HEYWOOD FOUNDATION

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THE HEYWOOD FELLOWSHIP

ENGAGEMENT SUMMARY REPORT

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Introduction

This report details a summary of the interviews conducted during the engagement strand of the Heywood Fellowship, which was one part of a wider engagement exercise undertaken. This study sought perspectives about policymaking at the intersection of economic prosperity and national security, and how it should improve. Insights from those that had experience in interacting with the challenge, in both dealing with the issues themselves and being affected by them as they manifest both in policy and in business, was a crucial enabler for the Fellowship to build constructive, practical, and inclusive recommendations. Instead of solely relying on secondary and historical research, the study was able to gain widespread views from a sample of policymakers in relevant Civil Service departments, businesses impacted by national security, and experts both in the UK and abroad.

This research study was the first of its kind, engaging with Civil Servants, businesses, and experts at scale about the practicalities of policymaking for future challenges. While comparable engagement research studies and surveys provided insightful views about broad geopolitical trends, the Fellowship's survey differed in how it probed into the 'how' as well as the 'what' in the policy making process, tested areas of vulnerability from those with personal experience, and explored solutions and recommendations. Because the survey targeted a wide range of respondents in the Civil Service across grades and departments, and with business leaders from a range of sectors, it attempted to gather a broadly representative sample of insights which were used to inform the insights and recommendations set out in the Fellowship's formal report. The diversity in views helped to reduce overall bias, although Civil Servant interview participants were disproportionately from the Fellowship's personal networks.

This report details the themes emerging from the interviews and roundtables conducted throughout the duration of the Fellowship. While not recorded verbatim for privacy purposes, the Fellowship attempts to report an accurate record of discussions without construing, interpreting or misrepresenting participant views. The Fellowship does not attempt to analyse or agree/disagree with views, but rather aims to communicate an accurate record of the engagement undertaken. The report groups views into broad emerging themes, setting out where most participants agreed or disagreed on specific discussion topics. This research was conducted as an academic study at the Blavatnik School of Government at the University of Oxford. The Fellowship's research commenced in January 2023 for 12 consecutive months. Further detail on the research project conducted can be found in the Fellowship's main report, '*The Crossroads of Geopolitics: the intersection of security and economic interests – policy making in a more complex and uncertain world*'[1]

Method and ethics

Both formal and informal engagement was conducted during the Fellowship's research, which included a total of approximately 1000 individuals though various methods: interviews with policy practitioners,

[1] Black, Jonathan, Connolly, Jack, Adjerid, Amina, and Kelsey, Tom 'The Crossroads of Geopolitics: the intersection of security and economic interests – policy making in a more complex and uncertain world', Blavatnik School of Government Working Paper, January 2024.

business leaders and other experts, a series of topical roundtables, two online surveys in partnership with research data group YouGov which received responses from 600 UK business leaders and over 200 UK Civil Servants, and international travel to engage with international policy practitioners, businesses and academics in the US, Canada, Australia, Japan and Singapore. This report focuses on the interview and roundtables conducted both in the UK and abroad.

During interviews, the Fellowship used a set of agreed and structured questions to extract the most constructive and relevant range of responses that would produce the most value to the Fellowship's research, but in every interview offered participants the opportunity to first comment on the overall topic without leading participants' responses. Interviews were conducted privately; therefore, participants' identities remain protected throughout this record and in the Heywood Fellowship's official report.

During engagement with Civil Servants, formal one-to-one discussions were conducted with individuals at grade SCS2 and above, but extensive informal engagement was also conducted at a variety of grades. The Fellowship engaged with individuals from a several departments: the Cabinet Office, the Department of Business and Trade, Department for Energy and Net Zero, HM Treasury, the Northern Ireland office, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the National Security Cyber Centre, the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, the Home Office, the College for National Security, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, the Department for Education and others. During engagement with businesses, the study conducted both formal one-to-one interviews and a series of roundtables. The Fellowship focused its efforts on businesses in sectors that were impacted by national security, such as technology service, utilities and energy, business services, financial services, as well as others. Most of these participants were business leaders at level 'Director' and above. Internationally, the Fellowship engaged with government officials, businesses, think tanks, and academics that had experience with the policy challenge and insight into innovation abroad.

