The metonymy of corrupt civic networks in the demand for public services in Africa

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Overview

Background

- Bureaucratic corruption versus illicit financial flows, political corruption, revolving doors...

- Bureaucratic corruption in Africa and the futility of cleanups (Mbaku, 1996)

- The need to look at the supply of corruption. Emphasis on the poor and non-poor

Background | **Relevant Literature** | Methodology | Main results | Conclusion & Policy Recommendations
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What do we know so far?

Relevant Literature

- ## Corruption, Access to public services and the poor
  - *Brunt of corruption largely borne by the poor(Borcan et al., 2017; Mbate, 2016; Daoud, 2015; Justesen & Bjornskov, 2014; Dong & Torgler, 2013; Hunt, 2007)*
  - *Institutional differences as main cause of bribery burden on the poor (Peiffer & Rose, 2018)*
  - *Social capital as an exit option??*

- ## Social capital and the poor
  - *Social capital- the golden baby (Putnam, 2002)*
  - *Clear distinction between presence of a social network and the resource within the social network (Bourdieu, 2002)*
  - *The Convertibility factor (Bourdieu, 2002)*
  - *Social capital not likely to be the capital of the poor (Cleaver, 2005; Boon and Farnsworth, 2011)*

- ## Social capital and corruption
  - *Social networks as facilitators of corrupt exchanges- reduction of information assymetery, disclosure of opportunities (Durlauf & Fafchamps, 2004)*
  - *Not all social networks are corruption enhancing, however, network subversion might occur (Kim & Whitaker, 2013)*

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What do we know so far?

Objectives of study

- To identify heterogenous effects of social capital on corruption for extreme poor, vulnerable and non-poor.

- To identify heterogenous effects of social capital on ease of access to certain public services for extreme poor, vulnerable and non-poor.

Data

We use the sixth round of the Afrobarometer survey for 36 countries and 53,936 respondents

1 **Measuring corruption**
Survey question: ...how often, if ever, have you had to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favour to government officials in order to get: a document or permit?, water or sanitation services?, treatment at a local health clinic or hospital?, a place in a primary school?, have your case heard in court or avoid a problem with the police like passing a checkpoint or avoiding a fine or arrest?
Six response options; never, once or twice, several times, many times, always, and no contact

Background | Relevant Literature | **Methodology** | Main results | Conclusion & Policy Recommendations
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Data

2 **Measuring social capital**-three variables as:

• Civicness: An ordered categorical variable measuring membership in a non-religious voluntary association

• Voluntary religious group membership.

• Level of connectedness of an individual (either in depth or in volume). We use the frequency of mobile phone usage of an individual as a proxy for connectedness

3 **Measuring Poverty**

Question: How often have you had to go without certain necessities; food, water, medical care, cooking fuel and cash income. Responses range from never (0) to always (3).

• *Non-poor:* We assign a value 0 to all individuals who have never gone without any of the basic needs

• *Extreme poor:* We assign a value of 2 to all individuals who have a value above 10 in the
first variable we created. These are individuals who, at the minimum, have had to, at several times, gone without all the basic needs.

• *Vulnerable:* We assign a value of 1 to individuals between 0 and 2.

Background	Relevant Literature	**Methodology**	Main results	Conclusion & Policy Recommendations
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Data

Table: Descriptive statistics of covariates

Variable	Categories	Freq.	Percent
Location	0 Urban	22,601	41.90
	1 Rural	31,334	58.10
	Total	53,935	100
Age Cohorts	1 18-25	13,003	24.24
	2 26-35	16,090	30.00
	3 36-45	10,869	20.26
	4 46-55	6,886	12.84
	5 56-65	4,125	7.69
	6 Over 65	2,668	4.97
	Total	53,641	100
Gender	1 Male	26,801	49.69
	2 Female	27,134	50.31
	Total	53,935	100
Education	0 No formal sch completed	18,965	35.26
	1 Primary school completed	18,012	33.49
	2 Secondary school completed	13,837	25.73
	3 University+	2,966	5.52
	Total	53,780	100
Employment status	0 No	32,724	60.95
	1 Yes	20,967	39.05
	Total	53,691	100

| Background | Relevant Literature | **Methodology** | Main results | Conclusion & Policy Recommendations |
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Estimation Strategy

We employ a Multivariate ordered probit model for both the corruption model and the access to public services model;

Corruption equation:

$$Y^*_{ipc} = \alpha_{0ipc} + \alpha_1 SocialCapital_{pc} + \alpha_2 X_{ipc} + \epsilon_{ipc}, \quad if \quad w^*_i > 0 \tag{1}$$

Selection equation:

$$Contact\_Public\_Services^*_{ipc} = w^*_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 M_i + \rho ipc, \quad if \quad w^*_i > 0 \quad and \quad w_i = otherwise \tag{2}$$

