Diverging identities

A model of class formation

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ABSTRACT

This paper is an application of Identity Economics to the social polarization between ‘Somewhere’ people and ‘Anywhere’ people posited by David Goodhart, and revealed in the votes for Brexit and Donald Trump. In a simple model, people rationally maximize their utility from esteem, by selecting a subjective salient identity which gears up the esteem generated by their choice from one of two objective identities: place and job. But as well as gearing up the esteem from the chosen identity, if people make different choices of salience this becomes a new attribute that divides the society. The model shows how an increase in wages for the upper half of the population can lead those with high incomes to switch from place to job as their salient identity. This rational switch in their choice of salience reduces aggregate utility and generates regressive transfers.

Keywords: identity; inequality; class formation; nationalism

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Diverging Identities: a Model of Class Formation

‘Actually there were only two forms of existence, I reflected: one that was tied to place and one that wasn’t.’

Karl Ove Knausgaard, Some Rain Must Fall (My Struggle, Vol 5)

1. Introduction

It is now a commonplace that people are becoming polarised into rival group identities to which they attach subjective importance, and which are believed to generate distinct behaviours (Chua, 2018; Goodhart, 2017; Williams, 2017). Goodhart has neatly encapsulated it into a new divide between ‘Somewhere’ people, whose identity is bound up with the place where they live, and whose norms tend to be reciprocity within the group; and ‘Anywhere’ people, whose identity is spatially detached, and whose norms tend to be individual rights. This is usually explained by invoking some dichotomous objective characteristic such as the level of education, which determines these rival subjective identities, and which directly explains why they are deemed important by those who hold them. However, such objective characteristics are not new, and in a previous era were not assigned much subjective significance. In this paper I apply and extend recent economic research on group identity to better understand what might be happening.

Economic research to incorporate group identity into behaviour, a line of work commonly termed ‘Identity Economics’, was pioneered by Akerlof and Kranton (2000). In their paper, subjective identification with a group directly entered the utility function and affected behaviour through the influence of group norms. Since 2000, the research has developed into two distinct branches: the processes by which subjective group identity is acquired; and the various channels by which, once acquired, it can influence the behaviour and utility of group members. While the agenda falls within Behavioural Economics, it is a distinct departure: its focus is on groups rather than individuals and, by definition, the behavioural effects it investigates vary between groups and so cannot be universal traits explicable by a socio-biological evolutionary process. They are in some sense ‘cultural’, albeit that in ordinary usage the term has wider connotations.1

The present paper shows how a society can become bifurcated into two subjectively significant ‘classes’ by a small change in the range of one continuous objective variable, (which can be thought of as income). I model a modest increase in income inequality that results in a rational subjective process of bifurcation into class identities. In turn, because these new identities affect utility, the change redistributes utility and can reduce it in aggregate. By demonstrating these consequences for utility, the model enhances our understanding of why longstanding objective characteristics have acquired new popular significance.

The paper also extends the research on Identity Economics by clarifying and incorporating two distinct types of subjectively important identity, both of which have featured in the literature, and both of which can confer utility. Some subjective identities are directly based on objective characteristics, such as ‘wage-earner’. Other subjective identities are defined not by the objective characteristics themselves, but by the observed difference in choices of salience that people make as between them. Thus, everyone has a job, and everyone lives in the same country, but if some choose to make their job salient and others choose to make their home salient, the society has divided into two new identity groups defined by these choices. As I will show, this distinction matters.

1 An association of economists, ERINN (Economic Research on Identity, Narratives and Norms), reflects this recent body of research.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I review the pertinent literature and relate it to the present paper. In the following three sections, I set out the model and derive the results of an exogenous change in the level and distribution of wages. In Section 6, I discuss possible extensions, including those suggested by features of some existing models that have been flagged in Section 2. Section 7 concludes.

2. The recent literature on group identity

A core idea of Identity Economics is that some objectively given identities of economic actors may generate utility for them. The mechanism can be direct, from a sense of belonging to a group. It may also be indirect, through two distinct channels. One is the esteem that may be conferred on the individual by others in the group. Typically, groups develop their own norms of behaviour, and by adapting behaviour so as to conform to these norms, individual members can generate esteem from the other members of the group and self-respect. The other channel is that membership of the group may confer esteem on all its members, bestowed by non-members. For example, a group may be regarded as prestigious by the entire society.

This expansion of the utility function to include belonging and esteem is as securely grounded in socio-biology as is the desire for consumption. The neurological instinct for the urge to belong is generated by the release of oxytocin. The original evolutionary advantage conferred by the release of oxytocin was to bond parents to their children, but this gradually became co-opted for the larger purpose of cooperation within a group (MacDonald and MacDonald, 2010). People naturally tend to identify with those other people with whom they share some similarities. The neurological instinct to seek the esteem of others is generated by the release of testosterone. Our sensitivity to esteem is acute: when humans meet, we detect differences in social rank within 1/25th of a second (Sapolsky, 2017).

In the pioneering model of Akerlof and Kranton (2000), the key idea was to recognize that people live in societies and so understand themselves and others as socially distinct, belonging to different groups. Thinking of oneself as a particular type of person, which is what they meant by ‘identity,’ comes with consequences: for a person to maintain her own self-image and to be valued as a member of the group, she has to behave in a certain way. Namely, a person has to comply with the social norms for behaviour. Different groups can have different criteria for judging behaviour, and people will need to learn them. Succinctly expressed, people want self-esteem and esteem of other group members, and hence need to comply with group norms. By putting this desire to follow the norms in the utility function, alongside consumption, the conventional economic assumption that rational behaviour implies utility maximization has a radical new implication. Rationally, a person may choose to have lower consumption in order to establish or maintain the desire to belong: we trade off consumption against esteem. Since different groups may be awarded different levels of esteem by non-members, this introduces a potential tension between the urge to belong, and the urge for esteem. In order to get esteem, people may be willing to attach themselves to prestigious groups with which they have less in common than less prestigious groups.