The study met appropriate ethical standards, with formal approval by the University of Oxford's Blavatnik School of Government Research Ethics Committee (DREC) in accordance with the procedure laid down by the University for Ethical Approval of research involving Human Participants. Participants in engagements remain anonymous to facilitate open discussions. While some quotes are used within this report, they are not attributed to any one participant or department. All views expressed are personal, and not representative of official departmental views or government policy.

Key findings

1. Engagement with UK Senior Civil Servants

1.1. General

1. When asked about the Fellowship's focus, almost all participants interviewed agreed with the Fellowship's core argument: that the intersection between economic prosperity and national security interests is becoming more complicated than ever before, and that in turn presents implications for policy making for governments. Most participants described the challenge as a product of a more contested world and a shift in the global paradigm. Several participants noted that there was less clarity about how major powers compete, make decisions, and react/respond in the rules-based system. These, as well as wider geopolitical factors, were generating a need for more resilience which couldn't be solved without thinking about economic security. In addition to this, participants perceived that hypotheses of the world and international economics were becoming more contested.
2. Looking at how the challenge has manifested itself in policy, participants named Artificial Intelligence, nuclear security and quantum as notable current examples presenting this challenge. Some of these issues were described as success stories - particularly on the Quantum Strategy published in March 2023. However, as one participant noted, absent having an "*integrated strategy for integrated interests across the wider scope of intersectional issues and for the long term*" barriers would continue to exist. Several participants referenced Mark Sedwill's Fusion Doctrine as a good example of responding to this challenge. Finally, participants commented on a lack of clarity on strategic priorities, lack of specificity about risks, and lack of coherent distinction between the domestic/international and economic/security interfaces. One participant said "*we need longevity but agility in our policy making. These challenges are inherently decadal, but you need to be able to flip and be agile to risk and opportunity*".

1.2 Culture

- One of the most frequently raised themes raised during engagement is that culture was a key barrier to enabling better integration but was also one of the hardest to change. Here, the term "culture" was used to describe the differences in customs, behaviours, and shared language between domains in government. While many participants were able to provide widespread examples of good-will and collaboration in the system that disrupt these traditional differences, it was also widely accepted that deep seated cultural differences remain. An emerging theme from interviews indicated a recognition that the two domains have different conceptual frameworks: three Senior Civil Servants during separate interviews defined this as: "*fundamental understandings and assumptions*", "*value systems, touch points, views on risk and understanding of what is important*", and "*the rhythm of what drives policy*". Another participant said, "*there is something about the rhythm of what drives economic policy versus national security and geopolitical*".
- The need to balance interests between economic driven objectives and security risks was sometimes perceived as an irritant in policymaking. Participants noted that fundamentally different goals in different domains could often be perceived as difficult to reconcile. Attempts to balance these interests has created some competition between departments, particularly where disagreements over responsibilities arise on cross cutting issues. Several participants noted that there were justified reasons for why different fundamental interests and cultures exist: in many

cases, it is more appropriate for security and economic departments to foster different cultures, and this would likely persist in the future. But while participants recognised that some version of '*us and them*' was bound to exist in any system, it equally acknowledged that it had been a barrier to collaboration and cohesion. One participant said, "*security departments conducting policy in a more closed way doesn't lend itself well to conducting open policy making*".

- In the context of increased cross-cutting pressures, the importance of collaboration was highlighted as a key enabler. Building connections across economic and security communities was perceived as challenging for a variety of reasons that participants identified: few individuals operated across both communities, there were limitations to access of national security clearances and secure IT, capacity constraints persisted, and structural issues (such as lack of links between teams, and a lack of horizonal accountability structures) existed. One participant noted that policymaking was currently "*somewhat dysfunctional*" about making connections between the two communities: "*it takes a huge amount of effort to build, and it can break easily*". To foster a more instinctively integrated culture, it was thought to be important to increase the depth of relationships through both early engagement in the policy process, and through clear governance structures. One participant commented that culture remained the most important enabler to improving policymaking: "*you can have the right data, but unless you have the right culture that doesn't matter*".

