ELEVEN YEARS TO
SAVE THE PLANET?
THE CLOSING POLITICAL
WINDOW FOR CLIMATE
MITIGATION
Thomas Hale

SHOULD MILLENNIALS
BE CHEESED OFF
ABOUT HOUSE PRICES?
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In Greta Thunberg’s address to the UN Climate Summit, she said: “This is all wrong. I shouldn’t be up here. I should be back in school … Yet you all come to us young people for hope. How dare you?”

But perhaps more young people should be on the stage. “Why deprive young people of the opportunity to lead?”, asked Mo Ibrahim, founder of the Ibrahim Prize for excellence in African leadership, speaking at the Blavatnik School of Government this year. “Africa has the youngest population of any continent and yet its leaders are mostly very old. They should move on.”

This new issue of the Oxford Government Review focuses on ‘The New Generations’, thinking about the ways in which young people are changing – and should change – the world. Each year, the Oxford Government Review features voices from our community – such as our faculty, researchers, students and alumni. This year, almost all the authors are under 40.

Millennials (born 1981–2000) and Gen Z (born since 2000) are concerned about their future – job prospects, housing, income – and about the future of the planet. Are they right to feel angry at previous generations over their economic concerns, asks Tom Simpson, or should we scrutinise the assumption that each generation has a duty to ensure the next is better off? The intergenerational debate is sharper yet on climate change, as Thomas Hale notes in his article, arguing that governments must urgently refocus their efforts or climate politics will become a stark question of who gets to survive.

For digital natives, technology is part and parcel of everyday life. But that sharpens the divide between those with access and those with none, and often demands more innovative regulation. The Pathways for Prosperity Commission at the Blavatnik School is concluding its research into how developing countries can best adapt, as reported by Beatriz Kira and Toby Phillips. Meanwhile, the global tech platform companies are the focus of Pepper Culpepper in his essay on how we should consider regulating them.

Cities are the destinations of the young across the world, and the ‘Cities that Work’ project at the Blavatnik School is examining how best to prepare urban areas, projected to house 60 per cent of the global population by 2030. Oliver Harman and Shahrukh Wani argue that city-specific policymaking is essential to ensure no-one is left behind. A positive example comes from our former MPP student Ángela Anzola De Toro, who led the efforts of Bogotá’s city government to put young women at the centre of transport and urban planning.

One of the biggest ongoing challenges is the decline of trust in governments and ‘the elites’, in particular among young people. Nik Kirby outlines a three-step strategy which can help governments rebuild integrity. Interestingly, Anna Petherick shows that exposing corruption can have positive effects on gender representation in politics.

Across all these issues, the pressing question for young people is how to make change happen. Is it better to work within the system, or to campaign outside of it? Calum Miller and former MPP student Jeremy Roberts consider the ‘inside or outside’ question and how young changemakers might navigate the options. And our doctoral candidate Jieun Baek reminds us that even in very challenging contexts young people can make a difference, describing the way North Korea’s younger generations are indirectly challenging the regime.

I hope you will find this collection of insights and research thought-provoking and stimulating. If you do, please share it (it is available on our website) and help us continue to inspire and support better public policy and better leadership in government.
Jeremy Roberts argues that, for important issues that don’t tick the boxes of political relevance and salience, a principled insider is the route to change.

INFLUENCING FROM THE INSIDE

At the Blavatnik School of Government students are taught how to critically analyse, develop, and influence public policy. The tools and skills gained by students are universal and the ability to think about policy challenges through economic, philosophical, legal, scientific, and political lenses opens a wide array of professional paths. Graduates who decide to continue in the field, however, face a choice: should they seek to influence policy from the outside or the inside?

My own career has largely followed the latter. Prior to my education, I worked as a political aide. Since graduating, I have been fortunate enough to have been elected. I knew from a very young age that my path to making a difference was going to be an ‘inside job’. That is not the case for everyone.

If the end goal of a policy debate is to convince government to act in a certain way, then we arrive at a question of motivation. How does one get government to act in a particular way?

In advising political candidates on what issues to campaign on, renowned strategist Lynton Crosby landed on four political criteria:

- Is the issue salient?
- Is it personally relevant?
- Does it differentiate you from the other team?
- Will voters consider this issue at the ballot box? (the classic ‘ballot box question’, for our political insiders)

I would contend that the most successful groups at influencing policy from the outside are those that coalesce around issues that naturally tick off most of Crosby’s criteria. I think, for example, of low-tax movements, small business advocates, or the environmental movement. Outsiders who can build compelling cases that their issues fall into these categories are likely to find success when attempting to persuade government – provided they can communicate effectively.

Where this becomes infinitely more difficult is when issues do not tick off these boxes. Take, for example, support for individuals with developmental disabilities. While those with developmental disabilities invoke a great deal of empathy, the issue as a public policy challenge often lacks the aforementioned political criteria. For those removed from it, it lacks personal relevance and it is not particularly salient. Political opponents largely agree that support...
Countless other examples exist of politicians getting the ball over the proverbial line on public policy issues of personal relevance. The late Minister Flaherty was my boss and a mentor. Much of my own decision to run for office was motivated by his example. As the older brother of a sibling on the autism spectrum, I too have had a personal issue that I have sought to influence from the inside.

I first started in politics from the ‘outside’. When I was 14 years old I joined an autism advocacy group in protesting outside the office of the then Ontario Premier – the head of Canada’s most populous sub-national government.

Autism spectrum disorder is the fastest-growing neurological disorder in the world. It affects individuals’ communication, social and sensory processing skills. 1 in 59 children are born with an autism diagnosis, with the number spiking to 1 in 37 for boys. My brother is among them.

Around the world, governments have struggled with sorting out how to properly support families with children with developmental disabilities, including autism. The challenges are both complex and legion: timely diagnosis, effective treatment, integration into schools, housing, employment, caregiver support... the list goes on. It is safe to say that no government has achieved a perfect system. Despite the autism advocacy community’s success at turning autism support into a political issue that ticks off multiple boxes, the need for an ‘inside’ push has been apparent. It was this need that served as a key motivator for me to put my name on the ballot in last year’s Ontario provincial election.

As a newly elected Member of Provincial Parliament since June 2018, I have been in a position to make that difference from the inside. Alongside Amy Fee, a fellow elected member who has two children on the spectrum, we have been working to move the issue forward amid a flurry of competing policy priorities (many of which are much more salient, personally relevant, differentiable and election-oriented).