An important precursor to Akerlof and Kranton was Rotemberg (1994), who demonstrated the potential for the endogenous emergence of reciprocal altruism among rational, initially self-interested individuals. He pointed to a key problem in the emergence of such mutually beneficial reciprocal altruism; namely how a self-interested actor could credibly establish his altruism towards another actor. Rotemberg considered signalling actions such as observable and hard-to-fake body-language, and costly gifts. At the end of his article he even pointed to social networks as a neglected area for economic research on reciprocal altruism. In retrospect, he was reaching towards the missing concept of subjectively chosen identity. While such an identity can be abandoned, it is
analogous to an investment and so abandonment is costly (Benabou and Tirole, 2011). In effect, that act of choosing an identity is, among other things, the commit technology that Rotemberg was seeking. Consequently, shared subjective identity tends to predispose members towards each other.

In one of the first subsequent models, Bisin and Verdier (2001) focused on the process by which a group identity was acquired. Their model introduced two cultural identities, coexisting in the same society. Abstracting from esteem, they focused exclusively upon the direct contribution of identity to utility, studying its transmission between generations. Parents have one of two cultures. They get utility not only from their own identity but from the identity that their children adopt; crucially getting more utility if their children identify with the culture that they themselves have adopted. Children acquire their culture neither genetically, nor through a conscious rational choice, but through social interaction. This assumption is consistent with the social psychology literature which suggests that the capacity for rational thought does not develop until around the age of 14, whereas group identity is established earlier (Hood, 2014). The social interactions that Bisin and Verdier assume set identity are partly with their parents (‘direct’ transmission), and partly with other members of society (‘oblique’ transmission). Parents can spend resources on direct transmission, for example by occupying their children’s time by playing with them, rather than letting them watch television. Parents can also spend resources on oblique transmission, for example by buying a house in a catchment area that gives them access to a school that has children from their own culture. If parents do not do this, children still acquire a culture, simply through costless social interaction with other people. The culture they adopt as a result of social interactions reflects the cultures of those with whom they interact, this being determined by a random draw. This form of acculturation is costless and so, in effect, a public good.

Their key result is to show that if the two cultures both persist in the social equilibrium, (which they show is a feasible outcome), parents maximize their own utility in a way that reduces wellbeing in the society. Specifically, parents from each culture are driven to devote resources to direct and oblique cultural transmission, rather than leaving acculturation to the costless process provided by the public good. Some of this is a zero-sum game, since these parental efforts reduce the efficacy of the costless process for parents belonging to the other culture.

The Bisin-Verdier model is directly pertinent for the present paper. As in that model, I posit two co-existent cultural identities. Although in its basic form the new model does not include behaviour directed towards the inter-generational transmission of identity, it readily lends itself to this extension. Once inter-generational transmission is incorporated into it, it generates a highly specific and testable prediction about parental behaviour. In Section 6, I present clear quantitative evidence from Britain and America that is consistent with this prediction. Specifically, I show that in response to the wage shock that the present model analyses, within the newly emerging minority identity group there has indeed been a substantial increase in family resources devoted to both direct and oblique transmission. I outline the implications of this new behaviour for an additional layer of adverse effects on aggregate utility and its distribution. A further implication of their model, though one that they do not discuss, is that this social waste will be at its peak, ceteris paribus, if the society is equally split between the two cultures. This will also be considered in Section 6.

Chandra (2012) provides a considerably richer conceptual analysis of the evolution in group identities. Although his focus is on ethnic identity, which is not the subject of the present paper, the conceptual apparatus is more general. He and his co-authors make a fundamental distinction between ‘attributes’ and ‘categories’. The former are the objective characteristics which are the raw materials from which identity groups may be formed; the latter are subsets of these characteristics which are given psychological significance in a particular social context: they are the identity groups constructed by social entrepreneurs from these raw materials. Such a change in group identity for a given set of attributes is the subject of this paper. I model the choice of which of two attributes to
make subjectively salient: in the process, is this choice of salience is publicly observable, it becomes a new objective attribute. If people make different choices, the population consequently divides into two new, socially created categories.

Chandra considers five mechanisms by which a given set of attributes can be rearranged into changes in categories. One of the five mechanisms, ‘passing’, is particularly pertinent. By ‘passing’, Chandra refers to an attribute which is held by the members of two different groups, and so, if it becomes salient, permits someone from one group to be accepted as a member of the other group. An example of its use familiar in America would be ‘passing for white’. Chandra’s concept of ‘passing’ is pertinent, because it constrains the scope for rational actors to deceive themselves. They cannot internalize the idea that they are members of a group that rejects them as members. In the model presented below, the highest-paid workers create a prestigious new category which they make salient, deemphasizing their previous inclusive identity. There are two rules of acceptance into the group (which may be implicit, but are nevertheless well understood). One is that the choice of salience (which is observable) must be switched (from place to job): it is not permitted to claim job-salience while retaining place-salience. The other is that any member of the new group must be earning more than any non-member. Consequently, those who continue to make place-based identity salient cannot fool themselves into thinking that they share salient identity with this group: they can no longer ’pass’ for members of the same salience category. I impose this rationality constraint on the adoption of an identity in the model presented below.