1.4. Systems

1. Systems for policy making processes work best with specific characteristics that encourage integration and collaboration. While participants raised examples of best practice throughout interviews, most questioned if systems encouraged integration. Some systems were thought to be more effective at supporting integration due to their maturity, such as the UK's CONTEST which was over 20 years old. Participants identified several features of the CONTEST framework contributing to its success: the Home Office's deep expertise, strong leadership for the system outside of the centre of government, and a defined single mission. One participant said that "*for systems to work, you need to define its mission and establish clarity about governance*". The participant noted that these characteristics are transferable to developing a system which codifies and clarifies what best practice looks like on economic security, which can also stand the test of time. Strong leadership both inside and outside the centre of government, with jobs tied to institutions instead of individuals, was crucial. However, one participant challenged a proposal to "*create more process*" versus developing principles, connections between communities, and getting the conversations right.

1.5. Capability

1. Almost all participants interviewed proactively raised the importance of people in policymaking. Many participants agreed that there were widespread examples of excellent individuals in policymaking. This included civil servants that were well intentioned, literate across multiple specialisms, are both analytical and disruptive, and had built up diverse experience across

domains. However, participants notably did not credit this to systematic or cultural encouragement, but rather individual excellence. In turn, this had created reliance on individual expertise and entrepreneurship, and potential vulnerabilities when people moved on or left roles. Participants were particularly cognisant of this at leadership level and highlighted the importance of having strong leaders with advanced collaboration skills and cross-cutting experience.

2. To ensure a more systematic approach, participants noted that an increased focus on career structures and incentives for the long term was required: everything from talent spotting to advanced training opportunities was in scope. One participant said, "*we need the right career incentives and training, and a structured way of bringing communities together*". But while participants were unified on the need to upskill individuals, participants had varying ideas about where the critical skills gaps existed: some participants argued that the rise of specialisms has enabled the development of siloed experts across a wide range of domains, while others identified skills shortages in areas such as foundational economic literacy and technology.

3. Developing the offer for the 'mid-career' with the right incentives and training, if done in a structured way, would enable deeper relationships between communities and diversity in experience earlier in career paths. Networking was identified as a key enabler, which could be facilitated through "classroom" activities, such as taught modules and case study activities. Several participants exemplified this by referring to the work of the College for National Security (CfNS), whose mission to improve the culture of the national security community was highlighted through commitments in the Integrated Review. In the past, there had been other attempts to develop an academy for National Security, such as the proposal set out in the 2016 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review. However, unlike other attempts, the CfNS did not link itself to territory, and instead functioned independently but inclusively across government. It also went further in developing a career programme which brings in business and academia and worked with international partners such as Australia to create shared curriculums. While the CfNS was widely recognised as an excellent initiative, some participants noted that it was too early to understand its long-term impact.

4. Separately, few participants noted the importance of creating more space for diversity, particularly in the National Security domain. Two participants raised resourcing and capacity constraints as barriers.

1.6. Information

1. An asymmetry of access to economic and security information was cited as the biggest barrier to improving policy making. Participants said that information flow between departments was insufficient: only a small amount of people had access to cross cutting conversations, and a lack of security clearances (particularly in economic departments) prevented coherent integration and access. Some participants were able to recall specific examples of information being withheld without sufficient explanation: one participant speculated that these behaviours may be a symptom of a lack of departmental join up, lack of clarity about which approvals were required, or instances of individuals not understanding the knock-on effect. A few participants noted that

based on their experiences, some strong cultural related characteristics of departments such as the Ministry of Defence and the Treasury did not encourage the open sharing of information.

2. Good use of information and data, especially in analysis and assessment was identified as being an enabler. One participant noted that the Joint Intelligence Committee's (JIC) role in creating an "*evidence based starting point for discussions that can't be argued with*" was important for the policy making process. This also meant that not every individual needed to be an expert to make good policy and creating a common baseline of evidence-based information across domains. The Fellowship's proposal on establishing a 'Centre for Integrated Analysis and Assessment' was pitched to participants, which received support from participants as a concept, however participants highlighted that it posed questions around positioning and remit vs the role of JIC.

1.7. Business

1. Most participants did not proactively raise the relationship with business, but when asked, were able to identify a gap. Participants noted that government was thinking about strategic problems that businesses are not, but that do impact them. Most participants agreed that information provision was critical here: businesses required the right intellectual framework in which to function. In this respect, there were examples of best practice: many participants positively reflected on the work of the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), which retained advantages through not being a 'policy' department and therefore functioning independently from policy making processes, working only to inform and implement. Cyber was a good example of dealing with both threat and opportunity, but as state threat and espionage had risen the last few years, this had required more intervention in both the public and private sector which were driven by different goals. Participants noted that the NCSC had established clarity on the interface in which business can interact on cyber issues, which had been greatly beneficial both to government and businesses.