We are not across the finish line yet. The complexity of the issue demands that appropriate time be taken to achieve a positive outcome. But by using the levers at our disposal as elected officials on the ‘inside’, I am confident that the results will be a welcome change. In reality, the decision over whether to influence policy from the inside or outside is a false dichotomy. When tackled successfully, public policy challenges are addressed with help from both sides. However, for those seeking to make a difference on an issue that fails to tick off many political boxes, they should consider addressing it from the inside. If you can learn how to navigate the political world effectively, you can expend capital to put items of both deep and personal relevance on the public policy agenda. In a world where the level of political discourse seems to be spiralling downward with every tweet, it can be easy to overlook the tremendously powerful and meaningful work being done by politicians on the inside all around the globe. Influencing from the outside is arguably viewed as the more principled route to change. Maybe if we took the time to highlight some of our positive political examples we would be reminded that fighting for policy change on the inside is indeed a noble and necessary calling.

Jeremy Roberts is the Member of Provincial Parliament for Ottawa West – Nepean. He also serves as Parliamentary Assistant to the Minister of Children, Community & Social Services and he is an alumnus of the Master of Public Policy at the Blavatnik School (MPP 2015).

In a polarised world where trust in institutions is eroding, Calum Miller considers ways of making a difference inside and outside government.

Christina is an engaged, capable and professional young woman. She excelled in her university studies and had the pick of employers for her first job. A strong commitment to her community led her to work for her country’s government, where she has progressed rapidly through a set of increasingly challenging civil service roles.

But recently, she has noticed that the conduct of public life is changing. Politicians are closing ranks. The tenor of debate is increasingly hostile. Highly partisan parliamentarians are striking uncompromising positions and shouting down those who oppose them. Outside parliament, an increasing number of her friends are protesting. They want a different politics and a government that listens to their concerns.

Christina has a simple question: “Can I make more of a difference from the inside or the outside?”

Of course, she’s far from the first person to ask this. Political philosophers and those committed to making change happen have debated it for centuries. There is, however, a renewed urgency around the question in this populist age, in particular for younger generations. Trust in institutions has declined, often encouraged by populist attacks on their legitimacy. Resurgent social movements have steadily gathered new activists among those under 40. This leaves many young people who are dedicated to making a difference in their communities asking Christina’s question. Three considerations might help them.

First, they need to know themselves. In public life, different roles require different temperaments. A senior civil servant recently summarised it for a group of graduate students at the Blavatnik School: “Are you a campaigner who gets excited about ideas and values or a pragmatist who most enjoys getting things done?” The more powerful ideas and values motivate an individual, the more difficult they will find life as a civil servant, since they are obliged to follow the direction of their political masters. If they really want to get things done, though, the levers of state authority provide powerful instruments to make change happen when compared to the often demading and drawn-out course of campaigning from the ‘outside’.

Second, aspiring changemakers need to prioritise the type of change they want to make. They must develop a view of how change can happen and what role they can play in the process.
If the change they want to see is so radical that incremental steps by government are unlikely to achieve it, they may decide they have to work from the outside to remagine and then reshape the system. For many issues, however, the size of the state and scale of its activities readily allows those who work inside it to have a positive impact on a substantial number of lives.

Lastly, they need to take a view about those for whom they work. In all political systems there is a structured relationship between those who compete for and hold power (the rulers) and those who serve them (the functionaries). This codified relationship provides both a moral boundary, which can insulate the functionary from the actions of the ruler, and a professional boundary, which allows the functionary to draw personal worth from their activities. So, for example, a government lawyer can take pride in providing timely, well-reasoned advice to ministers on the legal risks of a course of action even if, in the end, ministers elect to take a course of action that the lawyer knows is wrong.

Yet not everyone finds this separation of agency comfortable. And even those who in normal times do may still face challenges with which they personally disagree. They have discharged their ministers’ choice.

The yearning to learn new things is a universal hunger that cannot be suppressed, even within the Kim regime, writes Jieun Baek.

"BY MARSHALLING HUMAN CAPITAL, INFORMATION NETWORKS AND NORTH KOREAN DEFECTORS, YOUNGER GENERATIONS OF NORTH KOREANS CAN CREATE IRREVERSIBLE CRACKS IN THE REGIME."

After finishing her homework and house chores and saying goodnight to her parents, Ha-Young would plug her earbuds into her tablet, and watch the latest Korean drama series underneath her blanket. Upon finishing the series, she would take the USB stick to school and quietly ask her trusted friends if anyone wanted to swap memory sticks that had different movies and drama series on them. One time, she paid a lady in the market stalls to get a curly perm to imitate one of the actresses in the drama episode she last watched. She even bought a glittery hairband to finish the look.

Ha-Young was born in 1989 in Hoeryoung, North Korea, and described her childhood at length to me a few summers ago at a café in Seoul. She had escaped her country, and became a citizen of South Korea in 2011. As she and her friends described their past times to me, I was struck by how different their descriptions of their lives were from the depictions of North Korea in mainstream Western media – much of which pertain to the political elite and military.

Ha-Young is part of what is often referred to as the Jangmadang generation. Jangmadang in Korean means ‘market grounds’, and refers to the black and grey markets that sprang up around the time of the Great Famine, a period in the mid-1990s when the North Korean economy collapsed and resulted in the deaths of an estimated 800,000–2 million North Koreans. North Koreans who were born in the middle of, or after, the famine grew up dependent on these markets. That is, almost all defectors who are 35 years old or younger – an age group that comprises about a quarter of the country’s population – bought their foods and goods by shopping in the informal markets. They did not stand in lines with ration tickets or younger – an age group that comprises about a quarter of the country’s population – bought their foods and goods by shopping in the informal markets. They did not stand in lines with ration tickets at public distribution centres like their parents or grandparents had.

There are a few broad characteristics that describe this young generation. First, they are capitalistic, individualistic, and more likely to take risks to support themselves and their families. No longer are they blindly dependent on and trusting of the Kim regime. Second, North Korea’s young adults have unprecedented access to foreign information – information that is incrementally unravelling what they have learned in school and through their political youth leagues. Third, this younger generation is significantly less loyal to the state and its leadership. Much of their experiences with markets and access to foreign information contradict the propaganda they
learn from the state, so millennials dismiss much of what they hear via the state radio, television and newspapers.

This decrease in devotion to the state presents a clear challenge to the authoritarian government: either adapt their narrative and policies to meaningfully capture the younger citizens’ loyalty, or continue to lose credibility and support among the millennials, whose influence over time will naturally eclipse that of the older generations. If it does not adapt, Kim’s government risks experiencing dramatic changes that it may not be able to control.