Whereas Bisin and Verdier abstracted from esteem, two more recent models of identity make it central. Each sets the context as the formation of identity in school, which it models not as a random process of social interaction, (as in the Bisin-Verdier model), but as a rational choice of esteem-seeking behaviour. This is not a challenge to the assumptions of Bisin and Verdier. Models necessarily abstract from the complexities of reality in which people hold multiple identities, each subjectively significant in a social context. Bisin and Verdier model the primary acquisition of cultural identity, which is formed prior to rationality. The two models considered below focus on identities which carry differential prestige and so are reasonably regarded as the result of rational choice under constraints. For purposes of analytic tractability, each model again considers only two identities.

Eguia (2017) starts from the assumption that one identity is more prestigious than the other. This is a feature that was not pertinent for the Bisin and Verdier model, in which each cultural group values its own identity symmetrically more than that of the other group. In the Eguia model, some children come to the school with an elite identity acquired from their parents, while others come to it with the inferior identity, similarly acquired from their parents. Non-elite children wish to switch to the identity of elite children, and can do so, but only if elite children accept them as having elite identity. In the language of Chandra, they have to be able to ‘pass’. Children in the elite group admit those from the non-elite group selectively, screening them according to academic attainment. In turn, the academic performance of non-elite students is affected by the effort that they put into studying, this being an observable behaviour. Defection by high-effort members of the non-elite group further reduces the esteem generated by membership of that group. As a defensive reaction, those members of the non-elite group who are unwilling or unable to signal the required performance, punish would-be defectors: the behaviour sometimes stigmatised by non-elite African American children as ‘acting white’. As in the Bisin-Verdier model, these privately rational behaviours – the screening adopted by the elite group, the signalling of would-be entrants to the group, and their punishment by remaining members of the non-elite group – can in aggregate be socially costly.

In the present model, I adopt key features of the Eguia model. Members of the non-elite group wish to join the elite group, but to be accepted must make an observable sacrifice which only those best-placed to be members of the elite are rationally prepared to do. The choice is rational in two distinct
senses: it is determined by utility maximization, and it excludes the adoption of the identity by those who do not ‘pass’.

In a further model of the classroom, Robert Akerlof (2017) investigates a different response to exclusion from an elite group: the creation of a rival prestigious identity. Initially, all the children are in the same group, ‘Nerds’, whose norm is academic success. Reflecting the norm, they reward each other with esteem in proportion to academic success. As in the Aguia model, this is the result of effort and innate ability. But the children around the bottom of this hierarchy can choose to reject this identity and adopt another one in which they are able to be more successful: ‘Rockstar’. A sub-group of the class rationally defects from the ‘Nerd’ identity, and judges its members by a different set of criteria, thereby generating more esteem, and hence more utility. As in all models of identity, this privately rational esteem-seeking behaviour has consequences for both aggregate social welfare and its distribution that need not be benign.

In the model presented in this paper, I adopt from the Akerlof model this option of exiting an initially common identity to create a new identity that is superior for the group. Whereas in the above model it is those with the lowest esteem who exit, in the one presented below it is those who initially already enjoy the highest esteem. However, they exit for the same reason: by doing so they generate yet higher esteem.

The model that is closest to the model presented here, in that it has a similar context – a choice of identity between job and place - is Shoyo (2009). However, the assumptions, focus and behaviour analysed in the two models are interestingly different. Indeed, the two models lead to very different results. As in the present model, actors make a choice as to which of two objective identities they will make subjectively salient. In the Shoyo model this is ‘nation’ or ‘class’. Objectively, everyone is a member of the same nation, and one of two ‘classes’ – a minority elite class, or a majority non-elite class. In contrast to the present model which analyses the choice of each member of society, that of the Shoyo model focuses exclusively on the choice made by the majority class. Also, in contrast to the present model in which there is a continuum of wages across the society, and the size of each group is determined endogenously, in the Shoyo model there is a structural cliff in the wage distribution: all members of the elite class receive the same high wage and all members of the non-elite class receive the same low wage. Hence, the two class identities are objective facts defined by the height of the wage cliff. Within each class, all members are identical so that the dependent variable, which is the choice of salient identity of the non-elite class, yields all-or-nothing outcomes in which, at some critical threshold of the wage cliff, all members of the non-elite class switch their salient identity together.

If members of the non-elite opt to make their nationality salient, then they receive the esteem associated with the nation. If they opt to make their class salient they receive the esteem associated with their wage relative to that of the elite class. Finally, and critically, there is a feedback from these choices of identity to political outcomes. The setting is a democracy in which all public policy is set by the majority, which given the assumptions is the non-elite class. This is why the behaviour of the elite class can safely be left offstage: its choices have no consequence. By assumption, if the non-elite chooses to identify with the nation, the associated norms are less oppositional towards the elite than if it chooses to identify with its class, where the norms are more aggressively redistributive. The exogenous variation in the Shoyo model is the initial size of the wage cliff, and its key idea is that there can be multiple equilibria. With a wide wage cliff, the esteem from making class salient rather than nation is lower than if the wage cliff is narrow. But if the non-elite class makes nation salient then the wage cliff will indeed be wider because public policy will be less redistributive. Hence, it is possible, depending upon how rapidly class esteem declines as a function of a wider wage cliff, for there to be two locally stable equilibria: a narrow wage differential, class-based identity, and strong redistribution; and a wide wage differential, nation-based identity, and weak redistribution. By
construction, the utility that the non-elite gets from the combination of esteem and income is lower in the latter equilibrium and so it is collectively irrational for the non-elite to make this choice. However, it is explained by invoking the classic Marxist concept of ‘false consciousness’: the non-elite does not recognize this collective interest, which is in redistribution. False consciousness is the outcome of a Prisoners’ Dilemma, individually rational because it is esteem-maximizing. Shoyo presents data suggesting that this outcome of multiple equilibria is common.

