

# THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE CONSTITUENCY DEVELOPMENT FUND (CDF) IN KENYA AND JAMAICA

Karelle Samuda  
Jamaica House Fellow  
Ministry of Finance and the Public Service  
Jamaica  
Karelle.samuda@mof.gov.jm



# THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: STATE LEGITIMACY AND SERVICE DELIVERY

- Service delivery: reinforcement of the social contract between state and society:
  - Empirical analyses of what contributes to state legitimacy have established correlations between service delivery and approval of and trust in the state (proxy variables for legitimacy).
  - Gilley (2006) notes that a combination of welfare gains, good governance and democratic rights indicators is highly correlated with legitimacy.
  - Sacks (2009) notes that the relationship between service provision and state legitimacy is indirect and mediated by other indicators of well-being like food security.

# THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: STATE LEGITIMACY AND SERVICE DELIVERY

- State Responses:
  - Public sector reforms that seek to enhance service delivery.
  - Institutional reforms such as decentralization to enhance governance and accountability.
  - Distributive programs to strengthen the relationship between elected representatives and citizens.
    - The CDF: bringing finances and MPs closer to the 'ground'

# CDF AT-A-GLANCE

- Financial resources are obtained from the national/central government's coffers and disbursed at the local level.
- Funds are allocated to a country's political subnational unit, often the constituency, where MPs [can] exert significant influence on the allocation process within the constituency.
- Funds are expected to be allocated to development projects which reflect localized needs and preferences.

**“The essential objective of the Members of Parliament Local Area Development Scheme (MPLADS) is to enable Members of Parliament to recommend development works with emphasis on creation of durable community assets based on locally felt needs to be taken up in their constituencies” (Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government of India, 2014)**

**“Equitable socio-economic development at the constituency level” (Vision- National Government Constituencies Development Fund, Kenya).**

**The main thrust of the Fund is to promote *human and infrastructure development* [emphasis added] at the community and constituency levels through the establishment of *sustainable development projects* [emphasis added] (Office of the Prime Minister, Jamaica, 2016).**

**“The community based projects funded under the CDF are meant to serve community needs in the Constituencies, and to have long term positive effects on people’s well-being” (Hon. Dr. John J.N. Phiri, MP, Minister of Local Government and Housing, Zambia, 2015).**

Country	Name of Fund	Year Created	Legislation or directive creating fund	% or annual amount of annual budget	Direct or indirect disbursement	Administrative control?	Oversight?	Citizen monitoring?
Bhutan	Constituency Development Grant	2009	n/a	~US\$43k per constituency each year	Indirect: money disbursed to constituency (not clear exactly to whom) when project approved by National Assembly	Provincial government requests funds released to constituency by Finance Ministry when National Assembly approves project	Ministry of Finance (incl. Royal Audit Authority); National Assembly Budget Committee;	No
Ghana	District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF)	1992	Article 252 (2) of the 1992 Constitution & the DACF ACT 1993	7.5% annual budget revenue	Indirect: funds disbursed to the various District Assemblies (constituency local governments)	The Administrator of the District Assembly Common Fund (appointed by the President with prior approval from Parliament and Min. of Finance)	DACF Administrator. Additionally, The Auditor-General by law has responsibility to ensure that common Funds are used in line with laid down procedures	No
India	Member of Parliament Local Area Development Scheme (MPLADs)	1993	MPLADs Guidelines (first issued in 1994, latest update is in 2012)	Rs.5 crore (~US\$828K per annum per MP constituency per financial year)	Indirect: MPs make recommendations to District	MPLADs housed within the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation	District Authority MPLADs	No

Country	Name of Fund	Year Created	Legislation or directive creating fund	% or annual amount of annual budget	Direct or indirect disbursement	Administrative control?	Oversight?	Citizen monitoring?
Jamaica	Constituency Development Fund	Created in 2007, began 2008	n/a	2.5% of annual budget, but only 0.5% disbursed in 2008 and 2009. Now ~US\$13K per MP per constituency per financial year	Indirect: MPS submit proposals to CDF unit, which approves and submits project to Finance Officer at Office of PM for dispensation	OPM: CDF Programme Management Unit	CDF Unit	No: citizen participation (but not necessarily monitoring) in project identification in some constituencies
Kenya	Constituency Development Fund	Created in 2003 (amended in 2007 and 2013)	CDF Act 2003 (amendments 2007 & 2013)	2.5% of annual budget; 75% of allocation equally distributed to all constituencies, and 25% dispensed on basis of poverty need and population size	Indirect: CDF Board approves project selection; National Management Committee dispenses funds	CDF Board	CDF Board; National Management Committee	Yes: Institute of Social Accountability
Uganda	Constituency Development Fund	Created 2005	n/a	~ US\$4K per MP per constituency	Direct: CDF disbursements allocated to MPs bank accounts	CDF was abruptly discontinued in 2011		
Zambia	Constituency Development Fund	1995	Approved by Parliament within the country's larger National Decentralization Policy	~ US\$40000) per constituency in 2014	Direct: Local CDF Authorities (District Council and CDF Committee)	CDF Committee	not clear	No

