-independent-and-professional-civil-service/>, accessed January 2022.
- <sup>35</sup> Michel Azulai, Imran Rasul, Daniel Rogger and Martin J Williams, 'Can Training Improve Organizational Culture? Experimental Evidence from Ghana's Civil Service,' Working paper, October 2020, [https://www.homepages.ucl.ac.uk/~uctpimr/research/CSS\\_Ghana.pdf](https://www.homepages.ucl.ac.uk/~uctpimr/research/CSS_Ghana.pdf), accessed June 2021.
- <sup>36</sup> Rachel Sigman, Valeriya Mechkova, Christian Schuster, Jan Meyer-Sahling, and Kim Sass Mikkelsen, 'Civil service management practices for a more motivated, committed and ethical public service in Ghana,' Göteborgs Universitet, 2018, p. 28, <https://ace.globalintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Sigman-Mechkova-Schuster-Meyer-Sahling-Mikkelsen-Ghana-Report-FINAL.pdf>, accessed November 2021.
- <sup>37</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>38</sup> Ibid, p. 27.
- <sup>39</sup> Ghana Indicator: In practice, civil servants are appointed and evaluated according to professional criteria (2014), in 'Africa Integrity Indicators 2014-2021', Africa Integrity Indicators, 2021, available at <https://www.africaintegrityindicators.org/data>, accessed November 2021.
- <sup>40</sup> Robert Price quoted in Carola Lentz, "'I take an oath to the state, not the government": Career Trajectories and Professional Ethics of Ghanaian Public Servants,' in Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan and Thomas Bierschenk (eds.), *States at Work: Dynamics of African Bureaucracies*, 2014, pp. 175-204.
- <sup>41</sup> Sammy-Longman Attakumah, 'Relevance of The Code Conduct and Work Ethics to the Ghana Civil Service,' MPhil Thesis, University of Ghana, 2013, p. 57, [http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh/bitstream/handle/123456789/5412/Sammy-Longman%20Attakumah\\_Relevance%20of%20the%20Code%20Conduct%20and%20Work%20Ethics%20to%20the%20Ghana%20Civil%20Service\\_2013.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y](http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh/bitstream/handle/123456789/5412/Sammy-Longman%20Attakumah_Relevance%20of%20the%20Code%20Conduct%20and%20Work%20Ethics%20to%20the%20Ghana%20Civil%20Service_2013.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y), accessed November 2021.
- <sup>42</sup> Frederick Denkyira, 'Establishing Effective Performance Appraisal Practices in the Ghana Civil Service,' Office of the Head of the Civil Service, 12 February 2012, p. 33, available at <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2394578>, accessed November 2021.
- <sup>43</sup> Justice Nyigmah Bawole, Farhad Hossain, Kwame Ameyaw Domfeh, Hamza Zakaria Bukari, and Francis Sanyare, 'Performance Appraisal or Praising Performance? The Culture of Rhetoric in Performance Management in Ghana Civil Service,' *International Journal of Public Administration*, 2013, vol. 36, no. 13, p. 960.
- <sup>44</sup> Woeli K Kemevor quoted in 'Send-off for Past Head of Civil Service,' GNA, 15 January 2014, <https://www.modernghana.com/news/515864/send-off-for-past-head-of-civil-service.html>, accessed February 2022.
- <sup>45</sup> '2013 Annual Performance Report of the Civil Service', Ghana Civil Service, 2013, p. 222, available at <https://vdocuments.mx/2013-annual-performance-report.html>, accessed February 2022.
- <sup>46</sup> Joseph R A Ayea, 'Improving the Effectiveness of the Public Sector in Africa through the Quality of Public Administration,' p. 88, in K T Hanson, G Kararach, and T M Shaw (eds.), *Rethinking Development Challenges for Public Policy*, International Political Economy Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2012, [https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230393271\\_4](https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230393271_4), accessed November 2021.
- <sup>47</sup> Daniel Rogger, 'Who Serves the Poor? Surveying Civil Servants in the Developing World,' Policy Research Working Paper 8051, World Bank Group, May 2017, p. 14 & Table 4, <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/26503>, accessed November 2021.
- <sup>48</sup> Anonymous civil servant in Sarah Owusu, 'Structural Challenges in the Implementation Of Public Sector Reforms in the Ghana Civil Service – The Experience of the Office of the Head Of Civil Service (OHCS),' unpublished master's thesis, University of Ghana, June 2014, p. 49, available at [https://www.academia.edu/19687942/CHALLENGES\\_OF\\_THE\\_GHANA\\_CIVIL\\_SERVICE\\_A\\_CASE\\_OF\\_THE\\_OFFICE\\_OF\\_THE\\_HEAD\\_OF\\_CIVIL\\_SERVICE](https://www.academia.edu/19687942/CHALLENGES_OF_THE_GHANA_CIVIL_SERVICE_A_CASE_OF_THE_OFFICE_OF_THE_HEAD_OF_CIVIL_SERVICE), accessed March 2022.
- <sup>49</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>50</sup> Anonymous civil servant quoted in Martin J Williams and Liah Yecaló-Teclé, 'Innovation, voice, and hierarchy in the public sector: Evidence from Ghana's civil service,' *Governance (Oxford)*, 2020, 33(4), pp.789–807.
- <sup>51</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>52</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>53</sup> Anne C Campbell, Chelsea A Lavalley, and Erin Kelly-Weber, 'International Scholarships and Home Country Civil Service: Comparing Perspectives of Government Employment for Social Change in Ghana and Nigeria,' *International Journal of Educational Development* 82 (2021), p. 5, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijedudev.2021.102352>, accessed January 2022.
- <sup>54</sup> Mohammed Gazali Salifu, 'To deliver services effectively, Ghana's civil service needs a fast tech upgrade,' *Apolitical*, 19 December 2018, <https://apolitical.co/solution-articles/en/ghanas-civil-service-needs-tech-upgrade>, accessed January 2022.
- <sup>55</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>56</sup> Williams and Yecaló-Teclé, 'Innovation, voice, and hierarchy in the public sector'.
- <sup>57</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>58</sup> Gazali Salifu, 'To deliver services effectively, Ghana's civil service needs a fast tech upgrade'.
- <sup>59</sup> Bridget Katsriku quoted in 'Civil Service lacks effective leadership PSC Chairman,' GNA, 14 October 2014, available at <https://www.modernghana.com/news/574291/civil-service-lacks-effective-leadership-psc-chair.html>, accessed February 2022.