Finally, the model of Besley and Persson (2016) fuses features of both the Bisin-Verdier and Shoyo models, combining inter-generational transmission of culture with a feedback onto political outcomes that generates multiple equilibria. As with the other models, it presents a dichotomous choice: people hold one of two political values, X or Y. Initially, both beliefs co-exist in the society in arbitrary proportions. People mate according to affinity of political belief and their children acquire their own beliefs from those of their parents. Occasionally, however, a belief mismatch occurs in a marriage. The child of X-Y parents then adopts the beliefs of whichever parent is the happier. The happiness of each parent depends upon whether their own beliefs coincide with those of the majority, since these will be the ones implemented in public policy. If the X value is initially in a small majority, the polity will adopt X-friendly policies, and so in X-Y marriages the X parent will be the happier. In consequence, the children of such marriages will themselves adopt X values, and so over time the X majority will grow larger. By entirely symmetrical reasoning, if the Y value is initially in a small majority, it too will grow larger over time: two such societies will diverge over time, amplifying the differences in their values.

In the present paper, the setting is a citizen in a society such as Britain or the USA. As with the other models, I consider a binary choice as to which of two objective identities – place and job – the citizen should choose to elevate by making it subjectively salient. I keep the set-up skeletal in order to bring out the implications as straightforwardly as possible.

3. The Set-Up

All actors each have two objective attributes which each contribute to identity: a spatial attribute identity by the nation in which they live, and an occupational identity given by their job. They all live in the same nation. They all have a job, but the income generated by the job differs. Actors get esteem from each attribute, and this esteem generates utility: the model abstracts from sources of utility other than esteem. Thus far, the model is structurally similar to that of Shoyo (2009). However, unlike the Shoyo model, each actor gets four distinct contributions to self-esteem from these two objective attributes.

The first source of esteem is from the objective attribute of living in the nation. This confers the same amount of esteem on each actor, denoted by the amount N. For example, this can be thought of as the esteem associated with the prestige or history of the nation.

The second source of esteem is from the job. The job confers a different amount of esteem on each actor, the variation depending upon their position in the distribution of wages. In contrast to the Shoyo model with its assumption of only two wage rates, I consider a continuous distribution of wages. This enables the model to have a marginal actor (‘the critical actor’) who is indifferent between the two possible choices of salient identity, to be explained below. In consequence, the size of each salience-defined group can be determined endogenously, rather than being exogenously imposed by the wage structure as in the Shoyo model. For tractability, I specify the wage distribution as uniform. Without loss of generality, I specify the esteem-utility generated by the wage, \( U_{Wv} \) as being linear in this wage ranking, minus a constant. The constant is set, for convenience, such that the lowest-ranked wage earner gets zero esteem for the objective attribute of his job, and the highest ranked gets W, with the median earner getting 0.5W:
\[ U_{W_i} = W \cdot r_i \]  \hspace{1cm} (1)

Where \( W \) denotes the utility generated by the highest wage, and \( r_i \) is unity for the highest-ranked wage, zero for the lowest-ranked, and linearly interpolated between them.

An attractive feature of this specification is that job esteem is not assumed to be a zero-sum game, but rather comes from the absolute level of achievement. In this case, the higher is productivity, and hence the wage, the higher is esteem. The expectation is therefore that an increase in productivity will increase aggregate wellbeing.

In addition to these objectively given sources of esteem, the actor has the scope for generating further utility by choosing to bestow subjective salience upon one or other of the objective attributes. That is, the actor can regard herself as first-and-foremost defined by job, or by place. As is apparent from the previous section, this move from objective attributes to a choice of subjective identity is standard in models of Identity Economics. For tractability, I specify the effect of bestowing salience on an attribute: whichever identity that the actor chooses to make salient doubles the potency of that identity, and so doubles the amount of utility generated by it. Consistent with individual rationality, in making this choice, the actor is assumed to maximise utility.

It might seem that this choice is a simple matter, with nationality being chosen if and only if \( N \geq W \cdot r_i \). However, in making this choice of salience, the actor generates a third objective attribute, and with it a new identity: membership of the group of people who have made the same choice of salience. One way of thinking of this is that it is a rudimentary form of subjective class formation. If all actors make the same choice of salience they all belong to the same class and so everyone gets the same utility from this identity. But if some choose place and others choose job, then the choice of salience divides the society into two classes, analogous to Goodhart’s ‘Somewheres’ and ‘Anywheres’, opening the possibility for differences in group esteem, akin to the Eguia model. For simplicity, I assume that the esteem generated by this group identity reflects the average within the group of the sum of the other three sources of esteem: nation, job, and the boost to whichever of them has had salience bestowed on it. This feature of the model is a significant innovation that contrasts with the Shoyo model. There, as in the present model, if the structurally determined low-wage class chooses to make nationality salient, they get the prestige associated with the nation. But unlike the present model, they appear not to notice that those earning high wages have adopted an identity that excludes them, so that perforce, in choosing to make the spatial attribute salient, they also have landed themselves with a less prestigious new identity. Yet in societies such as present-day Britain and the USA, the mutual polarisation of choices of salience is evident, as is the differing amounts of esteem they bestow. Combined with the endogeneity of group size, replacing that exogenously imposed by the assumption of a structural wage cliff, the model generates strikingly different results from those of the Shoyo model, despite the superficially similar characterisation. The present model does not refute the Shoyo model, but demonstrates the sensitivity of its results to its distinctive assumptions.