2. Due to increasingly cross-cutting issues, businesses were more frequently having to deal with many different stakeholders and often didn't know who to go to for the information, consultation, or decisions that they needed. One participant said, "*with business, government needs to be a clearer partner and needs to be able to articulate itself*". In addition to this, participants that worked in domains of government that had more interaction with businesses reflected that relationship management with business and a heavy reliance on personalities had been an issue. One participant noted that a solution for this was to develop more specific sector strategies and clarify its views on what the most intelligent priorities for business engagement are. Another key barrier was how to overcome barriers for engagement with businesses where issues were in the national security space.

1.8. International

1. Participants highlighted that all countries were confronting this challenge in various respects. Participants looked to others as examples of where elements of the economic and security intersection are being responded to well. Here, participants tended to point towards the US on developing more strategic and open conversations with business, Japan for developing its

capability enabled by new legislation and the standing up of an economic minister, Australia for trade, Singapore for its future planning and France for its close and strategic relationship with business. While it was unclear that any one country did this better or best, it was concluded that everyone was grappling with this challenge, and participants were aware of shortcomings in this respect. In that same vein, participants able to identify where good innovation was taking place across countries and can seek to take inspiration or replicate solutions. Participants noted that several countries were further along in their policy innovation due to geopolitical circumstances and proximity to threats, particularly Northeast Asia and Australia.

1.9. Structures

1. Many participants noted that structures in which policy making for intersectional issues generally lack formality, and decision-making process could appear "ad hoc". One participant noted that greater clarity was needed in processes where it related to responsibilities, "*decision making rights vs veto rights*". In this vein, most participants agreed that the logical convener should be the centre, which had advantages in its role acting as a neutral party, representing the Prime Minister, and expertise in providing both coordination and challenge. However, some structural issues in the Cabinet Office raised concerns with participants - including the split of issues between the National Security Secretariat and the Economic and Domestic Secretariat. Participants argued that there could be a case for both economic and security issues to fall under the remit of one senior individual or secretariat. Several participants also noted that while the centre should retain its role as the convener, strong policy leads in Departments should be identified and appointed on issues.
2. On decision making structures, participants noted that there was a degree of formality on national security decisions that did not exist on business or the economy. The route for decision making on security included National Security Council (NSC), but participants noted that there was nothing equivalent on economics which had resulted in an "uneven playing field". Several participants described the security structure as "old fashioned" and uninterested in economic issues. The risk in formal structures that favoured security, combined with unique features of security issues (timescales, risks being easier to understand and more compelling, and more difficulties in balancing against using economics) presented a case for increasing the formality of inclusive decision-making structures. This required more consideration to how best to represent risk and reward from both aspects.

2. Engagement with business leaders and other experts

2.1 Perception of business and government engagement

1. While business leaders had mixed views about current arrangements for engagement between policy and business, all agreed that it remains an important factor. Experts interviewed noted that good public-private engagement was important, particularly in providing the strategic context for which businesses function in, and the associated risks where there are sensitivities. Overall, many participants perceived the UK government to be comparatively business friendly: this perception was highlighted by examples of effective interfaces that businesses had positive experience

engaging. This included the National Security Investment Act, the National Cyber Security Centre (which had effective outreach to businesses and was good at making connections across government) and the Inflation Reduction Act. However, several participants highlighted lack of coordination and transparency as key barriers, placing emphasis on the internal coordination between government departments where issues were cross-cutting.

2. Participants were unified on the view that there was a clear need for broader and more strategic conversations, but barriers relating to trust need to be overcome. Participants broadly agreed that there needed to be more strategic conversations and mature dialogues about sharing risks. One participant noted that there didn't seem to be enough trust in business in this space: in comparison with the US, UK businesses were less engaged in conversations with the government that were "*open and frank*". Trust needed to be rebuilt, but participants noted that there wasn't currently a place to coordinate this. Many participants expressed a desire for more upstream discussions, particularly about long term issues and future planning. One participant said, *"the information from government needs to be proactive and forward looking. Saying to business: "here are the upcoming things that you should worry about" is how you create real trust"*. Participants noted that there were opportunities for a closer relationship, but it required more structures that brought people together in a systematic way. This necessarily required departments to work together to simplify the interface for business engagement.