- <sup>60</sup> 'TIN no longer prerequisite for business registration,' MyJoy, 29 November 2018, <https://www.myjoyonline.com/tin-no-longer-prerequisite-for-business-registration/>, accessed February 2022.
- <sup>61</sup> See, for instance, 'Osu Mantse Asks Gov't To Punish Lazy Civil Servants,' GNA in News Ghana, 27 July 2014, <https://newsghana.com.gh/osu-mantse-asks-govt-punish-lazy-civil-servants/>, accessed November 2021.
- <sup>62</sup> Erin Metz McDonnell, 'Patchwork Leviathan: How Pockets of Bureaucratic Governance Flourish within Institutionally Diverse Developing States,' *American Sociological Review*, 2017, vol. 82, no. 3, pp. 484 & 487, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0003122417705874>, accessed February 2022.
- <sup>63</sup> Anonymous civil servant quoted in Owusu 'Structural Challenges,' p. 49.
- <sup>64</sup> Baba Jamal, 'Civil service inefficiency: Blame weak supervision', GhanaWeb, 22 March 2017, <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Civil-service-inefficiency-Blame-weak-supervision-Baba-Jamal-521159>, accessed October 2021.
- <sup>65</sup> 'Osu Mantse Asks Gov't To Punish Lazy Civil Servants,' GNA in News Ghana, 27 July 2014, <https://newsghana.com.gh/osu-mantse-asks-govt-punish-lazy-civil-servants/>, accessed November 2021.
- <sup>66</sup> Sammy-Longman Attakumah, 'Relevance of The Code Conduct and Work Ethics to the Ghana Civil Service,' MPhil Thesis, University of Ghana, 2013, p. 87, [http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh/bitstream/handle/123456789/5412/Sammy-Longman-Attakumah\\_Relevance\\_of\\_the\\_Code\\_Conduct\\_and\\_Work\\_Ethics\\_to\\_the\\_Ghana\\_Civil\\_Service\\_2013.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y](http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh/bitstream/handle/123456789/5412/Sammy-Longman-Attakumah_Relevance_of_the_Code_Conduct_and_Work_Ethics_to_the_Ghana_Civil_Service_2013.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y), accessed November 2021.
- <sup>67</sup> Rasul, Imran, Daniel Rogger, and Martin J Williams, 'Management and Productivity in Ghana's Civil Service', Policy Report, December 2015, p. 12.
- <sup>68</sup> Sigman, 'Which Jobs for Which Boys?', p. 143.
- <sup>69</sup> Ibid, p. 144.
- <sup>70</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>71</sup> Frank Louis Kwaku Ohemeng, 'Constraints in the Implementation of Performance Management Systems in Developing Countries: The Ghanaian Case,' *International Journal of Cross Cultural Management*, vol. 9, no. 1, 2009, p. 124, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1470595808101158>, accessed January 2022.
- <sup>72</sup> Imran Rasul, Daniel Rogger, and Martin J Williams, 'Update and Interim Results from Civil Service Management and Productivity Study,' presented to the Office of the Head of Civil Service, 16 October 2015.
- <sup>73</sup> Frederick Denkyira, 'Establishing Effective Performance Appraisal Practices in the Ghana Civil Service,' Office of the Head of the Civil Service, 12 February 2012, p. 25, available at <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2394578>, accessed November 2021.
- <sup>74</sup> Bawole et al, 'Performance Appraisal or Praising Performance?', p. 959.
- <sup>75</sup> Sigman, 'Which Jobs for Which Boys?', p. 152.