### 4. Class Formation

As set up, everything is determined by the relative values of \( W \) and \( N \). Whether the society is homogenous or divides into two classes depends upon the existence of a critical actor, \( c \). This \( c \)-th actor is defined as being indifferent between making place or job salient. If there is a critical actor, then all actors in more prestigious jobs, for whom \( r_i > r_c \), will make their job salient, and all actors in less prestigious jobs, for whom \( r_i < r_c \), will make their nationality salient.

The \( c \)-th actor faces the following choice.
If nationality is made salient then utility will be generated from the following four sources:

The objective component of national identity, $N$

The objective component of her job, $W_r$

The boost conferred directly by place-salience, $N$

The esteem generated by membership of the class of those who make nationality salient, which is the average of its three components:

$$\frac{2N + (W_r/2)}{3}$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)

The term in (.) denotes the contribution of average job esteem generated in the group, which is uniformly distributed on the range from $W_r$ to zero.

So that total esteem is:

$$2N + W_r + \frac{2N + (W_r/2)}{3}$$  \hspace{1cm} (3)

If, instead, the c-th actor makes her job salient, then utility from the four sources will be generated as follows:

The objective component of national identity, $N$

The objective component of her job, $W_r$

The boost conferred directly by salience is $W_r$

The esteem generated by membership of the class of those who make their job salient, which is:

$$\frac{N + W + W_r}{3}$$  \hspace{1cm} (4)

So that total esteem is:

$$N + 2W_r + \frac{N + W + W_r}{3}$$  \hspace{1cm} (5)

Since the critical actor is indifferent, these four components must sum to the same amount for each choice. Hence:

$$2N + W_r + \frac{2N + (W_r/2)}{3} = N + 2W_r + \frac{N + W + W_r}{3}$$  \hspace{1cm} (6)

Rearranging:

$$r_c = \frac{(8N/W) - 2}{7}$$  \hspace{1cm} (7)

Consider the situation in which the esteem from national identity is so high that even that from the highest remunerated job only just equals it, so that $W = N$. Even in this case the society divides into two classes. On the specific numbers, $r_c = 6/7$, so that the top-earning seventh of the society chooses to make their job their salient identity. In making this choice all but the top-earning worker actually get less esteem from their job than from their national identity and so their choice directly generates an avoidable average loss. For the average worker making this choice, the loss is the simple average of the $N/7$ loss of the critical actor, and the breakeven of the most highly paid worker: hence, it is $N/14$. Yet the choice is rational because, by identifying with the elite class, they get a larger compensating gain. But both the offset loss and the net gain are entirely at the expense of those who do not change their salient identity.
For the critical actor, since by definition she makes no compensating gain in esteem from switching class, this loss is N/7 as before. Since the loss of esteem is the same for all actors in the class, this is the loss for each of them. Summing the consequences, for 6/7ths of the population there is a per capita loss of N/7, whereas for one seventh of the population there is a gain of N/14. Hence, there is a per capita average net loss of 11N/98, or approximately N/9. Were we to switch from Utilitarian to Rawlsian ethics in which the society is judged by the circumstances of the least advantaged group, the welfare loss would be judged far more serious because the losses are being borne exclusively by this group. This is an inefficient transfer from the disadvantaged to the advantaged. In contrast to the Shoyo model, it is driven not by the ‘false consciousness’ of the low-wage majority in choosing to make nationality salient, but by the entirely rational, self-serving decision of the highest wage earners in abandoning their national identity in favour of making their job salient. A corollary is that from the perspective of the elite class, the low-wage class is now indeed distinctively ‘nationalistic’.

Note that the potential tension between the psychology of belonging – the desire to identify with those similar to oneself; and the psychology of esteem – the desire to associate with those better than oneself, is not an issue in this set-up. As in the Aguia model, those who join the job-salient group are as similar to each other as possible: they are defined by their high rank. The critical (indifferent) actor is equally similar to her neighbours in the ranking, each of whom rationally opt for different groups.

5. Comparative Statics

Having seen the simple mechanics of the model, I now apply it to two types of social change, using comparative statics. The first is the consequences of a decline in the objective esteem generated by identifying with the nation; the second is a rise in productivity and wages for the upper half of the workforce.

**A decline in national prestige**

The prestige of a nation can change: it might win or lose a war; or gain or lose an empire. For example, in the USA, the post-1945 generation could take pride in a massive military victory, whereas the post-1968 generation was embarrassed by mounting military defeat in Vietnam. This change can be represented by a decline in the value of N. The previous analysis readily adapts to portray the comparative statics of such a situation. If the value of N is initially ≥ 9/8 then there is no class formation: everyone chooses to make national identity salient. We have already seen that if it drops from this value to unity, class formation occurs. The only addition introduced by the comparative statics is that there is a loss of esteem for everyone of 2ΔN, which is then reduced for those who switch salience, and compounded for those who do not, each by the redistributions already discussed.

**An increase in the productivity of high wage earners**

Reverting to national prestige as a constant, I now consider the consequences of an objective increase in wage inequality such as has occurred in most OECD societies during the past 40 years. I begin from a situation in which wage inequality is sufficiently modest that the society is cohesive: everyone chooses to make their nationality their salient identity. Given the parameters of the model this occurs as long as N/W ≥ 9/8, and for specificity I assume that this condition holds as an equality.

Now suppose that wage inequality, and the dispersion of esteem associated with the job, increases. To mimic the increased wage inequality that has been common, while retaining the simplicity of the model, I assume that below median income, wages remain unaltered. Above the median, wages increase in proportion to the excess of income over median income: specifically, I will assume that
this premium over the median doubles. This is a crude characterisation of the stylized facts: median income has stagnated, while wages above the mean have increased substantially. The specificity of the example enables us to generate precise consequences for each of four different groups in the society, showing both the overall change in efficiency, (the absolute amount of wellbeing in the society), and its distribution. The price that is paid is merely some tedious arithmetic.