# CDF AT-A-GLANCE

## Proponents:

- Equitable distribution of a pool of funds to all MPs to pursue projects in their constituencies
- Enhances the constituency service role of MPs
- Addresses gaps in public service delivery
- Promotes local decision-making and citizen participation

## Opponents :

- Merely pork and clientelism
- Inefficient allocation mechanism
- Undermines existing local government infrastructure (Chisinga, 2009)
- MP's primary role is to legislate



# CDF: DISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS

- Allocation of government goods and services, particularly to identifiable groups or constituencies.
- Distributive policy decisions are inefficient (Weingast et al., 1981)
- Partisan in nature (Cox & McCubbins, 1986; Dixit-Londegran, 1995,1996; Levitt & Snyder, 1995; Keefer and Kehmani, 2009; Golden and Min, 2013;)
- Political parties as machines (Stokes, 1999)
  - Party machines and stages of political and social development (Scott, 1969).
- Programmatic vs. Non-programmatic distributive politics (Stokes et al., 2013)
- Clientelism:
  - Provision of private and club goods (Lindberg, 2010; Hyden, 2010).
  - Political clientelism
    - Jamaica - Stone, 1980; Bartilow, 2014
    - Van de Walle (2009); Barkan & Matiangi (2009)

# CDF: CONSTITUENCY SERVICE

- Social proximity of MPs to citizens (Stokes et al., 2013)
- Politicians mediate between the citizens and the state. Challenges the Weberian notion of the state (Berenschot, 2010).
- Political parties (particularly in African countries) are typically weak, and electoral politics is driven by candidate-centered organizations (Barkan & Mattes, 2014).

# RESEARCH QUESTIONS

- **Question 1:**

- How do MPs spend their CDF monies? What are the determinants of the allocation of CDF monies to public, private and club goods?

- *Hypothesis 1:*

- *MPs are likely to spend CDF monies on private and club goods than on public goods in their constituencies.*

# RESEARCH DESIGN

- Subnational comparative case study analysis: Jamaica and Kenya
- Explored not only how the CDF in different countries operates, but how MPs utilize the CDF within their constituencies.
- The purposive sampling strategy included identifying cases:
  - (i) with fairly well- established rules and processes for the operation of the CDF to better understand how countries address the critique that the CDF is merely pork;
  - (ii) that were not necessarily in the same region in order to identify processes and practices of the CDF that are common across geographical boundaries, and also unique to the country given social, political and cultural contexts. This was a significant indicator for choosing Jamaica. The one existing case study of the CDF in Jamaica focuses on a different set of questions than those being addressed in this study (Bartilow, 2014). Other existing studies either focused on single or multiple case studies from African and Asian countries (for example: Gutierrez Romero, 2009; Keefer & Khemani, 2009; Tsubura, 2013); and,
  - (iii) with accessible CDF-related data spanning at least two general elections.

# RESEARCH DESIGN

Data Source	Qualitative/Quantitative	Case: Kenya	Case: Jamaica
<b>1. Semi-structured interviews</b>			
Face-to-Face	Qualitative	None	20
Phone	Qualitative	3	3
Email	Qualitative	6	3
<b>2. Observations</b>			
Complete observer	Qualitative	None	6
Site Visit	Qualitative	None	3
<b>3. Documents</b>			
CDF Committee Meeting Minutes	Qualitative	25+	25+
CDF Allocation & Disbursement Data	Quantitative	50+	50+
CDF Project Documents	Quantitative & Qualitative	50+	50+
Audit Reports	Qualitative	4	4
Newspaper Articles	Qualitative	50+	50+
<b>4. Demographic Data</b>			
	Quantitative	Yes	Yes
<b>5. Election Data</b>			
	Quantitative	Yes	Yes <sup>13</sup>

# CDF IN KENYA: STRUCTURE

- CDF established under the *Constituencies Development Fund Act (2003)*
- 2.5 percent of government's revenue is allocated to the CDF:
  - 75 percent is divided equally among all constituencies
  - 25 percent is allocated to each constituency based on the poverty incidence

Year	CDF Allocation (US \$ million)	Annual GDP Rate (%)
2003/04	19	2.9
2004/05	83	5.1
2005/06	107	5.9
2006/07	148	6.3
2007/08	149	6.9

# CDF IN KENYA: STRUCTURE

## ■ Parameters:

- 3 percent is allotted for CDF administrative costs
- 5 percent for emergency reserves
- 10 percent for school bursaries