Now, we must remember that North Korea remains the most authoritarian state today, systematically inflicting egregious human rights violations onto its citizenry of 25 million. The Songbun system (political caste system) pretty much determines the fate of every baby based on the role that the baby’s ancestors played at the inception of the North Korean state. A nationwide network of brutal political prison camps and detention centres exists to ensure that every person lives in lockstep with the demands of their state, and lives up to the wishes of the Great Leader, Kim Jong-Un. With surveillance technologies purchased from China and elsewhere, the regime’s surveillance system, which used to be implemented offline by brute human force, is now becoming systematically digitalised. The Chinese–North Korean border is no longer only guarded by dogs, electric fences, and border guards under shoot-to-kill orders against anyone suspected of escaping the country. These old-school methods of preventing defections have been reinforced by tens of thousands of CCTVs, facial recognition software and motion sensors. North Korea remains as brutal as ever.

What enables this regime to remain so effective in controlling its people as a sealed-off country is, in part, its hold over the monopoly over information access and dissemination. Radios are manufactured to be tuned only to the state’s stations. All media electronics (televisions, radios, DVD players, computers) must be registered with local authorities and are subject to random content checks. All mobile phone activity is subject to monitoring by the state. International calls are illegal. One of the most heinous ‘crimes’ that a North Korean can commit is to consume foreign media that is not sanctioned by the state – an act punishable by hard labour, imprisonment and/or execution.

Despite these draconian measures, a quiet information revolution is taking place inside North Korea. Over the past three decades, small-scale information access activities implemented by networks of disparate defector groups and commissioned middlemen have cultivated interest in foreign media among swaths of North Koreans. Human rights organisations, tech companies, and the US State Department have separately funded such creative efforts to push information into this country, despite the risks and dangers that exist. Between second-hand Chinese radios and DIY construction, many ordinary North Koreans use black-market radios to secretly listen to foreign programmes such as Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, Free North Korea Radio, and Radio Free Chosun. Just like Ha Young did when she was a teenager, more and more North Koreans clamour for DVD and CD players, cell phones, e-books, movies, news articles, and simple computers that are illegally snuck in by defectors and NGOs.

Why do North Koreans risk their lives to seek forbidden information and media? The insatiable yearning to learn new things – to discover our world, to see how other people live, what they eat, how they spend their days – is a universal hunger that cannot be squelched, even by the Kim regime.

As important as extant campaigns are, these spotty and small-scale efforts are not a sufficient force against such a ruthless regime. These information activities must be reinforced by a much more powerful engine with coordinated strategies, expertise, innovative technology, and more funding by foreign entities, such as the US government and its allies. The North Korean government must change and adapt to the times, and by marshalling human capital, information networks and North Korean defectors, increasingly informed younger generations of North Koreans can create irreversible cracks in the regime, a society previously beyond reach, and ultimately create conditions that favour freedom, human rights, and dignity.

In the words of Ha Young: “People say mountains change in about ten years. If something as stubborn and mammoth as a mountain can change in a decade, the hearts of ordinary North Koreans can change. I’m sure of it.”

Jieun Baek is the author of North Korea’s Hidden Revolution: How the Information Underground is Transforming a Closed Society. She is currently studying for a DPhil in Public Policy at the Blavatnik School of Government.
When it comes to tech firms, convenience has its price, writes Pepper Culpepper.

Many items you can think of delivered to your home in a matter of hours and at a low price; rides taking you from one side of the city to the other quickly and conveniently; staying connected to your friends and family, seeing their every update with the swipe of a finger.

These are among the most obvious examples of the convenience offered by Amazon, Uber, Facebook, and other ‘big tech’ platform companies. For older generations, these firms have revolutionised the market, offering wider choice, more convenience, and better prices. Younger generations rely on them even more, integrating them into the fabric of their lives from an early age – 50% of US teens say Amazon is their favourite website, and in the UK Uber is more popular among millennials than any other age group.

This extreme convenience has political consequences. People have become dependent on the innovations delivered by the platforms. Regulation that could limit the ability of platforms to deliver this convenience will not just be opposed by platform companies. It will be opposed by many consumers too.

This power that tech companies hold – which Kathy Thelen and I call ‘platform power’ – presents governments with a novel regulatory challenge. In the past, business was regulated by government to protect the interests of consumers. In the case of tech companies that reach a certain scale, the consumer interest argument is hard to sustain – Amazon delivers outstanding value, even if it operates as a dominant player in online retail. The challenge for government lies in the fact that consumers appreciate this convenience. As a result, they can often be mobilised on behalf of those companies, implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) forming part of the bloc that supports such companies.

This power poses risks in terms of regulation and challenges for governments and politicians. Who wants to be the politician who denies customers the wonders of Amazon Prime? And yet, in the current moment there is much talk of regulating big tech firms. If platform power is so important, how can this be? We argue that the vogue for regulating big tech results from fissures in the consumer-platform power alliance, which can come about in two ways.

The first is when an event underscores that the platform firm’s interests diverge from those of consumers. This is what happened with the Facebook and Cambridge Analytica data scandal in 2018, when it was revealed that personal data of millions of Facebook users were used for targeted political advertising without their consent. This revelation generated a backlash against the social networking site, with Facebook facing calls for tighter regulation and its CEO Mark Zuckerberg called to testify before the US Congress. Perhaps even more importantly, the public understanding of personal data and its power changed, highlighting that the interests of tech giants were not as aligned to the consumer as they might have thought.

Much the same dynamics lies at the root of the recent European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Just at the moment the GDPR legislation was being considered by the European Parliament, Edward Snowden’s leak of intelligence agency documents revealed that tech companies such as Google, Microsoft, Yahoo and Facebook gave the US government access to their servers to track online communications. The companies once seen as liberators were revealed as government spooks.

The second way in which the consumer-platform alliance is broken is priming people to think as citizens first, rather than as consumers. In Denmark, a campaign against Uber pivoted around the risks posed to the welfare state by a company whose model seemed to skirt the tax collection and social rights of workers that prevail in the rest of the Danish economy. The Danish public strongly values the welfare state – which is funded by taxpayers – and the risk posed by a company like Uber, which was seen as not paying its fair share, was enough to swing people in favour of regulation.

