

When Does Transparency Improve Public Goods Provision? Street-level Discretion, Targetability, and Local Public Service Delivery

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- What is the role of transparency in explaining such differences?

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- Increased government transparency widely expected to improve the quality of public service delivery: derived from the logic of PA theory: reduces information asymmetries and allows for monitoring
- Empirical findings on effects of transparency on improved access to service delivery are surprisingly mixed (Joshi 2013; Bauhr and Grimes 2014; Chong et al 2015; Malesky et al 2012; Björkman and Svensson 2012; Keefer and Khemani 2012; Fox 2015)

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- Transparency may redress these information asymmetries

Hypothesis

Transparency has a stronger effect on the quality of service provision in sectors where street level discretion is high than in sectors where street level discretion is lower

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
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- Commune level fixed effects regressions (and pooled OLS regressions)


Vietnam Provinces




Vietnam Provinces and Communes



Vietnam Population (2015 WorldPop)



Vietnam Night Lights (2013)



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- Suggestive evidence in favor of our hypothesis that effects of transparency are conditional on degree of street-level discretion

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- *Your suggestions??*