## ■ Administrative structure

- **Constituency Development Fund Committee:** established within the National Assembly. Oversees the policy and legislative environment of the CDF.
- **Constituency Development Fund Board:** responsible for overall management of the CDF at the national level: approval of projects; disbursement of funds; review of constituencies' annual reports.
- **District Projects Committee:** coordinates project implementation at the district level. Compiles list of projects for each constituency in the district; suggests projects that can be taken to scale; liaises with the Constituency Development Fund Committees (members: the District Commissioner; heads of local authorities; the District Development Officer; chairpersons of the CDCs; the District Accountant)
- **Constituency Development Fund Committee:** decides on project proposals; prioritizes list of projects (members: the MP, constituency councilors, district officer, residents)

# CDF IN KENYA

**Constituency Development Fund NO. 10**

**SECOND SCHEDULE (Sec. 14)**

**STANDARD CONSTITUENCY PROJECTS SUBMISSION FORM**

Name of Constituency-----Financial Year-----

District-----Province-----

SERIAL NUMBER	NAME OF PROJECT	COST ESTIMATES In Kshs.
TOTAL FOR THE YEAR Kshs. -----		-----

1. Name of Member of Parliament----- Signature-----

2. Name of Member of Constituency Development Committee -----  
Signature-----

3. Name of Chairman Of District Project Committee -----  
Signature-----  
Date-----

**Constituency Development Fund NO. 10**

**THIRD SCHEDULE (S. 15) STANDARD**

**PROJECTS DESCRIPTION FORM**

( To be completed in consultation with District departmental head)

Constituency----- District-----Province-----

Project Number-----Project Title-----

Relevant Government Department-----  
-

Status of the project (tick one) New-----Extension-----On-going-----  
Rehabilitation-----

Brief Statement on the progress at the time of submission  
-----  
-----

Financial Year under reference 1<sup>st</sup> July-----to 30<sup>th</sup> June -----

Original Cost Estimates, in kshs. -----dated-----

Amount allocated last financial year-----

Person completing form: Signature -----  
Name -----  
Position -----  
Date -----



# CDF IN JAMAICA

**“It can’t be that a constituency can only be properly looked after its Member of Parliament becomes Prime minister. And that is why we are committed. We are going to set aside 2 ½ percent of the budget; we’re going to divide that equally among all 60 constituencies. It is going to amount to about 150 million dollars a year. But the people have to be represented, and if central government is going to forget them, we have to make sure resources are there to address their needs” (Bruce Golding, 2007)**

**“There are many constituencies and communities within those constituencies that suffer; some of them because of neglect, some of them because of downright victimization. If you are a backbencher in parliament, you are not likely to be treated very handsomely. If you happen to be a backbencher on the opposition benches, ‘dog nyam yuh suppa’. And when we propose to set aside a certain amount of the budget to be divided equally among the constituencies, is to ensure that some of the things that cause roadblocks can be addressed” (Bruce Golding, 2007).**

# CDF IN JAMAICA: STRUCTURE

- Each MP receives the same amount:
  - FY 2008-09: JMD\$40million (~US\$562,825)
  - FY 2009-10: JMD\$20million (~US\$225,276)
  - FY 2011-12: JMD\$15million (US~171,861).
- Projects funded by CDF fall in the following categories:
  - Physical infrastructure projects: minor road repairs, community center renovations.
  - Human and social development: Parliament requires that 10% of what MPs allocate to human and social development should be reserved for Welfare and Emergency Assistance and Social Housing Assistance. Examples of projects include: education & training programs; book vouchers; filling prescriptions for the indigent; and sports and cultural development.
  - Economic enablement projects: Economic enablement projects: such projects facilitate groups or individuals in becoming self-sufficient. Examples include: livestock production, agricultural development; and small business/entrepreneurship ventures.
  - Disaster mitigation: for emergency situations due to a natural or other disaster

# CDF JAMAICA: STRUCTURE

## ■ Administrative Structure

- CDF Parliamentary Committee: comprises MPs who oversee CDF legislative and policy environment. The committee also approves CDF projects.
- CDF Project Management Unit: compiles projects submitted by MPs, oversees and monitors implementation of projects.

# CDF IN JAMAICA

**CONSTITUENCY DEVELOPMENT FUND  
PROJECT SUBMISSION FORM**

CONSTITUENCY/MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT: St. Andrew DATE OF SUBMISSION: PROJECT # 4

NAME OF PROJECT: St. Andrew Programme 2017-2018		PROJECT DURATION: 1 Year <input type="checkbox"/> NEW <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ON-GOING	
PROJECT BUDGET:			
<input type="checkbox"/> Physical Infrastructure		<input type="checkbox"/> Economic	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Human & Social Development		<input type="checkbox"/> Enablement	
		<input type="checkbox"/> Disaster Mitigation	
CDF: J\$5,000,000.00		Contributing Partner (Name)*: J\$	
TOTAL: J\$5,000,000.00			

**JUSTIFICATION:**

Education brings significant benefits to society, not only through higher employment opportunities and income, but also through enhanced skills, improved social status and access to networks. A large portion of the constituents are single mothers who are unable to fund the education of their children due to lack of resources. The volume of requests from the constituents for assistance with school fees, book vouchers, uniforms and school supplies exceeds that which we are able to satisfy. This project will go a far way in assisting parents to provide educational opportunities for their children.