One of the interesting features of platform technology companies, as compared with traditional firms, is that the existence of platform power means that they are often in favour of having a public political battle, as they think the public will be on their side. In 2015 in India, for example, Facebook undertook a highly public campaign to introduce ‘Free Basics.’ This mobile app gives free access to a selection of data-light websites and services. Zuckerberg called it a way to allow everyone with a phone to ‘join the knowledge economy while also enabling the industry to continue growing profits and building out this infrastructure.’ And it could also have created the possibility of a huge, captive market for Facebook. A group led by Nikhil Pahwa campaigned against Free Basics, highlighting that Facebook would dominate the internet and violate the principle of ‘net neutrality’ (the concept that internet service providers should treat all traffic equally). The case was decided in front of a regulator, rather than the parliament. In the clash of citizen values – greater internet access versus net neutrality – the regulator sided with the net neutrality argument. Independent regulators, which do not have to worry directly about approval ratings and popularity, can maintain a level of independence from tech companies that governments and legislatures may find harder to achieve.

Regulating platform companies is a complicated task because of their close ties to consumers. Younger generations are often more trusting of big companies than they are of governments, and yet they are the ones who will need to tackle this challenge head on. Will the increasing number of privacy and data-related scandals around the world politicise younger consumers – who are also citizens – in favour of more stringent regulation? Or will they instead trust the large companies who have brought them such incredible convenience and a seamless user experience? The answer to this question will help determine the future course of platform politics and technology regulation.

Pepper D Culpepper is Blavatnik Chair in Government and Public Policy at the Blavatnik School of Government.
Governments need to pick up new tools and become the creators, rather than observers, of the technological revolution, argue Toby Phillips and Beatriz Kira.

"MANY OF THE WORLD’S POORER COUNTRIES DO NOT EVEN HAVE AN EFFECTIVE DATA GOVERNANCE OR COMPETITION POLICY REGIME."

In 2018, Uganda passed a daily ‘social media tax’ of 200 Ugandan shillings (around US$0.05) for several internet applications, including Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp. Policymakers hoped the measure would increase revenue. It backfired: after the introduction of the tax, use of online platforms and tax revenues from these services plummeted in the country. Regulatory tools from an analogue past are ill-suited to achieve policy goals in the digital age, and decisions made today will affect businesses, societies, and economies for decades to come. As young people are the most active users of information and communication technologies, they are the ones who will be most affected. Policymakers need to adapt and innovate to govern new technologies – not only for the challenges of government today, but also for the future.

Because technological change is dynamic and fast-paced, tech regulation is characterised by uncertainty and complexity. It is difficult to predict the benefits and risks from new technologies, and a reluctance to stifle innovation often leads to policy paralysis. However, maintaining the status quo is certainly no alternative, especially if the status quo fails to guard against major new risks (for example, cyberattacks and data leakages). As our research at the Pathways for Prosperity Commission at the Blavatnik School of Government has identified, there are many areas where traditional governance is being stretched by digitalisation.

Guidelines around the collection, storage and use of data provide a foundational framework for the digital economy. Data governance is relevant for all types of information (from business information to supply chain monitoring to satellite imagery), but is most important in the case of personal data, for which some level of informed consent should accompany collection and use. And these frameworks should account for the fact that transactions increasingly involve moving data between different places, systems and devices. Countries need to establish policies and regulations to support interoperability and data portability (including across borders) in order to maximise the social and economic value of data. The ability to tax technology companies that offer goods and services worldwide without having a physical presence in each country. But multinational companies can choose where to book their profits (and thus pay their corporate taxes). The heavy use of intangible assets (e.g. users’ browsing history) and the different revenue models adopted by technology companies make it unclear where or how the value is created in digital value chains. As a result, technology companies often fail to contribute a fair share to national revenue, fuelling further economic inequality, and limiting funds available for education, health and infrastructure. Tailoring taxation policy to the digital economy, therefore, requires not only figuring out how digital services and the data that enables them should be characterised and valued for tax purposes, but also how to distribute this value among the actors and countries involved in the operation.

Countries also need to ensure that digital markets are open to entry and innovation. There are always opportunities for anticompetitive behaviour and monopolies, so governments need effective competition policy to level the digital playing field. While the international debate has been dominated by calls to break up big tech in the US, and record fines in Europe, the majority of countries are still trying to understand the particularities of digital markets and how to update competition rules to deal with features of digital platforms – for example, identifying competitive dynamics in markets where prices offer no guidance because many products are ‘free’ to consumers.

Policymakers know that these issues require new approaches to governance and regulation. The question is about how to do this. Well-resourced countries, such as OECD member states, are grappling with how to adapt their existing frameworks. For developing countries, the challenge is more stark: many of the world’s poorer countries do not even have an effective data governance or competition policy regime. The silver lining here is that developing countries may be able to ‘leapfrog’ in their regulation, using new and adaptive forms of governance, rather than importing outdated regulatory tropes from richer nations. The next generation of leaders will play a central role in this process.

Traditional governance processes are often about promulgating strict rules, but more adaptive processes give policymakers the ability to iterate and adapt quickly – with a focus on constant evolution rather than achieving stability. The aim should be to find the right balance within only a few years, not decades. Some countries are creating ‘regulatory sandboxes’, allowing firms to test and pilot innovations on a small scale, such as a drone corridor in Malawi or the live testing environment for new financial tech in the UK. Other countries are taking a risk-weighted approach: applying different rules depending on a firm’s size, revenue or market share.

These adaptive approaches may work well for regulating local firms, but the technological age also means countries must deal with sprawling global tech titans. Technology policy is crystallising around a multipolar global landscape, with powerful actors – such as the US and the EU, and to a lesser extent, China and India – setting rules that become de facto global standards. But these emerging standards don’t work for everyone. Our research found they aren’t always a good fit for developing countries, whose policymakers want to strike a different balance between priorities (say, between cybersecurity and innovation), and who are working in low-resource bureaucracies.
One of the principal concerns for Enrique Peñalosa when he started his second term as mayor of Bogotá in January 2016 was how to make it a better city for women, and particularly for young women. The statistics revealed a bleak reality: 5.8% of young women were poor according to the Multidimensional Poverty Index; per every 100,000 women there were 67 assassinations and 49 sexual abuse cases were reported, and there was a very high number of teenage pregnancies: 48.6 per 1,000 girls between 15 and 19 years of age.

This situation meant that a broad-based approach was necessary to make Bogotá a happier, safer and more just city for young women. We needed to implement policies from every sector to fully contribute towards structural change. In our government plan, we included result-oriented goals such as reducing the number of teenage pregnancies, reducing multi-dimensional poverty, drastically reducing violence against women and girls, and closing the gap between the number of hours of household chores performed by men and women. Additionally, we set out to bolster the gender approach, especially in urban planning and public transport.