Access equation:

$$Y^*_{ipc} = Access^*_{ipc} = \alpha_{ipc} + \alpha_1 SocialCapital_{pc} + \alpha_2 X_{ipc} + \epsilon_{ipc} \tag{3}$$

Table: Determinants of corrupt behaviours

Reference category	Other categories	Full sample (1)	Non-Poor (2)	Vulnerable (3)	Extreme Poor (4)
Primary sch in locality					
No	Yes	-0.00645	-0.00381	0.00458	-0.124
		(0.0425)	(0.00709)	(0.0309)	(0.0806)
Paid transport in locality					
No	Yes	0.106***	0.178**	0.126***	-0.00124
		(0.0354)	(0.0893)	(0.0406)	(0.0808)
Health clinic in locality					
No	Yes	0.00963	0.0966*	-0.00455	0.0415
		(0.0171)	(0.0497)	(0.0228)	(0.0658)
Civic Association		0.805***	1.135***	0.671**	1.224*
		(0.249)	(0.0990)	(0.323)	(0.626)
Religious Association		0.271**		0.268	0.222
		(0.117)		(0.241)	(0.429)
Telephone Usage					
Never	Less than once a month	-0.0748	0.0719	-0.0642	0.0685
		(0.0527)	(0.308)	(0.0655)	(0.185)
	Few times a month	0.200***	0.356	0.188**	0.115
		(0.0649)	(0.249)	(0.0807)	(0.145)
	Few times a week	0.113***	0.146	0.123	0.216*
		(0.0411)	(0.173)	(0.0764)	(0.113)
	Everyday	0.145***	0.338*	0.159***	0.184**
		(0.0274)	(0.173)	(0.0510)	(0.0856)
Local council contact					
No	Yes	0.181***	0.184***	0.185***	0.123**
		(0.0214)	(0.0385)	(0.0133)	(0.0574)

Background	Relevant Literature	Methodology	**Main results**	Conclusion & Policy Recommendations
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General public service delivery in Africa

Table: Table 2 cont.

Reference category	Other categories	Full sample (1)	Non-Poor (2)	Vulnerable (3)	Extreme Poor (4)
Govt official contact					
No	Yes	0.193***	0.136***	0.213***	0.137*
		(0.0294)	(0.00109)	(0.0287)	(0.0824)
Political party contact					
No	Yes	0.159***	0.247***	0.150***	0.113
		(0.0224)	(0.0261)	(0.0375)	(0.0812)
	_cons	0.669***	0.0670***	0.825***	0.799***
		(0.164)	(0.0153)	(0.0845)	(0.296)
	rho	0.911	0.939	0.993	0.004
	No. of countries	36	36	36	36
	No. of provinces	394	372	413	325
	N	43681	9170	35255	2919

Bootstrapped standard errors are reported for models 1-3 and replications are based on provincial clusters. We report robust standard errors for model 4. All standard errors are reported in parentheses. Country dummies are included with Algeria as the reference country.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

• Both civic and religious association impacts positively on corruption

Development of moral values? (Putnam,1995)

Network subversion? (Kim & Whitaker, 2013)

• Political ties impacts positively on corruption

• Heterogenous impacts of social and political ties on corruption for diffferent poverty cohorts

Civic association has a positive and significant effect across all specifications albeit weakly for the poor.

Political ties have a positive effect on corruption for the non-poor and vulnerable than the poor (Chantarat and Barrett, 2012).

Table: Role of social capital in corruption in certain public service deliveries

Type of public service	Education (Non-life threatening Non monopoly)	Health (Essential Non-monopoly)	Water and sanitation (Essential non-monopoly)	Documents and permits (Monopoly)	Police (Monopoly but Non-induced corruption)
Civic association	Vulnerable (+)	Vulnerable (+), Extreme poor (+)	Non-poor (+), vulnerable (+)	Vulnerable (+)	Vulnerable (+)
Religious association	No effect	No effect	No effect	No effect	No effect
Connection	Non-poor (+), vulnerable (+)	Vulnerable (+)	Non-poor (+), vulnerable (+)	Vulnerable (+)	Non-poor (+), vulnerable (+)
MP contact	No effect	Vulnerable (+)	Vulnerable (+)	Vulnerable (+)	Vulnerable (+)
Local council contact	No effect	No effect	No effect	Non-poor (+)	Extreme poor (-)
Gov't official contact	No effect	No effect	Vulnerable (+)	Vulnerable (+), Extreme Poor (+)	Vulnerable (+)
Political party contact	No effect	Extreme poor (+)	No effect	Vulnerable (+), Poor (+)	Vulnerable (+)

Civic networks have the danger of being subverted by corrupt individuals for personal gains

Even when subverted, social networks are appropriated more by the rich than the poor

The poor will prefer to appropriate the little value in their social networks to access life threatening basic needs

Thank you!