3. In respects to information sharing, participants agreed that there was room for improvement but there were examples of best practice where interests aligned. One participant from the financial sector highlighted that international crime was a good example of information sharing. In the UK, this was exemplified by the Joint Money Laundering Intelligence Taskforce (JMLIT) which was able to effective exchange information where it related to money laundering and wider economic threats. While this model was effective, it was not necessarily transferable to other areas. The participant noted "*when it comes to law enforcement, there's a clearer alignment of interests. In other things, there's a bit of divergence*".

4. Engagement abroad

4.1 Japan: perception of the challenge and innovation

1. In Japan, a changing global context had been a key factor in driving innovations in structures and legislation, which participants broadly agreed were working successfully to respond to the challenge. Participants from government departments various businesses in Japan were unified on the view that the global context had changed and that there was a shifting global landscape. Policymakers and business leaders alike noted that they were conscious of these dynamics, and particularly pointed towards the US's policy towards China. In addition to this, there were also difficult domestic dynamics with Japan facing high debt (approx. 270% against GDP), an aging population and less productivity.

2. Japan's establishment of the Economic Department and Economic Security Act received widespread praise for successfully conducting the role of a key economic function that brought

together different and talented individuals from various ministries. While it had not entirely removed silos, experienced participants noted that it had significantly helped to close gaps and establish more coherence across government. The position of the economic function had meant that it could act as a representative of pressures coming down from the Prime Minister, and other ministries were therefore more willing to cooperate effectively. Another participant highlighted another structural feature for its success was because while departments engaged with a central function, they retained responsibilities for delivery. However, some vulnerabilities remained: participants observed that the career process was weaker than in the UK: when an individual started working in a single department, they could only be elevated within that same department.

4.2 Japan: perception of international engagement

3. A core theme of engagement with officials in Japan was the importance of international engagement. Participants noted that international cooperation was key to tackling the challenge, and that a dynamic of cooperation must be promoted in international domains. This included existing forums for international cooperation: one participant said that the G7 should be used to have more proactive discussions on the challenge, such as regulating the space around Artificial Intelligence. Other participants also noted the importance of information sharing: "*we need more transatlantic information sharing, particularly to respond to China*". One participant suggested that there was a case for a new Five Eyes for the 20th century, likely with a different combination of members. One participant from a think tank noted that Japan wanted a closer relationship with the USA and others, but dynamics here mattered. The participant noted that some viewed the West as neglectful of the Global South, and that this was a conversation that needed to be happening.

4.3 Japan: perception of relationship between government and business

4. Participants had an overall positive outlook on the government's relationship with businesses but noted some barriers. A senior member of Japan's National Security Secretariat noted that businesses in Japan were completely accustomed to state orientated policy and government regulation "*the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry is attentive, so businesses understand, adapt and recognise the metamorphosis of the world economy*". Guidance from the government to the private sector was highly important during enforcement of the Economic Security Act. However, several participants noted that the security clearance system for businesspeople was not sufficient and lacked a structured procedure. A participant from a think tank noted that the Japanese government had a closer relationship with industry than the UK or US did and noted its importance in bringing industry knowledge into government. A senior business leader noted the emerging debate about the role of the state and private sector in managing risk "*the Government needs to play a clearer role in setting the strategic imperative*".

4.4 Australia: perception of the challenge and innovation in government

5. Participants broadly agreed that the context had changed, and the interlinkages between economics and security were increasingly strong. One participant from a leading Australian think

tank noted that Australia has been aware that economics and security cannot be separated for a long time, but now there was an opportunity to learn from past events "*we got better, but we need a better system*". Positives of the Australian system was that it does well on its ability to move quickly on national interference, but this remained on an issue-by-issue basis. A senior policy maker noted that COVID had shown Australia, alongside many other countries, that systems can respond when there is an issue, but that we shouldn't wait until a crisis arises to act.

6. Skills, networks, and join-up within government were cited as key factors for responding to the challenge effectively. Many participants noted a lack of clear responsibility and accountability for join up was a barrier to being more effective on integration of the economic-security intersection. A senior policymaker noted that good coordination was the "*most important*" factor. Looking at international comparisons, participants highlighted that Singaporeans do this best - not just because their system is small, but because they used the right tools. Participants also highlighted good examples in the Australian system including the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation, and the Futures team within the Prime Minister's Department which would likely expand its analysis over time. Exchange with universities and business were important to enable having more individuals being well versed in futures/scenarios analysis. Several participants identified security clearances as a persistent issue to ensure people have visibility to the right issues.