This last objective is deeply related to guaranteeing women’s right to the city. In 2017, 26% of women over 15 years of age claimed not to leave their houses at night because they feared they could be attacked on the street and the number of women that claimed they felt unsafe in public transport was unacceptably high. We needed to rethink Bogotá and put women at the centre, promoting inclusivity and safety. All efforts to guarantee women’s right to the city are important and an ethical imperative for a democratic local government. For me, as Secretary for Women, and for the team I lead, this meant broadening the focus of our work and being profoundly involved in the traditionally male-led mobility and urban planning sectors. Luckily, we found in those Secretariats and in the Security Secretariat great individuals who understood our concerns and the importance of including a gender approach.

To achieve our goal, we created ‘Me Muevo Segura’ (‘I move safely’), an umbrella programme that groups several strategies to improve women’s experience on public transport and in public spaces. As an initial measure we created a protocol for the prevention, attention and sanction of violence against women in public space. This was a complicated task as it involved getting...
a variety of actors on board – the Police, General Attorney’s Office, the public transport company (Transmilenio), the Security Secretariat and the Mobility Secretariat. Additionally, with the Security Secretariat we faced the challenge of creating the first ever mechanism to support victims of sexual violence cases occurring in public transport and public space. It was clear that we needed to do more in terms of prevention and promote a cultural shift away from machismo (a concept that encapsulates many aspects of Latin American male behaviour, and that often reflects male power and female subservience), often at the core of sexual violence and harassment. We devised and implemented the first ever campaign to challenge sexism, called ‘Bogotá Libre de machismo’ (“Bogotá free from machismo”), and soon we will launch a large ‘Me Muevo Segura’ campaign to raise awareness of harassment in public spaces.

However, these efforts are long-term changes and young women needed immediate options. So we decided to focus on the bicycle as an empowerment tool, and as well an efficient means of sustainable transport. Bogotá boasts over 560km of bicycle paths and approximately 850,000 bicycle journeys are made every day – around 22% of which by women. In order to boost the use of the bicycle among women, we are hosting the first ever Congress 50–50 More Women on Bicycles in January 2020. It is District Secretary for Women Angela Beatriz Anzola De Toro who is District Secretary for Women. We are working to create the first ever programme that helps women to identify and improve their own cycling conditions.

The project was selected among the top 10 best initiatives by the Transformative Urban Mobility Initiative (TUMI), which allowed us to finance it and to generate data to build evidence-based interventions and policy. The project involved gathering geo-referenced visual data from 16,145 km of road network (almost the full network) and 527 km of bicycle paths in 19 of the 20 boroughs that constitute the District of Bogotá. Additionally, over 14,300 women were surveyed on their perceptions of night safety in the city. The index generated through these results, and based on eight variables of the UN Women Safe Cities and Safe Public Spaces programme, provided information on the locations and factors that determine why women feel unsafe in specific areas of the city. Once the information is analysed, it will be possible to make informed decisions that will improve security and urban planning in the city. For example, we are now able to establish the relationship between lighting and safety in a given area, and identify common factors in areas with the highest occurrence of sexual harassment cases.

After three and a half years of implementing an articulated and cross-sectoral policy, we can say that young women in Bogotá are better off now than they were in 2015. The figures speak for themselves: a 21% decrease in the number of assassinations, 29% decrease in teenage pregnancies, 14% decrease in the number of sexual abuse cases, and 33% decrease in multidimensional poverty. In addition, among women, practising sport has increased by 46% and bicycle use has increased by 29%, the number of women attending the rock festival Rock al Parque has increased by 81%; and 35% more women now find parks safe and well-equipped. More work remains to be done, but these statistics prove that we are on the right track to create a safer, happier Bogotá for young women, and this is possible only through gender mainstreaming. @

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Oliver Harman and Shahrukh Wani look at why we’re entering the ‘post-rural age’ and what it means for public policy.

**“SUDAN’S KHARTOUM, WHERE THE MAJORITY OF CITIZENS ARE UNDER 20, HAS BEEN THE SITE OF PROTESTS WHICH TRANSCEND THE TRADITIONAL NETWORKS OF ETHNICITY AND RELIGIOUS CONSERVATISM.”**

Whatever we might say is right or wrong with cities of the 21st century, they’re indisputably a defining feature of our age. As much as we’re post-modern, post-gender or post-colonial, we’re also post-rural. Our existence, for an increasing majority, is urban. Even more than that, our aspirations are urban. This is visible almost everywhere: in the US, people with advanced education are clustering in a dozen or so, mostly coastal, cities. In Afghanistan, refugees returning from Pakistan and Iran move to big cities, rather than moving back the villages from which they fled decades ago. In Nigeria, Lagos alone adds 77 people every hour to its burgeoning city boundaries. If people voted with their feet, cities would certainly be the winners.

But, in the case of the citizens who live in them, it often doesn’t look like they’re winning. Most people live in cities which are crowded but disconnected, with scarcity of jobs, housing, and, consequently, of opportunity. If cities that work well can increase prosperity, those that don’t make the lack of prosperity more visible and exacerbate inequality.

The same networks which increase productivity also provide new avenues of dissent and discovery. Being urban both amplifies the voices of the distressed and allows them to access new networks of common thinkers.

Think about Tahrir Square: would that have been the stage of revolutionary change if the network of dissent from Cairo and surrounding areas didn’t exist? The digital and personal connections necessary for such change wouldn’t have been so strong had the square been in the Sahara – for the city is “a human settlement in which strangers are likely to meet”, as sociologist Richard Sennett once wrote.

Often, these networks are dominated by the young. Over the past few months, Sudan’s Khartoum, where the majority of citizens are under 20, has been the site of protests which transcend the traditional networks of ethnicity and religious conservatism.

However, when existing networks break down in cities, new ones may not always be as progressive as seen in Khartoum. For example, in Karachi, Pakistan, converging ethnic identities have been mobilised to form networks of solidarity and of opposition, often with deadly results.

The urban age exists in the three-way intersection of the promise of opportunity, the amplification of voice, and the emergence of voice, and the emergence of innovation.
of new, more powerful, networks of solidarity. Each of these has important implications for public policy. How does a government fulfil the promise of opportunity represented by cities? By working with its residents to develop a right to the city, and to meet expectations of jobs, housing, sanitation and clean air. This is especially important when there is an exponential growth of inhabitants. It is hard to imagine how Lagos will be governed in 2050, when its population is expected to have 10 million more residents, particularly in regard to the challenges presented by climate change and technology.