**PURPOSE**

To provide financial assistance to parents who are in need, for the purpose of education

Project Scope	Activities	Outputs Or Short-Term Results	Outcomes Or Medium-Term Results	Impact Or Long-Term Results
To assist needy students at all levels of the education system with tuition, examination and other fees; books, uniforms and other related expenses.	Identify students needing financial assistance and evaluate the cost	Better attendance in schools	Higher rate of literacy	Higher level of productivity in the labour market
	Identify students needing tertiary assistance	Better output from schools	Less violence in Schools	Less crime in Jamaica
	Conduct needs assessment and shortlist applicants	Better exam results		Greater engagement in civic activities
	Recommend level of benefit to implementing agency	Improved quality of life		Increased employment rate
Monitor project				Higher life expectancy


Member of Parliament \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

MEASURABLE INDICATORS:	MEANS OF VERIFICATION:											
a. # of students receiving assistance	a). MP's records; Implementing agency's records & CDFFMU monitoring reports											
b). Increased attendance levels	b). School/College records											
c). Decrease in de-registration of tertiary students	c). As above											
DIRECT BENEFICIARIES:	BENEFITS TO BE DERIVED:											
A. Students within the constituency who are in need education assistance	A. Fees, education related needs satisfied											
B. As above	B. Ability to attend school regularly											
C. Parents	C. Financial and economic assistance											
D. Educational institutions	D. Increased registration and attendance											
KEY ASSUMPTIONS												
1. Students reside in the constituency and are in genuine need of assistance												
2. Educational institutions can verify registration												
3. Intervention will lead to intended positive outcomes												
IMPLEMENTER:												
Social Development Commission												
SUSTAINABILITY OF PROJECT (Operation & maintenance once project is completed)												
Responsible Institution:												
Origin of Resources:												
Approximate Annual Cost of Operation/Maintenance:												
DURATION OF THE ACTIVITIES OF BUDGET (Chronogram):												
Principal Activities:	Months											
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
See Page 1	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
DISTRIBUTION OF PROJECT COSTS												
Type of Cost	CDF		Community Contribution		Other Contribution		TOTAL					
	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%	\$					
Education Assistance	5,000,000.00						5,000,000.00					
TOTAL:	\$5,000,000.00						\$5,000,000.00					

# PUBLIC, PRIVATE, CLUB GOODS

- Public goods are defined as those goods and services where consumption by one individual does not reduce its availability to other individuals, and no one is excluded—they are ‘non-rivalrous’ and ‘non-excludable’ (Buchanan, 1965; Samuelson, 1954).
- Private goods are on the opposite spectrum, and are those goods and services where “consumption by one individual automatically reduces potential consumption other individuals by an equal amount” (Buchanan, 1965, p. 3). They are rival and excludable.
- Club goods are nonrival and excludable, that is, one individual’s use of the good does not prevent other individuals from its use (nonrival), and use of the good can be restricted (excludable). Club goods can be regulated by, for example, utilization of fees. Examples of club goods include swimming pools, golf courses, (See: Buchanan, 1965; Cornes & Sandler, 1996; Olson, 1965).

# JAMAICA: CDF & 'WELFARE' GOODS



“If you look at the [CDF] programme and you look at welfare, there is nothing in many constituencies that you can turn back and say over three years, we have spent \$45 million, and you can't see a stump standing up and say this represents CDF,” Munroe said during a CDF meeting at Gordon House on Tuesday” (Luton, 2014).

“Members of Parliament should not be limited particularly in inner-city constituencies where education, social housing and housing rehabilitation were the greatest needs” (Clerk of the Houses of Parliament, 2012)



# JAMAICA

## Question 1:

How do MPs spend their CDF monies? What are the determinants of the allocation of CDF monies to public, private and club goods?

## Hypothesis 1:

*MPs are likely to spend CDF monies on private and club goods than on public goods in their constituencies.*

# RESULTS: JAMAICA

## ■ Model:

Average Amount Spent per Public Goods Project 2011-2015<sub>c</sub> OR Average Amount Spent per Private Goods Project 2011-2015<sub>c</sub> OR Average Amount Spent per Club Goods Project 2011-2015<sub>c</sub>

$$\begin{aligned} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{MP Seniority}_c + \beta_2 \text{MP Sex}_c + \beta_3 \text{MP Party Affiliation}_c \\ &+ \beta_4 \text{Percentage of Households with Private Kitchen}_c \\ &+ \beta_5 \text{Percentage of Households with Private Bathroom}_c \\ &+ \beta_6 \text{Percentage of Households with a Flush Toilet}_c \\ &+ \beta_7 \text{Percentage of Households with Public Piped Water} \\ &+ \beta_9 \text{Percentage of Constituents with a High School Diploma}_c \\ &+ \beta_{10} \text{Party Stronghold}_c + \beta_{11} \text{Candidate Stronghold}_c \\ &+ \beta_{12} \text{Garrison Constituency}_c + \varepsilon_c \end{aligned}$$