- <sup>76</sup> Bawole et al, 'Performance Appraisal or Praising Performance?', p. 958.
- <sup>77</sup> Denkyira, 'Establishing Effective Performance Appraisal Practices,' p. 41.
- <sup>78</sup> Ibid, p. 36.
- <sup>79</sup> Martin J Williams, 'There Is More Than One "Public Sector Way": The Diversity Of Management Practices In Ghana's Government,' Policy Brief, London School of Economics and Political Science, November 2013, p. 11, <https://martiniwilliamsdotcom.files.wordpress.com/2015/10/williamsm-there-is-more-than-one-public-sector-way.pdf>, accessed February 2022.
- <sup>80</sup> Ibid, p. 10.
- <sup>81</sup> Larbi (2001) in Sigman, *Which Jobs for Which Boys?*, p. 142.
- <sup>82</sup> Sigman, 'Which Jobs for Which Boys?', p. 142.
- <sup>83</sup> 'CLOGSAG threatens nation-wide sit down strike,' GhanaWeb, 27 January 2012, <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/CLOGSAG-threatens-nation-wide-sit-down-strike-228699>, accessed February 2022.
- <sup>84</sup> 'Code of Conduct for the Ghana Civil Service,' The Office of the Head Of Civil Service, 1 November 1999, [https://www.ohcs.gov.gh/sites/default/files/Civil%20Service%20Code%20of%20Conduct\\_0.pdf](https://www.ohcs.gov.gh/sites/default/files/Civil%20Service%20Code%20of%20Conduct_0.pdf), accessed January 2022.
- <sup>85</sup> Franklin Akosa, Emmanuel Yeboah-Assiamah, Bossman E Asare, Kwame Asamoah, Akua Pokua Essah-Koli and Paiman Ahmad, 'Operationalization of Ghana's civil service code of conduct,' *Public Money & Management*, vol. 40, no. 6, p. 478, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09540962.2019.1598198>, accessed January 2022.
- <sup>86</sup> Ibid, p. 479.
- <sup>87</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>88</sup> Francis Owusu, 'On Public Organizations in Ghana: What Differentiates Good Performers from Poor Performers?', *African Development Review*, vol. 18, no. 3, 2006, pp. 471-485, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8268.2006.00151.x>, accessed March 2022.
- <sup>89</sup> Metz McDonnell, 'Patchwork Leviathan'.
- <sup>90</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>91</sup> Williams, 'There Is More Than One "Public Sector Way"', p. 10.
- <sup>92</sup> Denkyira, 'Establishing Effective Performance Appraisal Practices,' pp. 48-49.
- <sup>93</sup> Ibid, p. 38.
- <sup>94</sup> Rachel Sigman, Valeriya Mechkova, Christian Schuster, Jan Meyer-Sahling, and Kim Sass Mikkelsen, 'Civil service management practices for a more motivated, committed and ethical public service in Ghana,' Göteborgs Universitet, 2018.
- <sup>95</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>96</sup> Campbell et al, 'International Scholarships and Home Country Civil Service,' p. 5.
- <sup>97</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>98</sup> David Essuman-Mensah, 'A Study of the Performance of Reform Institutions: Focusing on the Evolution of Public Sector Reforms in Ghana,' *Journal of International Development Cooperation*, 2019, vol. 14, no. 2, [https://www.ejdc.org/archive/view\\_article?pid=ijdc-14-2-99](https://www.ejdc.org/archive/view_article?pid=ijdc-14-2-99), accessed February 2022.
- <sup>99</sup> Ohemeng, 'Constraints in the Implementation of Performance Management Systems', p. 125.