Perhaps navigating such an age requires coming to grips with radical uncertainty – the idea that we do not know what is going to happen, and in the present we are not even able to fully imagine it. Try telling someone in 1991 that in two decades, protesters in Cairo will break down power structures by supplementing offline networks with those formed online over a social network, amplified by 24/7 television channels.

Under radical uncertainty, making urban policy will require unprecedented responsive experimentation. Context is king: what works in another city might not work in yours, what worked in your city a few years ago might not work today. Cities need policy structures which not only get the known fundamentals right, but are flexible enough to change according to context – for example merging governments together when inhabitants spread beyond the local jurisdiction. This balance is hard to strike, but possible, and it could be key to navigating the urban age.

Most cities are, however, still to get the basics right. Many cities are still disempowered because power is concentrated at higher spatial scales. Nigerian cities, for example, do not have control over design standards and building regulation – instead, these are prescribed at a national level. Britain has only recently started to transfer power over transport to cities. Due to the very interaction based on which the urban age exists, cities are controlled by political networks which can sometimes be opposed to national ones. The result is a vertical struggle, which can lead to more control taken away from cities. Cities are being set to fail.

Conversely, there are questions of spatial justice across urban and rural areas that do require a national perspective. Blossoming cities exist alongside areas left behind, as cities hoard the benefits of proximity and productivity. London has been described by some as ‘shackled to a corpse’ when referring to provincial England. Kampala generates two-thirds of Uganda’s national economic activity. The young, rather than returning to the provinces to set up rural homes, are now residing in cities for longer. Is there a role for policy in guaranteeing inter-spatial justice, ensuring that cities like Kampala and London don’t run away and devour all opportunities for urban and rural counterparts? Due to their complexity, cities need decentralised authority to make good policy decisions, without restricting the ability of national governments to distribute economic gains to those places left behind. If this doesn’t happen, it won’t be the case of cities being ‘shackled to a corpse’ but – as Paul Collier puts it – their rural counterparts being ‘chained to a shark’.

Oliver Harman and Shahrukh Wani are economists at the International Growth Centre’s Cities that Work team, based at the Blavatnik School of Government.
Tom Simpson asks whether our instincts about ‘intergenerational justice’ stand up to scrutiny.

**“WHY IS CONTINUAL GROWTH A CLAIM THAT ONE GENERATION CAN MAKE AGAINST OTHERS?”**

The question of what duties are owed to future generations is a puzzling and difficult intellectual problem. It has ceased to be only that, however. As members of younger generations – millennials, born 1981–2000, and Gen Z, born since 2000 – encounter unexpected challenges in the economy, there is a widespread sense not just that the intergenerational compact is under strain, but that there is generational injustice. Generational injustice is the result of previous generations having failed to fulfill their obligations to present and future generations.

Most policy work on this problem has focused on the economic prospects of the young. The historic assumption that living standards would rise for each generation no longer holds. In the UK, millennials’ incomes are approximately identical to those of Gen Xers, born 1966–80, at the equivalent age. But housing costs are significantly up, and so millennials’ spending on consumption is lower. The situation is worse in Italy, Spain and Greece, where millennials’ incomes are lower than Gen Xers. In the US, the trend started earlier, so that Gen Xers were affected too.

The problem of intergenerational justice is posed more starkly yet by climate change. Diminishing biodiversity and pressure on ecosystems deprives present generations of the interaction with and participation in nature that has been the historical assumption for the normal human life. It leads to loss of health, livelihood, and of lives. Future generations look likely to be grotesquely deprived of this, unless very significant changes are made immediately.

It is not difficult to see that the problem of climate change offends basic justice. Previous generations have made – and future generations worse off. Even though this has not been intended, the problem is now known about, and it is negligence to ignore it. The effect may be not just a comparative one, of making future generations worse off than they could have been had growth been sustainable, but may be an absolute one. And it is a basic principle of justice that, other things equal, one should not actively cooperate with or seek to benefit others. But if this picture of justice-as-self-interested-claims is correct – and it is a common one – then millennials’ stalled economic prospects are not the basis for any legitimate claim against previous generations. That claim is legitimate if, and only if, different generations are united by bonds of love and affection.

This point has a corollary. Insofar as bonds of affection are the basis for intergenerational justice, this applies both prospectively and retrospectively. Members of the millennial cohort are, I think, increasingly aware of their obligations to future generations on environmental issues. It is an open question how far baby-boomers, born 1946–65 and now entering their long retirement, appreciate the economic privileges their generation has uniquely enjoyed, and how the burden of providing for their retirement is about to be imposed on a proportionately smaller, younger workforce. Rebuilding a sense of intergenerational loyalty is an urgent task. Edmund Burke famously wrote that society is a ‘contract between those who are dead, those who are living, and those who are yet to be born’. If what I am saying is correct, however, then even Burke underestimates the case. His language of ‘contract’ is misleading, as a contract is what two self-interested parties enter to enable a mutually beneficial exchange. But the relationship between generations seems more like a covenant, in the theological sense – a non-revocable agreement, which may bind independently of whether one has individually consented to it, based on ties of love and regard.

If this point is recognised and taken as seriously as it should be, it changes one’s attitude to the past. Instead of the past being primarily a target for one’s opprobrium – perhaps because social attitudes were insufficiently enlightened – the primary attitude becomes gratitude to one’s forbears. For those claims of justice which depend on one’s forbears making sacrifices, you have the standing to make those claims only if you reciprocate their sacrifices with your gratitude. And there is plainly a shrinking supply of gratitude to the past.

This also changes one’s attitude to the future. A self-interested generation asks what the minimum is that we can make sacrifices with your gratitude. And there is plainly a shrinking supply of gratitude to the past. It is not difficult to see that the problem of climate change offends basic justice. Previous generations have made – and future generations worse off. Even though this has not been intended, the problem is now known about, and it is negligence to ignore it. The effect may be not just a comparative one, of making future generations worse off than they could have been had growth been sustainable, but may be an absolute one. And it is a basic principle of justice that, other things equal, one should not actively cooperate with or seek to benefit others. But if this picture of justice-as-self-interested-claims is correct – and it is a common one – then millennials’ stalled economic prospects are not the basis for any legitimate claim against previous generations. That claim is legitimate if, and only if, different generations are united by bonds of love and affection.

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This also changes one’s attitude to the future. A self-interested generation asks what the minimum is that we must do to make sure things aren’t worse in the future. Those committed to an intergenerational covenant ask what the sacrifice is that we can make now to promote the good of those in the future.