# JAMAICA: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

## ■ MP Characteristics

- Fifty-five (of 63 MPs): male
- Forty-two (of 63) affiliated with the People's National Party
- Tenure:

Tenure	Count	Percentage
Cabinet Minister & Previous MP	17	26.98
Cabinet Minister & First Time MP	1	1.59
Minister of State & First Time MP	4	6.35
Minister of State & Previous MP	1	1.59
Previous Cabinet Minister & Previous MP	13	20.63
Previous Minister of State & Previous MP	2	3.17
Previous MP	9	14.29
First Time MP	16	25.4
Total	63	100

# JAMAICA: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

## ■ Political Characteristics

- Party stronghold: constituency in which the same party won every election for the previous five elections (see: Keefer & Khemani, 2009).
- Candidate stronghold: constituency in which the same candidate won every election for the previous five elections.

<b>Party Stronghold</b>	<b>Number of Constituencies</b>	<b>Candidate Stronghold</b>	<b>Number of Constituencies</b>
<b>Yes</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>No</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>54</b>
<b>Missing</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>Missing</b>	<b>3</b>

# JAMAICA: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

- Garrison constituencies: constituencies with a percentage of more than 75 percent voting for the individual (CAFFE, 1998).

Constituency	Party	Percentage of Votes won by candidate in 2011 Elections (%)
Kingston Eastern & Port Royal	PNP	83.0
Kingston Western	JLP	82.1
St. Andrew Southern	PNP	91.2
St. Andrew South Western	PNP	94.0
St. Catherine Central	JLP	75.7

# JAMAICA: PUBLIC GOODS

OLS  
Regression  
Results

## Determinants of CDF Spending on Public Goods and Services

Dependent Variable: Average Amount Spent per Public Goods Project 2011-2015c	OLS, Robust Standard Errors (in parentheses) ( *p value of 0.10, ** p value of 0.05, *** p value of 0.01)						
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
<b>Cabinet Minister + Previous MP</b>	-295491.5 (252237.7)			-174667.2 (242997)	-513345.7* (282489.2)		-332773.4 (271375.7)
<b>Cabinet Minister + First Time MP</b>	985237.9*** (143608.8)			745142.5 (664957.4)	652119*** (221344.3)		495713.1** (250996.8)
<b>Minister of State + Previous MP</b>	502532.8*** (143608.8)			810678.3 (669486.4)	606893.8*** (152469.7)		804080.9*** (213632.7)
<b>% HH Private Kitchen</b>		-86120.11*** (26337.2)		-81767.64** (32086.36)		-86964.89*** (26899.94)	-81558.33*** (30177.84)
<b>% HH Private Bathroom</b>		67763.38*** (17312.28)		61441.15*** (20749.28)		68960.53*** (17946.09)	62961.93*** (20792.46)
<b>% HH Flush Toilet</b>		15734.1* (7803.392)		16367.89* (9388.385)		17020.61** (7623.56)	15293.8 (8681.039)
<b>Average Age of Constituents</b>		-104895.7* (68199.54)		-115710.2* (66107.41)		-119435.2 (71183.15*)	-126422 (87824.68)
<b>Party Stronghold</b>			237677.6 (185521.2)		437479.9** (202166.4)	69697.11 (170175)	137609.1 (168919)
<b>Candidate Stronghold</b>			-614069.4** (257571.7)		-474505.2 (298703.8)	-511192.8** (237376.1)	-473821.4 (295840.9)
<b>N, R</b>	63, 0.17	63, 0.04	60, 0.09	63, 0.37	60, 0.24	60, 0.36	60, 0.45

# JAMAICA: PRIVATE GOODS

OLS  
Regression  
Results

## Determinants of CDF Spending on Private Goods and Services

Dependent Variable: Average Amount Spent per Private Good Project (JMD\$)	OLS, Robust Standard Errors (in parentheses) (*p value of 0.10, ** p value of 0.05, *** p value of 0.01)						
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Cabinet Minister + Previous MP	207989 (160542.7)			135748.8 (180729.5)	-18046.34 *** (207829.7)		-42007.48 (229403.3)
Cabinet Minister + First Time MP	-265860.1** (131161.5)			-76188.29 (181868.1)	-451906.9 (166441.5)		-330008 (227907.8)
Previous Minister of State + Previous MP	-\$1510050** (700487.6)			-1338887** (605085.7)	-1186763** (594334.8)		-118063.9** (570758.3)
% HH Private Bathroom		-18568.23*** (17312.28)		-29944.26 (19403.09)		-7614.599 (15942.09)	-22415.71 (17363.1)
Party Stronghold			321894.6** (141755.5)		272372.6** (159770.2)	352448.2** (151887.9)	376086** (177407.3)
Garrison Constituency			823150.9** (381659.5)		662616.9* (396401.1)	763749.7** (362556.2)	543630.6 (376236.7)
Constant	2429166 (467088.9)	21563.84 (2757600)	1782294 (80297.12)	3674862 (1811634)	2189946 (379771.1)	3285803 (2258583)	2319810 (1707159)
N, R	63, 0.28	63, 0.40	60, 0.28	63, 0.38	60, 0.47	60, 0.31	60, 0.49