7. A common theme from engagement was how the government looked at risk and opportunity. One participant noted that once a risk was identified, the system was good at formatting itself - but this remained on an issue-by-issue basis. Different departments tended to look at risk in different ways, with economists thinking of margins and securists thinking of risk. During a roundtable, senior policymakers noted that when an issue is identified, departments tended to stamp down on the risk rather than look at the opportunity - which was an important balance to get right on issues such as Artificial Intelligence. Participants noted that risk posture was ongoing work: the system did not yet have a deep understanding of risk and were not able to "price" it very well. One participant said, "*to de-risk you first need to understand risk*".

8. Innovation in intelligence functions plays an important role in facilitating more integration in policy: participants from key government departments noted that the Office for National Intelligence had expanded its remit to go beyond a traditional intelligence role and enabled the bringing together of unique insights to have a 'top down' view on different areas of policy. Its legislative mandate on what policy can be given meant that "*they can be frank*". This important innovation was perceived as a positive step to bringing together greater integration in policymaking.

4.5 Australia: perception on international engagement

9. Participants agreed that international groupings were important mechanisms for progressing the conversation. One participant noted that there was a need for better use of international forums in which cross-cutting issues could be discussed with partners. The participant commented, "*the Quad is a public goods building forum, but it should be discussing things like supply chain resilience*". Another participant noted the importance of intelligence sharing through the Five Eyes mechanism, but identified a case for other groupings of countries where interests align. Using

international groupings for more proactive conversations was important, but a future priority should be in developing more awareness of other countries: Southeast Asia, India, Pacific etc.

4.6 Australia: perception on business and government engagement

1. Australia had significantly improved its alignment with business in recent years, but more work needed to be done. During a roundtable, participants reflected that the relationship between government and business had seen significant improvement, particularly due to the government's ability to provide strategic context to businesses. Participants from government departments understood that businesses were sensitive about the market and what is coming down the road. The government had taken a more "*genuine*" look at businesses since the Russia/Ukraine crisis began, because it had enabled a deeper understanding about how businesses are hurting. But some gaps remained: businesses would instinctively chase opportunity, so the government's ability to communicate the security risks and provide incentives in that context remained important. One participant noted that intelligence functions in Australia needed to look more deeply at how they received market intelligence: the Trusted information sharing network on Critical National Infrastructure was a good example which brings together the right stakeholders. Separately, participants also noted that more industry placements would help government to better understand business and vice versa.

4.7 Singapore: perception of the challenge and innovation in government

1. Singapore has an advanced awareness of the strategic context and has made progress in responding to it. One senior business leader commented that the boundaries in the National Security space were shifting, and there was not a set model for understanding risk "*it's more of an art than a science*". The long-term nature of the challenge was also not lost on participants: with one individual stating, "*the overarching thing is the move from a more acute phase to more chronic*". Being a small country with limited resources, Singapore had retained advantages in its small communities within the government system: meaning that people could talk to each other, share information and bridge together common understandings more easily. One senior policy maker said that "*Singapore's progress has stemmed from the fact that it is small and aware of its own vulnerability, with a good sense of what is happening outside of its borders*". One senior policy maker said that "*Singapore always looks to others*", paying particular attention to US policy.
2. Singapore's Centre for Strategic Futures (CSF) was an important innovation that aimed to improve the process of policy itself. Participants agreed that cultural differences acted as barriers to effective cooperation across domains, where people were often "*speaking different languages*". One participant referenced a Chinese saying "*chicken duck talk*" to illustrate this. The CSF was highlighted as an important innovation in responding to this challenge. Its coordination role was enabled by its placement in the Prime Minister's Office, with various teams embedded in ministries. One participant noted that its objective was to "*erode and ignore the boundaries between economics and security by creating platforms that are explicitly cross domain*". Its approach is to involve teams early in the process to "*get people in the same room to answer the same question*".

While some of its effectiveness may be attributed to unique advantages of the Singapore system, particularly its size, the CSF's outlook on improving the process of policy through deliberate intervention was the most significant feature in enabling coherent coordination. One participant highlighted, "*the process is the product*".