Tom Simpson is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Public Policy at the Blavatnik School of Government.
Distrusted by the Young? Build Integrity

Young adults have less confidence in key institutions compared to previous generations. Nik Kirby’s three-step approach could help governments regain trust.

“Trust is a fragile commodity: once lost, it is hard to regain.”

Falling trust in government is a problem. It is a particular problem among the young. The Pew Research Center recently released data showing that US adults aged between 18 and 29 reported 22% less confidence in the military than those aged 50+, 18% less in the police, 6% less in school principals, and 4% less in elected officials (for whom, to be honest, even the ‘olds’ only reported 38% confidence levels). Previous research confirms that the collapse in youth trust levels in the US is a general trend. Citizen trust matters for governments. It is needed to gain cooperation with communities, political support for risky projects, and legitimacy in the eyes of citizens. Distrust leaves governments vulnerable to cynicism, extremist politics and populism. Endemic distrust among the youth risks a disaffected generation growing old with no faith in the public institutions that need their support to survive. What can governments do to address this problem?

Unsurprisingly, there is no secret sauce. Trust in government is affected by a preponderance of factors: economic performance, inequality, partisanship, media reporting and social integration levels between diverse groups. However, at the foundation of any government strategy to improve trust must be a commitment to being genuinely trustworthy. A government should not merely aim to improve citizens’ perceptions of its performance, but more importantly the reality of its performance. When and why should we rationally trust government anyway?

The aim of the Building Integrity Programme, based at the Blavatnik School of Government, is to answer that question. Just as with individual persons, integrity should be the logical basis for trust in government. We aim to define ‘public integrity’ for public officers and their institutions, determine its value, discern its determinants, and work with practitioners from around the world to help improve the public integrity of their institutions.

Public integrity involves more than ‘not being corrupt.’ After all, not being corrupt is a pretty low ethical bar. In our view, for public institutions, integrity requires four key elements. First, institutions must have a clear purpose, or set of purposes. Without a clear purpose an institution has no chance of being internally consistent and coherent. Second, institutions need to be legitimate. As citizens, we should not expect institutions always to act in a manner that we personally think best, morally good, or just. After all, disagreement about those issues is the essence of politics. However, we can reasonably demand that those institutions act within the constraints such as the law, due process, human rights, good faith and basic principles of fairness. Third, institutions need to keep their commitments. No agent is trustworthy if it cannot keep its commitments: to citizens, stakeholders, employees, contractors and other actors it engages. Finally, institutions need to be robust. They need various reactive and proactive mechanisms of internal and external accountability, transparency and support that ensure they retain purpose, legitimacy and commitments across time and circumstance.

This defines what we call ‘public institutional integrity’: purpose, legitimacy, keeping commitments and robustness. ‘Public officer integrity’ is a simple function of it. The integrity of individual public officers turns upon playing their role as ‘stewards’ or ‘trustees’ of the integrity of their institutions. They must take responsibility, often beyond the narrow scope of their job descriptions, to support the elements of overall public institutional integrity.

If this is the meaning of public integrity, then how might governments go about building it?

This is at the heart of our ongoing research in Brazil, the Philippines, Chile, Argentina, South Africa and more. For example, we recently completed a report on the integrity regime of the Australian Public Service (‘APS’), commissioned by the Commonwealth Government in conjunction with Australia and New Zealand School of Government. The report recommended the following.

First, define integrity. It might seem simple, but many public institutions, including the APS, have ‘integrity regimes’ without any definition of ‘integrity’. This defining process should also include detailing the operational values at the heart of the organisation that seek to realise overall integrity. In the case of the APS, we recommended reinstating an emphasis on ‘ment’ and a new value of ‘stewardship’ for APS employees ‘who are collectively responsible for its integrity’.

Second, embed integrity. Without a sustaining culture, values statements arrive as stillborn as the mission plaques on many corporate walls. In order to embed integrity within the culture of the APS, we recommended: first, a comprehensive, ongoing, annual, independent assessment of integrity performance set to targets, with survey data tested against more complex measures in key areas; second, an investment in ethical leadership, a move towards group-based, mandatory ethics training, senior ethics officers within each department, and a one-stop-shop for peer reporting and whistleblowing; and finally, an overall risk-driven strategy to investing integrity, using aggregate data to identify red flags like geographical isolation, high levels of sickness absence, austerity, low pay, downsizing and low levels of diversity.

Third, institutionalise integrity. Building integrity requires a legislative and regulatory framework, with specialist, independent institutions. We recommended that the current set of overlapping legislative instruments be rolled into one, clear Public Integrity Act, with a broader coverage across the whole public service, and anyone contracting to deliver public services. We recommended that the Commonwealth Government follow through on current plans for a Commonwealth anti-corruption commission. However, we pressed against current recommendations to include added ‘pro-integrity’ responsibilities within that commission. Our research indicates that institutions with both responsibilities inevitably end up prioritising with time, personnel and resources the urgent, media-sensitive demands of corruption investigations, rather than the important, less popular work of research, assessment, advice and support in implementing cultural and systemic change. Instead, we recommended establishing a separate, genuine ‘integrity agency’ to complement the new anti-corruption commission.

As our work with the Australian Commonwealth Government demonstrates, ‘public integrity’ is a powerful analytic tool to diagnose the pathologies of public institutions that might ground citizen distrust. It also offers a framework to think productively about building a more trustworthy set of institutions. Trust is a fragile commodity: once lost, it is hard to regain, especially in the modern political and media landscape. However, by working first on being worthy of trust, public institutions will be on a firmer ground to tackle citizens’ perceptions, including and especially those of today’s youth.
Whenever a corruption scandal hits the headlines, public attention tends to gravitate towards identifying the resources that have gone missing and the scoundrels responsible. Corruption often triggers collective moral outrage, and, at least where the problem is not systemic, it can motivate citizens to hold public officials to account.

But there is another, often hidden, side to every scandal. Compared to clean management, corruption is almost always regressive: it distributes public resources so as to exacerbate existing inequalities in society. It also reshapes access to power. Many of the ways in which it does both of these things are gendered.

For example, political parties that seek voter support through clientelism, which often involves corrupt acts such as vote buying, indirectly shut out women. In Thailand, generating and maintaining the necessary in-group trust that facilitates coordinated, illegal acts within the closed network of a party requires performing social norms that indicate a particular, dominant kind of masculinity. In Argentina, female legislators elected to the federal congress usually represent small, new parties, or medium-size parties that appeal to voters by advocating for public policy change. By contrast, women are disproportionately absent among politicians from the big, traditional, ‘machine’ parties, which offer clientelistic benefits. The biographies of the blokes who make it suggest that they frequently earn candidacies by stuffing their résumés with jobs involving dividing up the spoils of patronage. Yet gender stereotypes work against women getting that experience early in their careers within the party.