# JAMAICA: CLUB GOODS

OLS  
Regression  
Results



## Determinants of CDF Spending on Club Goods and Services

Dependent Variable: Average Amount Spent per Club Good Project 2011-2015c	OLS, Robust Standard Errors (in parentheses) (*p value of 0.10, ** p value of 0.05, *** p value of 0.01)						
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Male	414770.3 (218819.2*)			376513.7 (267845)	522827.8* (282648.6)		578950.7 (338943.9)
Garrison Constituency			-102926.3 (408749.8)		174685 (435781.8)	498467.8 (310869)	741117.8* (431175.9)
Constant	521596.3 (393100.9)	420315 (2094625)	1102963 (113521.9)	395344.1 (2411420)	453890.7 (429106.8)	-169682.1 (2366005)	-661043.5 (2639052)
N, R	63, 0.06	63, 0.14	60, 0.03	63, 0.38	60, 0.10	60, 0.19	60, 0.49

# KENYA

## Research Question 1

How do MPs spend their CDF monies? What are the determinants of the allocation of CDF monies to public, private and club goods?

### Hypothesis 1:

*MPs are likely to spend CDF monies on private and club goods than on public goods in their constituencies.*

# RESULTS: KENYA

**“Our people believe in brick-and-mortar - in physical and quantitative growth as opposed to qualitative development..... When will we start using CDF money to start rural credit schemes? Have we thought about turning them into rural revolving funds? What will it take to wean us from the mentality of equating development with concrete” (Kisero, 2007).**

**“Key among the concerns being raised is over whether or not MPs can be fair in the distribution of resources in their own constituencies. "There is fear that MPs are either using this fund themselves or channelling it through their supporters, which is wrong," the official added.” (Onyango, 2004).**

**“The voters’ perception of an Mps responsibility is very high, a development that makes it difficult for Mps to deliver services to their electorate,” Mr Shikuku [late Kenyan MP] said.**

# RESULTS: KENYA

## Model:

Average Amount Spent per Public Goods Project 2002-2007<sub>c</sub> OR Average Amount Spent per Private Goods Project 2002-2007<sub>c</sub> OR Average Amount Spent per Club Goods Project 2002-2007<sub>c</sub>

$$\begin{aligned} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{ MP Sex } + \beta_2 \text{ MP Seniority }_c + \beta_3 \text{ MP \& President Party Affiliation }_c + \beta_4 \text{ Major Ethnic Group }_c \\ &+ \beta_5 \text{ Population Density }_c \\ &+ \beta_6 \text{ Percentage of Households with Zinc Roofed Houses }_c \\ &+ \beta_7 \text{ Percentage of Households with Water Source: Borehole }_c \\ &+ \beta_8 \text{ Percentage of Households with Waste Disposal: Bush Waste Disposal }_c \\ &+ \beta_9 \text{ Percentage of Households with Light Source: Lantern }_c \\ &+ \beta_{10} \text{ Poverty Incidence }_c \\ &+ \varepsilon_c \end{aligned}$$

# KENYA – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

## ■ MP Characteristics

- One hundred and ninety-two (of 202 MPs): male
- Tenure:

Tenure	Count	Percentage
Cabinet Minister & Previous MP	29	14.36%
Cabinet Minister & First Time MP	8	3.96%
Minister of State & First Time MP	15	7.43%
Minister of State & Previous MP	13	6.44%
Previous Cabinet Minister & Previous MP	10	4.95%
Previous Minister of State & Previous MP	3	1.49%
Previous MP	49	24.26%
First Time MP	75	37.13%
Total	202	100%

# KENYA – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

- Political Characteristics
  - Party Affiliation

Party	Count	Percentage
Ford Aisili (FORD-A)	2	0.99
Ford People (FORD-P)	14	6.93
Kenya Africa National Union (KANU)	62	30.69
National Rainbow Coalition (NARC)	119	58.91
SAFINA	2	0.99
Sisi Kwa Sisi (SKSP)	2	0.99
Shirikisho Party of Kenya (SPK)	1	0.5
Total	202	100

# KENYA – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

- Political Characteristics
  - Major Ethnic Groups by Constituency

Ethnic Group	Count	Percentage
Bajun	2	0.99
Boran	2	0.99
Cosmopolitan	13	6.44
Digo	3	1.49
Embu	2	0.99
Gabbra	1	0.5
Giriama	5	2.48
Kalenjin	25	12.38
Kamba	17	8.42
Kenyan Somali	11	5.45
Kikuyu	34	16.83
Kisii	10	4.95
Kurla	1	0.5
Luhya	24	11.88
Luo	19	9.41
Maasai	6	2.97
Mbeere	2	0.99
Meru	7	3.47
Orma	2	0.99
Pokomo	1	0.5
Pokot	3	1.49
Samburu	2	0.99
Taita	3	1.49
Taveta	1	0.5
Teso	1	0.5
Tharaka	2	0.99
Turkana	3	1.49
<b>Total</b>	<b>202</b>	<b>100.07</b>