<sup>100</sup> This section draws significantly on Martin J Williams's unpublished manuscript, *Implementing Civil Service Reform in Africa*.

<sup>101</sup> Ayee, 'Civil Service Reform in Ghana,' p. 7.

<sup>102</sup> Stephen Adei and Yaw Boachie-Danquah, 'The Civil Service Performance Improvement Programme (CSPiP) in Ghana: Lessons of Experience,' *African Journal of Public Administration and Management*, 2003, <https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/The-Civil-Service-Performance-Improvement-Programme-Adei-Boachie-Danquah/fad8dc5b226b9a894fba397ed4935880848a6b83>, accessed February 2022.

<sup>103</sup> Martin J Williams, *Implementing Civil Service Reform in Africa* (unpublished manuscript).

<sup>104</sup> Jerry Rawlings quoted in Ayee, 'Civil Service Reform in Ghana,' p. 18.

<sup>105</sup> Office of the Head of Civil Service, 1991 in Williams, *Implementing Civil Service Reform in Africa*.

<sup>106</sup> Nana Agyekum Dwamena, interview with Martin J Williams, 18 December 2018.

<sup>107</sup> Williams, *Implementing Civil Service Reform in Africa*.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid.

<sup>109</sup> Peter Fuseini Haruna, 'Reflective Public Administration Reform: Building Relationships, Bridging Gaps in Ghana,' *African Studies Review*, 2001, vol. 44, no. 1, pp. 44.

<sup>110</sup> World Bank 1996 quoted in Ayee, 'Civil Service Reform in Ghana,' p. 26.

<sup>111</sup> Nana Agyekum Dwamena, interview with Martin J Williams, 18 December 2018.

<sup>112</sup> Nana Agyekum Dwamena, interview with Martin J Williams, 18 December 2018.