For all those with incomes above the median, esteem is now given by:

$$W(2r - \frac{1}{2})$$  \hspace{1cm} (8)

The first group constitutes the highest earning 18.25 percent of the workforce. This is the group with a direct incentive to switch their choice of salience, since now that the wage premium for those above-median income has doubled, for them, $W \geq N$. Beyond this point, switchers take a direct hit, which for the critical actor will be $N - Wr_c$. For the switch to be rational, this must be compensated by an offsetting gain from the difference in esteem between the two classes.

If the critical actor chooses to make nationality salient, (and $1 > r_c > \frac{1}{2}$), total esteem is:

$$2N + (2Wr_c - \frac{1}{2}) + [2N + 9r_c/8 - \frac{1}{4}W]\] \hspace{1cm} (9)$$

which simplifies to:

$$\frac{9N}{3} + 19Wr_c/8 - 2W/3$$  \hspace{1cm} (10)

If instead, the critical actor chooses to make the job salient, total esteem is (after simplification):

$$\frac{4N}{3} + 14Wr_c/3 - 2W/3$$  \hspace{1cm} (11)

Setting (10) = (11), (the equivalent of (6) above), and solving:

$$r_c = (32/55)(N/W).$$  \hspace{1cm} (12)

Normalising on $W$ and recalling that $N = 9W/8$, this yields $r_c = 0.6545$. Hence, overall, slightly over a third of the population, 34.55 per cent, now makes their job their salient identity. Of these, 16.3 per cent of the population constitute the second group: people who are switching their choice of salience despite directly gaining less esteem from their job, even with its higher productivity, than they get from place. They switch because of the greater esteem from being associated with the group that chooses to make their job salient.

The increase in productivity produces a direct gain in esteem, and indirect effects from the changes in the choice of salience. Recall that esteem is not assumed to be a zero-sum game: if a worker becomes more productive, her esteem goes up correspondingly, and there is no counterpart direct loss of esteem inflicted on workers whose productivity has not altered. To avoid biasing the utility consequences of an increase in productivity downwards, esteem is not modelled as a zero-sum game in status. In the present example, since half of the workforce experiences a substantial average productivity increase of 25 per cent, averaged over the entire population the direct gain in esteem is 0.125.

However, this direct gain is offset by indirect losses resulting from the decisions to switch salience. For the critical worker who chooses to switch identity from national to job, $W = 0.809$, whereas $N = 1.125$. She is therefore getting a gain in esteem from the objective attribute of the productivity of her job of 0.1545, but a loss from salience of 0.316. Were she not to switch salience, she would still get
the gain in esteem from the objective attribute of job productivity of 0.1545, but suffer no loss from her choice of salience. Hence, for her to be rationally indifferent about the switch, the gain in esteem from membership of the new class rather than remaining in her former class must equal 0.316.

Where does this difference in class esteem come from? We know that if the critical actor does not switch salience, there is no change in the esteem generated by the objective attribute of residence in the nation, nor is there any change from her choice of salience, enabling the attribute of nation to confer an additional subjective esteem. The esteem from the attribute of job productivity is also the same regardless of salience. The big difference made by remaining with nationality as salient comes from class esteem. Recall that this depends upon the average esteem among members of the group, of what is generated by their nationality, job, and salience, (each weighted by one third). The esteem for the average member of the class from nationality as an attribute is the same regardless of the choice of class, but that from job productivity is now radically different. Having chosen nationality, the average for the group is only 0.2683.\(^2\) If, instead, the critical actor had chosen job, the average for the group is 1.66.\(^3\) Hence the difference in the contribution of esteem from job productivity to class esteem is 1.392/3 = 0.464. This is what is making the difference. This large opportunity cost of persisting with nationality is partially offset by the larger contribution made directly by salience, to bring the net loss to 0.316.

To see the overall effect on wellbeing, we can aggregate these four distinct groups of the population. The top 18.25 per cent of wage earners end up with a considerable average gain. Their average earnings, and hence their esteem from job productivity, rise by 0.41. They have no change in esteem from nation as an attribute, and they make a direct gain from switching salience of 0.375/2 = 0.19. Their absolute gain from their new class identity is the average of the absolute gain for the class of those who switch salience. To work this out, we first need to calculate the effects on the other component of the new class. As we will see, it is 0.11. Summing the four components of esteem, the top group gets a hefty absolute increase in esteem of 0.71.

Now consider the remaining 16.3 percent of the population who switch salience, who switch despite getting more esteem from the nation than their job. Their gain in esteem from job productivity as an attribute averages 0.24. Their esteem from nation as an attribute is unchanged, and they make an average direct loss from switching salience of -0.16. The average change in the esteem from the new class identity is the weighted average of the two classes from each of the three direct sources of esteem. So, the average gain for the class from the attribute of job productivity is 0.32; and from the change in salience is a tiny 0.02, with no change in that from nationality. Hence, the absolute change in esteem from class increases by 0.34/3 = 0.11. Again summing the four components, the net gain for this group is 0.19.

The next group is the remaining 15.45 per cent of the population for whom productivity increases but salience is not switched. For them, the increase in esteem from the attribute of job productivity averages 0.04. The contributions of nationality are unchanged. Prior to the increase in wages for the upper half of the population, they were in the same class as everyone else, and received the reflected glory of average productivity of 0.5. Now, the average productivity of their class has fallen to 0.26, the slight increase from the unchanged average productivity of the bottom half of the population, with whom they have chosen to remain in the same class, being due to the small increase in that of their own productivity. Hence, they get a loss of esteem from the productivity of the class of 0.24, weighted by one third, namely -0.08. Summing the four components of esteem, the absolute change for this group is -0.04.