# KENYA: PUBLIC GOODS

OLS  
Regression  
Results



Dependent Variable: Average Amount Spent per Public Goods Project - 2003-2007 (Coefficients expressed in '0000s)	OLS, Robust Standard Errors (In parentheses)						
	(*p value of 0.10, ** p value of 0.05, *** p value of 0.01)						
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
<b>Male</b>	523.577* (286.0857)			442.595* (252.9802)	373.2564 (272.3402)		430.0674 (262.2613)
<b>Boran</b>			-538.9088*** (159.3678)		-575.4038*** (184.492)	-749.8393** (274.8129)	-560.9006** (260.7662)
<b>Embu</b>			-266.297 (192.7693)		-352.3798* (181.0216)	-563.5186** (265.1081)	-412.6625** (185.3609)
<b>Kalenjin</b>			780.3324*** (254.9561)		741.6177*** (273.9205)	532.0363** (270.185)	680.5402** (279.218)
<b>Kamba</b>			469.3525*** (469.3525)		498.9359*** (182.8218)	101.0322 (314.4527)	518.8466*** (188.3116)
<b>Luhya</b>			2286.187*** (2286.187)		2282.666*** (457.3271)	1978.508*** (561.0362)	2322.908*** (484.6304)
<b>Luo</b>			572.922*** (215.2778)		570.4748** (232.6376)	262.1093 (361.4635)	658.8333*** (243.7017)
<b>Pokomo</b>			-356.9119** (149.4214)		-393.4069** (175.5529)	-431.2667* (239.5356)	-535.5524** (239.0197)
<b>Pokot</b>			1038.791** (421.6856)		1176.919** (466.4393)	852.5123* (487.4487)	1247.034** (500.8453)
<b>Teso</b>			3054.519*** (144.9801)		3022.787*** (179.0338)	3035.473*** (289.2163)	3278.742*** (309.4759)
<b>Tharaka</b>			964.956*** (339.0169)		1018.153*** (302.4445)	746.0076 (506.1196)	1227.61*** (338.5793)
<b>Population Density</b>		-0.0394931*** (.0145486)		-0.0284551* (.0160839)		-0.0138521 (-.0138521)	-0.0136781 (.02333060)
<b>Poverty Incidence</b>		21.60892 *** (4.442118)		22.01931*** (4.913604)		13.01846 (8.320514)	13.60254 (9.346359)
<b>Constant</b>	1811.058 (287.674)	971.7566 (438.2975)	1820.122 (149.4214)	505.7954 (588.8715)	1483.361 (332.9046)	1313.872 (497.2764)	-661043.5 (2639052)
<b>N, R-squared</b>	202, 0.02	202, 0.07	202, 0.42	200, 0.07	202, 0.42	200, 0.43	200, 0.43 <sup>41</sup>

# KENYA: PRIVATE GOODS

OLS  
Regression  
Results

## Determinants of CDF Spending on Private Goods and Services

Dependent Variable: Average Amount Spent per Private Goods Project 2003-2007 (Coefficients expressed in '0000s)	OLS, Robust Standard Errors (in parentheses) (*p value of 0.10, ** p value of 0.05, *** p value of 0.01)						
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
<b>Male</b>	74.1078*** (24.8254)			69.50173*** (26.52336)	72.08408*** (27.04829)		61.01135** (26.20804)
<b>Previous Minister of State + Previous MP</b>	-65.68385*** (24.60682)			-101.1059*** (29.03309)	-45.24206 * (26.649279)		-75.2038** (37.69462)
<b>Previous MP</b>	-42.69923* (23.6674)			-50.91635* (26.87253)	-53.33743* (28.11229)		-55.84092** (26.65279)
<b>Boran</b>			-81.36061 (41.71915)		38.95456** (46.41487)	-95.90825** (43.57921)	-120.3441** (46.99648)
<b>Gabbara</b>			-75.73561** (36.89867)		-90.68115** (41.91909)	-141.5501*** (48.78093)	-163.081*** (50.80347)
<b>Giriama</b>			234.2285*** (77.80144)		231.7143*** (79.84459)	199.7885** (99.19581)	199.9368* (104.9159)
<b>Luhya</b>			161.2939** (63.68135)		159.9965** (63.23901)	140.403** (67.3017)	140.0545** (69.7012)
<b>Maasai</b>			-53.3427** (23.93849)		-68.44974*** (26.02207)	-63.64605** (30.69238)	-82.56161*** (31.18103)
<b>Mbeere</b>			-74.22317*** (28.11611)		-63.45768** (32.57742)	-88.46698* (49.2303)	-82.70375* (45.57753)
<b>Meru</b>			-62.90659*** (22.33903)		-71.83253*** (25.89191)	-76.9821** (31.88602)	-85.90644** (37.31418)
<b>Taveta</b>			-79.48561** (36.89867)		-22.34707 (50.30388)	-130.0074*** (49.37426)	-81.29346 (72.15749)
<b>Teso</b>			74.35432*** (19.03358)		61.61351 (28.27356)	54.70842 (56.09325)	56.50989 (77.61284)
<b>Turkana</b>			-49.35603* (26.31276)		-9.494318 (29.97524)	-93.09474* (56.53436)	-45.57477 (64.10333)
<b>Poverty Incidence (%)</b>		1.638041** (.701032)		1.733416** (.7000217)		.9612038 (1.106393)	.9154208 (1.174402)
<b>Constant</b>	33.8594 (25.45115)	420315 (2094625)	106.9856 (36.89867)	-76.92206 (90.72284)	453890.7 (429106.8)	60.59033 (88.64498)	24.54288 (110.0949)
<b>N, R</b>	202, 0.03	200, 0.03	202, 0.22	200, 0.07	202, 0.25	200, 0.24	200, 0.2731