<sup>113</sup> Martin J Williams and Liah Yecalotele, 'The (Non-)Implementation of Performance Management Policies: Mapping 30 Years of Reforms in Ghana and Zambia', Working paper, November 2020, <https://martinwilliamsdotcom.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/williamsyecalotele2020thenon-implementationofperformancemanagementpolicies-1.pdf>, accessed June 2021.

<sup>114</sup> Office of the Head of Civil Service, 1995, quoted in Williams, *Implementing Civil Service Reform in Africa*.

<sup>115</sup> 'Innovations and Best Practices in Public Sector Reforms: The Case of Civil Service in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa', Economic Commission for Africa, December 2010, p. 52, [https://uclgafrica-alqa.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Innovation-and-best-practices-in-Public-Sector-Reform\\_.pdf](https://uclgafrica-alqa.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Innovation-and-best-practices-in-Public-Sector-Reform_.pdf), accessed August 2021.

<sup>116</sup> Williams, *Implementing Civil Service Reform in Africa*.

<sup>117</sup> OHCS N.D. in Williams, *Implementing Civil Service Reform in Africa*.

<sup>118</sup> Nana Agyekum Dwamena, interview with case writers, 20 August 2021.

<sup>119</sup> OHCS N.D.; UN 2010 in Williams, *Implementing Civil Service Reform in Africa*.

<sup>120</sup> Nana Agyekum Dwamena, interview with case writers, 20 August 2021.

<sup>121</sup> Nana Agyekum Dwamena, interview with case writers, 20 August 2021.

<sup>122</sup> Williams, *Implementing Civil Service Reform in Africa*.

<sup>123</sup> Nana Agyekum-Dwamena, interview with case writers, 20 August 2021.

<sup>124</sup> William Karthey, Interview, December 2018 and Nana Agyekum-Dwamena, Interview, August 2021, in Williams, *Implementing Civil Service Reform in Africa*.

<sup>125</sup> Williams, *Implementing Civil Service Reform in Africa*.

<sup>126</sup> Interview GHA12, December 2018 in Williams, *Implementing Civil Service Reform in Africa*.

<sup>127</sup> Frank Louis Kwaku Ohemeng, 'Constraints in the Implementation of Performance Management Systems in Developing Countries: The Ghanaian Case,' *International Journal of Cross Cultural Management*, vol. 9, no. 1, 2009, p. 120, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1470595808101158>, accessed January 2022.

<sup>128</sup> K B Antwi, F Analoui, and D Nana-Agyekum, 'Public Sector Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa: What Can Be Learnt from the Civil Service Performance Improvement Programme In Ghana?', *Public Administration and Development*, 2008, vol. 28, no. 4, p. 261 <https://doi.org/10.1002/pad.503>, accessed February 2022.

<sup>129</sup> Seidu 2010 in Williams, *Implementing Civil Service Reform in Africa*.

<sup>130</sup> Oppong et al 2015; ISS 2018 in Williams, *Implementing Civil Service Reform in Africa*.

<sup>131</sup> Kwame Adorbor, Interview, December 2018 in Williams, *Implementing Civil Service Reform in Africa*.

<sup>132</sup> Samiatu Bogobiri Seidu, 'Institutionalizing reforms in the public sector: a comparative study of public sector reform agencies in Ghana and Nigeria' [unpublished master's thesis], 15 February 2010, Erasmus University Thesis Depository, available at <https://thesis.eur.nl/pub/6683/>, accessed June 2022.

<sup>133</sup> Samiatu Bogobiri Seidu, 'Institutionalizing reforms in the public sector: a comparative study of public sector reform agencies in Ghana and Nigeria' [unpublished master's thesis], 15 February 2010, Erasmus University Thesis Depository, available at <https://thesis.eur.nl/pub/6683/>, accessed June 2022.

<sup>134</sup> Interview GHA12, December 2018 in Williams, *Implementing Civil Service Reform in Africa*.

<sup>135</sup> Williams, *Implementing Civil Service Reform in Africa*.