\(^2\) 0.25 + \{0.07725.\[1 – (15.25/65.25)]\}\)
\(^3\) (1.5 + 0.809)/2
The final group is the remaining 50 per cent of the population for whom nothing changes except the contribution of class identity. In absolute terms only one component of this changes, namely the esteem from the attribute of job productivity of the class. Prior to the increase in wages for the upper half of the population, they were in the same class as everyone else, and received the reflected glory of average productivity of 0.5. Now, the average productivity of their class has fallen to 0.26, the slight increase from their own unchanged average productivity being due to the small increase in that of the third group. Hence, they get a loss of esteem from the productivity of the class of 0.24, weighted by one third, namely -0.08. For this bottom group, the absolute change in esteem is simply this last component, -0.08.

Weighting each of these effects by the shares of the four groups in the population, the total increase in the esteem of the population is 0.12. In comparison, were the society to remain united, the absolute gain in esteem would be 0.17. To put this in perspective, the initial level of aggregate esteem, summed over the four components, is 3.75.

Pulling this together, nearly 30 per cent of the potential gains in the total esteem of the population from the rise in productivity have been dissipated because the most productive third of the population has chosen to withdraw from shared identity. In doing so, an elite of less than a fifth of the population has captured more than the entire increase in total esteem, gaining almost as much from switching its identity as it does from the direct contribution of the additional pride in its higher productivity. The remaining fourth-fifths of the population in aggregate suffers a small absolute loss in esteem, despite some of its members getting enhanced pride from their own increase in productivity. The switch in the salient identity of the most productive thus substantially enhances their own wellbeing at the expense both of everyone else and of national wellbeing.

Note that far from the assumptions of the model being stacked in favour of finding that an increase in wage inequality inevitably produces a loss of esteem among the less productive, it assumes that even those who are left out of the increase in productivity are willing to get an increase in their own esteem from the reflected pride of association with those who have become more productive. Far from assuming envy, the model assumes a generous disposition to enjoy, vicariously, the success of others. It is the successful who block this by setting themselves apart and denying shared identity.

In the Shoyo model, an increase in wage inequality induces those with low wages to switch their identity from job to place; in the present model, it induces them to retain their identity with place. In each case the motivation is individual esteem-maximization. But there are two important structural differences between the models. Whereas in the Shoyo model it is the low-wage who change their identity to join the same club as the high-waged, in the present model it is the high-wage who change their identity in order to exit the common club. And whereas in the Shoyo model the low-wage are able to join the common club by adopting place as their identity, in the present model, although they share the same objective attribute of nationality with the high-wage, the differentiation of salience-defined identities excludes them from the club of the high-wage.

6. Extensions

I now consider possible extensions of the model, some evident from the model as currently set up, and some taken from the literature discussed in Section 2.

Class esteem as endogenous

In the above model, each of the four components of esteem, nationality, job, salience and class, is given equal weight: while the values of each component have changed, the weights on these values have been constant. Here I revisit the assumption that the weight on class is exogenous. A possible
way in which the weight on class might be endogenous is for it to depend upon the difference in esteem between the classes. Arguably, the larger is this difference in esteem, the more salient does class itself become, as distinct from nation or work. The fundamental equation, (6), would be modified by the addition of a term $\beta$:

$$2N + W.r_c + \beta[2N + (W.r_c/2)]/3 = N + 2W.r_c + \beta[N + W + W.r_c]/3$$

(11)

$\beta$ would itself be an increasing function of the difference in group esteem:

$$[N + W + W.r_c] - [2N + (W.r_c/2)].$$

(12)

The consequence of this extension is straightforward: for any of the exogenous changes considered above, it amplifies the size of the resulting switch in salience. The exogenous changes, such as a reduction in national prestige, increase the esteem gap as set out in (12), and this in turn now increases $\beta$, reducing $r_c$ as implied by the change in (11), so that more people switch their choice of salience. Hence, the assumption of equal and exogenous weights has likely biased downwards both the efficiency and distributional consequences discussed.

**Inter-generational transmission**

Now consider how the behavioural and normative implications of incorporating the Bisin-Verdier model of inter-generational transmission into the present set-up. In the present set-up the cultural trait to be transmitted between generations is the choice of salience. In the initial equilibrium, everyone makes the same choice and so all parents will rationally leave transmission to the costless public good of random social interaction. As a result of the increase in wage inequality, the equilibrium changes, with the top third of the population adopting the new trait of making their high-paying job salient. This group then becomes the cultural minority in the Bisin-Verdier model, with the clear prediction that it would start to invest in the two costly channels of cultural transmission: more intensive parental interaction with their children, and greater control of social interaction, reducing child contact with the majority group. The key prediction is that this would not become a general trait across the entire society: the increased effort by the minority would be distinctive, albeit possibly inducing a smaller defensive increase in effort by the majority.

This is a testable proposition and it is fully consistent with the evidence on the change in child-rearing practices between the high-wage ‘anywheres’ and the rest of the population. In Britain, both groups of parents have increased their hours of interaction with their children since the time when the dispersion of wages was narrower, but the increase has been dramatically larger in educated households (Wolf, 2013; Sullivan and Gershuny, 2012). Putnam (2016) provides an extensive array of equivalent evidence for America. The new job-salient class is investing far more household resources in direct transmission than the previous generation of those earning relatively high wages. It is also investing far more in indirect transmission. As Putnam shows, differences in schools are less significant than might be imagined in respect of their function - the acquisition of cognitive knowledge - but more significant as sites for social interaction between children. The key channel for oblique transmission is the purchase of housing within the catchment area of a school. By diverting expenditure into housing, high-class parents have reduced the social interaction of their children with low-class children.