# KENYA: CLUB GOODS

OLS  
Regression  
Results

Dependent Variable: Average Amount Spent per Club Goods Project 2003-2007. (Coefficients expressed in '0000s).	OLS, Robust Standard Errors (In parentheses)						
	(*p value of 0.10, ** p value of 0.05, *** p value of 0.01)						
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
<b>Cabinet Minister + First Time MP</b>	42.01922** (10.4316)			-31.79913*** (12.18557)	-14.5862 (14.57743)		-19.26379 (14.42733)
<b>Bajun</b>			105.9867** (44.21718)		101.4429** (47.50239)	79.94743* (45.3545)	68.98872 (51.32798)
<b>Cosmopolitan</b>			77.76776** (36.67738)		70.70368** (33.94837)	38.80347 (44.78976)	27.6527 (42.28173)
<b>Embu</b>			-17.48357 (13.14851)		-17.4273 (16.62468)	-48.4463** (20.04756)	-53.49648** (25.28186)
<b>Kamba</b>			-18.04204 (9.142296)		-18.85335* (10.45372)	-56.74333** (28.43468)	-61.88472*** (23.05712)
<b>Luo</b>			-5.958917 (13.00566)		-9.748994 (14.21391)	-47.77647** (20.54807)	-56.9077** (24.3245)
<b>Maasai</b>			-17.78515 (11.38295)		-15.75872 (12.44901)	-34.52459** (14.18358)	-35.89119** (18.12038)
<b>Mbeere</b>			-18.44196** (8.844347)		-21.20343 (14.3158)	-61.50609*** (21.30724)	-72.98963** (30.42879)
<b>Orma</b>			-28.24844*** (8.204681)		-28.29474** (11.9751)	-40.85114*** (11.3256)	-44.92096*** (14.98667)
<b>Pokomo</b>			-25.8883*** (9.393468)		-27.71696** (11.58638)	-36.26598** (16.99557)	-37.77083** (16.07514)
<b>Population Density</b>		.0093026*** (.0023501)		.0090562*** (.0027905)		.0054184* (.0028471)	.0054091* (.0029279)
<b>Percentage of Households with Water Source: Borehole</b>		-.6027829** (.2344366)		-.6012845** (.2559074)		-.6660813** (.3052002)	-.7061749** (.3181355)
<b>Poverty Incidence (%)</b>		.7137571* (.3879514)		.7779036*** (.3399064)		1.405064** (.5366249)	1.578229** (.6659966)
<b>Constant</b>	62.45634 (40.41279)	30.41034 (34.03622)	25.8883 (9.393468)	42.3643 (43.22444)	453890.7 (429106.8)	13.22499 (40.25757)	29.32069 (54.74774)
<b>N, R</b>	202, 0.02	200, 0.12	200, 0.25	200, 0.13	202, 0.26	200, 0.32	200, 0.34

# CONCLUSION

	Public Goods	Private Goods	Club Goods
Jamaica	<p><b>MP Characteristics:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• MP Seniority</li> </ul> <p><b>Constituency Characteristics</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Private kitchen</li> <li>• Private bathroom</li> </ul>	<p><b>Political characteristics</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Party Stronghold</li> <li>• Garrison constituency</li> </ul>	<p><b>Political characteristics</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Garrison constituency</li> </ul>
Kenya	<p><b>Political characteristics</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ethnicity</li> </ul>	<p><b>MP Characteristics</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• MP Sex</li> <li>• MP Seniority</li> </ul> <p><b>Political Characteristics</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ethnicity</li> </ul>	<p><b>Political Characteristics</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ethnicity</li> </ul> <p><b>Constituency Characteristics</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Water source: borehole</li> <li>• Population Density</li> <li>• Poverty Incidence</li> </ul>



**THANK YOU!**

**Q & A**