But does corruption always push out women, even in a country where clientelism is commonplace? My research explores this question in local governments in Brazil. In one set of analyses, I looked at rerun elections, and find similar results. In these cases, something illegal happened in the run-up to the original election, or on election day itself, which led an electoral court to order a do-over. Again, in Brazilian mayoral contests, I find that this can lead to women candidates achieving greater success. If in addition to deciding to rerun the election, the electoral authorities prohibit a mayor accused of vote buying from competing, there is an uptick in votes for women — though not for waves of cancelled incumbents, as voters expect them to continue as their husbands did. Accusations of corruption are pretty routine in many places, so banning a candidate signals that there is substance to rumour. Here it is not media that informs citizens about corruption, but the very act of having to vote afresh.

In Brazil, voting is compulsory for the literate between 18 and 70 years of age, so people notice that something is amiss when an election is out of sync with the normal calendar — and nearby municipalities are not also holding one.

What explains these sudden lurches in citizens’ support for female politicians? There is plenty of research that shows that both men and women trust women more than men. Standard economics experiments test how much money people would send to an anonymous individual, when induced by the promise that any amount the other person returns will be multiplied. When participants are told that the other person is a woman, they tend to send more money because they trust a woman to send more back.

In another set of analyses, I looked at experimental data from random audits. These audits were conducted by experts in the comptroller general’s office, almost immediately after a municipality was selected in a televised, national lottery. In Brazil, the few women who are elected mayor spend more on healthcare – particularly prenatal care – and less on hiring temporary workers around election time than men in the same position.

Corruption can block women from power, then, but revelations of corruption, and the resulting wish for trustworthy office-holders, can propel women forward – in an unusual example of gender stereotypes working for, rather than against, women as powerholders. Many traditional stereotypes that are unrelated to incorruptibility impede women’s professional progress. So when the salience of scandal abates, it is possible that women’s symbolic representation, and odds of political success, may be back to square one.

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Eleven years to save the world? A common sign at the global Fridays for Future climate strikes. Millions of people in over 100 countries, many of them too young to vote, have taken to the streets to demand governments radically increase efforts to fight climate change over the next decade. But do we really have until just 2030 to avert climate catastrophe? While emphasising the importance of urgent action, scientists have tried to caveat this crude message. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) says we need to halve global emissions by 2030 in order to have at least a one in two chance of limiting warming to 1.5°C, the goal set by the 2015 Paris Agreement. The world will not “run out” in 2030. But if we are not on a rapidly falling emissions pathway by that point, we will likely to blow through the 1.5°C limit around 2040.

By that time, the climate strikers on the streets today will be entering middle age, starting families, rising up in their careers, and outvoting their irresponsible forbearer. So can they not just solve the problem then? Geophysically speaking, perhaps. Because carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases linger in the atmosphere for decades or longer, what matters most is the total stock of emissions over time. That means sluggish action today could, in theory, be compensated for by aggressive action in the future. Accordingly, some oil and gas companies have shifted from denying climate change altogether to accepting incremental steps like modest carbon prices.

But anyone advocating an incremental approach – which most governments are now following – is making a strong assumption not just about climate models, but about the politics of climate change in the middle of the 21st century. In joint work with Jeff Colgan at Brown University and Jessica Green at the University of Toronto, my research is exploring how, as both climate change and decarbonisation advance over the next decades, climate politics will be increasingly existential. This change will shift governments’ focus from prevention to reaction.

To date, conservation over climate policy resembles what political scientists call “distribution politics.” Policies like carbon taxes or renewable energy deployment benefit some economic sectors and populations and impose costs on others. Interest groups that stand to win or lose from these changes advocate for their preferred policies.

But as we push the climate system to further extremes, the costs of climate change will become much more intense and widespread. Not just small islands, but whole coastal regions will be inundated. Droughts will cut off vital water supplies from hundreds of millions of subsistence farmers as well as those that feed global supply chains. Deadly heat will render whole regions uninhabitable. Under these conditions, climate politics will not just be a question of “who gets what, when, how,” as the political scientist Henry Laswell famously put it. Rather, climate politics will become a question of who gets to survive.

At the same time, the advance of decarbonisation will pose a similar existential threat to companies, workers, regions and regimes whose economic survival is linked to fossil fuels. Already, hundreds of coal plants and mines have shuttered across the world, taking investments, jobs and pensions with them. For this reason, a key demand of climate protesters today is for governments to provide a “just transition” for workers in carbon-dependent sectors. Oil and gas companies may follow coal, and countries and political regimes based on the exploitation of these resources may follow. Those that have managed to diversify or channel resources into sovereign wealth funds may adapt. Others – cruelly, it will be those least able to manage – may discover that the only thing worse than the “resource curse” is the curse of lack of resources.

In other words, the advance of both climate change and decarbonisation efforts will not just change the distribution of resources; it will threaten the very existence of large swathes of the global economy and population. How can we expect political leaders in the middle of the century – the young people who are today demanding action in the streets – to react?

In the face of urgent survival needs, it may be substantially more difficult to invest political effort and resources in preventing further climate change by reducing emissions. Instead, governments will face increasing, and in some cases overwhelming, pressure to limit the harm climate change and decarbonisation are causing in the short term. Imagine you are the mayor of a Middle Eastern city in which the night-time temperature has been over 50°C for the last week. Will you spend the city budget on climate-saving electric cars or climate-destroying air conditioners?

Broader, we have four strategies we can take to counter climate change. We can mitigate it by reducing emissions. We can adapt to it by taking steps like building seawalls or developing drought-resistant crops. We can compensate those who are hurt by its effects to reduce suffering. Or we can, perhaps, develop geoengineering technologies to limit temperature change or suck carbon from the air, or seeding clouds to reflect more sunlight back into space) as an unproven distraction from mitigation efforts. But if the impacts of climate change continue to accumulate, governments may come to see such technologies as vital components of national security.

All of these strategies will be far more costly, and far less effective, than mitigation. But by the time today’s climate strikers are watching their own children take to the streets, they might be the only options left.

The good news is that these trends are not inevitable. The more we can prevent climate change now, while also making sure that those dependent on fossil fuels are not left behind, the less existential climate politics will be in the future. In other words, the urgency of action today is demanded not only by climate science, but also by political reality; it will certainly be dealing with climate change for longer than the next 11 years, but we may have only the next decade to prevent it.

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