The Bisin-Verdier model provides a ready mapping from this change in behaviour to the normative implications: the reduced reliance upon the public good of random social interaction is socially wasteful. Further, as wage inequality increases, the size of the minority increases. While there were evidently many influences on both the Brexit and Trump votes, they can reasonably be interpreted as
crude proxies for the current size of the two cultural identities (job-salient, and place-salient). Each society has been revealed as being divided down the middle. In the Bisin-Verdier model, this is the peak level of social inefficiency at which both classes are driven into large direct and oblique expenditures on cultural transmission.

**Endogenous altruism**

In the basic model, all actors might be considered ‘weakly altruistic’, in the sense of getting some utility from the wellbeing of the average member of the group with which they subjectively identify, while being indifferent to the wellbeing of other members of the society. This pro-sociality to other members of the group is consistent with the notion of ‘belonging’ and the theory of in-group reciprocity set out by Rotemberg (1994). That the choice of group is rationally based on individual utility maximization is not in tension with this characterization. Those who opt into the job-salient group still value belonging to that group, and hence, are weakly altruistic towards its other members. However, the model could readily be refined to introduce different degrees of pro-sociality for members of the two groups: for example, those in wage-salient group might adopt a package of beliefs that espouse self-fulfilment, and other forms of selfishness, over all forms of care for others.\(^4\)

Williams (2017) cites evidence for such a divergence of values in America. The distinctive dimensions of morality regarded as most salient by ordinary workers are ‘protecting’, ‘interpersonal altruism’, and sincerity; among the professional class, while none of these is salient, the distinctive addition is ‘self-actualization’. If the switch of high-earners to job-salience were part of such a wider switch to a new package of beliefs, it would tend to reduce the incentive for those who would directly lose from switching salience, \((N>W.r)\), because they would value less the offsetting gain of joining the elite group.

A further possibility is that the two salience groups develop oppositional identities in which indifference to the wellbeing of members of the other group degenerates into gaining pleasure from harming them. Hjort (2014) demonstrates a social context in which this appears to have happened. I now turn to the political consequences of changes in identities, where such a change would have clear and adverse implications.

**Endogenous politics**

Both the Shoyo and Besley-Persson models incorporate the consequences of changes in identity for politically-set public policies. Whereas in the Shoyo model, the attachment of the low-wage class to nationality rather than class results in policy change that reduces income redistribution, in the present model the change in identity comes from the abandonment of shared salient identity in place by the elite class. This is the process characterized and documented in Britain by Goodhart (2017) as the emergence of elite ‘Anywhere’ people. Rueda (2017) and Munoz and Pardos-Prado (2017) analyse the political implications of a rejection of shared identity by the elite. Using different empirical methodologies – survey evidence versus lab experiments in framing choices – they each find that such rejection reduces the willingness of above-median earners to pay taxes for redistribution to below-median earners. On this interpretation, the observed reduction in political support for redistribution is due not to the increase in ‘nationalism’ among the low-wage class, as argued by Shoyo, but to the rejection of shared place-based identity by elite wage earners, as modelled in this paper. In the Shoyo model, the poor majority automatically gets its way in policy-setting. The present paper recognizes the possibility that even in democracies elites may be disproportionately influential. Thus, there are potentially two distinct political routes to redistribution, a ‘class war’ in which the poor are victorious, as envisaged by Shoyo; and an

\(^4\) I discuss this concept of belief packages in the context of the defection of elite wage-earners to job-salience in Collier (2018).
equilibrium of reciprocal altruism dependent upon social cohesion, (as analysed by Rotemberg (1994)), which is secured by the commitment technology of shared salient identity. Shoyo interprets the exceptionally equal income distribution of Scandinavia as evidence of the former, but it might equally be interpreted as evidence of the latter. Similarly, the rise of nationalism might not reflect stronger identification with place by non-elite workers, but their imposed new distinctive identity of place-salience, in consequence of the switch of salient identity by the elite. This highlights the importance of distinguishing between the inclusive-by-definition objective attribute of place, (which I have assumed confers some utility on everyone), and the contingently inclusive acquired attribute of choice-of-salience. As these new divisions in salience-identity have hardened into oppositional identities, ‘nationalism’ as measured in surveys, may well have increased despite a decline in the proportion of the population identifying with place. Existing survey data on identity are problematic since when an identity is universally shared, it is less prominent in survey responses. In the present state of the empirical evidence, neither interpretation can be decisively rejected and new data, explicitly designed to distinguish between them, is probably necessary.\footnote{I would like to thank the psephologist Steven Fisher for this point.}

7. Conclusion

It is no longer controversial for an economic model of behaviour to incorporate both choices of identity and the esteem generated by that choice. In this paper, I have combined objectively determined identities of place and job, with a choice as to which of them should be made subjectively salient. This choice itself potentially creates a cleavage between those who choose place and those who choose job, which gives rise to a further difference in esteem: in effect, the model endogenizes the new widely noted class formation discussed by Chua, (2018) and Williams (2017) for America, and by Goodhart (2017) for Britain. What the model brings to the analysis are three results that are arguably non-obvious. First, a small change in the distribution of a continuous variable can produce bifurcation into group identities. Second, such a change has both efficiency and distributional effects. Third, while these effects are generated by privately optimizing behaviour, on a conventional Utilitarian metric both are adverse: there is an overall loss of efficiency, compounded by a regressive redistribution.
References:


Rueda, D. 2017, Food comes first, then morals, redistribution preferences, parochial altruism and immigration in Western Europe, *Journal of Politics*. 

